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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Conflict and Environment in North Lebanon: Vulnerability in 
a Volatile Socio-Political Context 
Irna van der Molen and Nora Stel 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter constitutes the introduction to our edited 
volume. It offers an overarching conceptual framework on 
vulnerability revolving around the notions of exposure, sensitivity 
and resilience. Drawing out the overlaps and tensions between the 
various chapters making up the book, this chapter provides a 
tentative conceptual linkage between vulnerability and political 
economy, asking where and how political fragility and 
institutional hybridity affect vulnerability. 
Keywords: Conflict, environment, vulnerability, political 
economy 
 
 
1. WHAT IS AT STAKE? ISSUES AND CONCEPTS 
Conflict and the natural environment are closely linked. Homer-
Dixon’s work (1994, 2001) has been instrumental in staging a 
lively academic debate on the question whether, to what extent, 
under what conditions and in what way(s) natural resource 
scarcity contributes to armed conflict. The discourse on the 
relation between environment and war, or environment and 
security, has been further added to by studies on the ‘resource 
curse’, where the abundance and lootability of natural or mineral 
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resources were said to cause conflict, rather than its scarcity 
(LeBillon, 2001, 2012; Bannon and Collier, 2003; Collier, 2010).  
 Lebanon’s recent history and current socio-political climate 
are volatile and conflict-ridden. The 1975-1990 Civil War left 
many scars and the ‘post-war’ period has been characterized by an 
almost ceaseless sequence of clashes, attacks, assassinations and 
bombings. North Lebanon has known its own trajectory of 
conflict, including the infamous clashes between the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF) and militants in the Nahr al-Bared 
Palestinian refugee camp in 2007 and the recent sectarian clashes 
in Tripoli flaring up as a proxy to the Syrian war.
1
 These violent 
conflicts have left their marks in various ways, ranging from 
psychological trauma (Gannagé, 2012a, 2012b; Khamis, 2012), 
social fragmentation (Choueiri, 2007) and economic deprivation 
(Salti and Chabaan, 2010; Acra and Acra, 2006) to political 
marginalization (Volk, 2009).  
Less well-known, but certainly not less substantial, have 
been the effects of armed conflicts on North Lebanon’s natural 
environment. These effects are often direct, as is the case with, for 
instance, war-related debris, coastal and groundwater 
contamination as well as land pollution as a result from oil spills 
after the Israeli War on Lebanon in 2006. Other direct impacts 
were land degradation, people’s displacement, and major 
infrastructural damage. Apart from such direct environmental 
damage, Lebanon’s repeated episodes of violence2 have had a 
more indirect effect on the natural environment as well. Repeated 
                                                          
1
 In the empirical chapters, the authors specifically focus on three episodes of 
violent conflict: Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon; the 2006 War between 
Israel War on Lebanon; and the 2007 Nahr al-Bared clashes. 
2
 When we talk of ‘repeated episodes of armed conflict’, we refer to various 
episodes of conflicts of a different nature, not to a repetition of one conflict in 
the same area, with the same conflicting parties and about the same conflict 
issues. 
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episodes of armed conflict have affected the ways in which 
agriculture, fishery, industries, tourism and water and waste 
sectors are governed and regulated. Lack of regulation and 
enforcement results in soil erosion, depletion of underground 
water resources, pollution from pesticides, fertilizers and 
agricultural by-products and seawater contamination from 
unregulated industrial waste disposal (Integrated Management of 
East Mediterranean Coastlines Program (IMAC), 2007b). 
In this book, we explore these direct and indirect impacts of 
violent conflict on North Lebanon’s natural environment and their 
effects on the livelihoods of the population of North Lebanon. We 
do so through a series of stand-alone studies. All studies, 
however, draw on an analytical framework revolving around the 
concept of vulnerabilities, on which we further elaborate below. 
The starting point for the research program ‘Conflict and 
Environment in North-Lebanon’ has been the vulnerability 
framework by Turner et al. (2003:8075), without, however, the 
intention to “develop appropriate metrics and measures for 
assessments, models and tests”, and without the illusion we would 
be able to quantify “the stochastic and non-linear elements 
operating on and within the coupled system.”  
When we define vulnerability as the susceptibility of 
particular communities or systems to specific risks and hazards 
(Turner et al., 2003),
3
 three components are essential in the 
analysis: exposure (the extent to which a human or biophysical 
system is confronted with the risk or hazard in question, here: 
violent conflict); sensitivity (the likely damage the conflict will do 
to these systems); and resilience (the coping or response 
                                                          
3
 Turner et al. (2003:8074) define vulnerability as: “The degree to which a 
system, subsystem or system component is likely to experience harm due to 
exposure to a hazard, either a perturbation or stress/stressor.” For an overview 
of different approaches, definitions and analytical frameworks of vulnerability, 
see Birkmann (2006) and Wisner et al. (2004). 
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mechanisms available to the systems to mitigate the impacts of 
conflict).  
Although it seems difficult to measure exposure of an area 
to armed conflict, we argue that some areas in Lebanon were more 
affected by armed conflict than others, depending on the 
proximity to borders (with Syria, Israel); polarization among the 
population (resulting in sectarian violence), the history of violence 
in the area; the proximity to refugee camps – specifically the Nahr 
el-Bared camp in Tripoli and the Ain el-Hilweh camp in Saida, 
and the influx of refugees. Similarly, not all municipalities were 
equally sensitive to the damage that conflicts do to its population 
and the natural environment, including its resource-base.  
Finally, resilience is – in this particular book – related to the 
capacity of citizens, households, and stakeholders in the public 
and private sector to cope, respond and adjust to the impacts of 
conflict on the natural environment and livelihoods. We add 
livelihoods, as these are intrinsically related to the natural 
environment, in particular among populations that are more 
vulnerable (more poverty-prone) than others. Poorer communities 
are not, by definition, more vulnerable to violent conflict in terms 
of exposure,
4
 but, without adequate facilities, services, human 
resources, and institutional capacity, they are less capable to cope 
with the environmental degradation that is the direct or indirect 
effect of these conflicts. 
We explore various manifestations of resilience, that have 
developed in the absence of contingency planning, disaster 
management plans, emergency response mechanisms or 
government recognition of a population, or acknowledgement of 
                                                          
4
 Although some commentators argue that North Lebanon’s relative deprivation 
results in a relative over-representation of the region among recruits for both 
the LAF and non-state militias and terrorist cells. 
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an emergency situation.
5
 Resilience requires cooperation; 
moreover, it requires a minimum capacity to address the 
environmental degradation that has either emerged from the 
conflict(s) itself, or could flourish in the absence of governance 
structure.  
The conflicts
6
 that took place in North Lebanon during the 
last four decades – from the Civil War, to the Nahr el-Bared crisis 
and the current ‘Syrian spill over’ – and their environmental 
consequences are intricately related to the fragile nature of 
Lebanon’s political system.7 In Lebanon, ‘vulnerability’ should 
therefore be positioned in the context of fragility of the political 
system. Lebanon’s consociational system constitutes a paradox. It 
is remarkably protracted on the one hand: the overarching logic of 
an elite bargain managing the distribution of state positions and 
resources has not been seriously challenged since Lebanon’s 
independence. On the other hand, however, the dynamics within 
this relatively constant system are distinctly volatile: the balance 
of power between the political leaders representing Lebanon’s 
various sectarian communities is instable and intra- and inter-
sectarian alliances are shifting constantly.  
This instability of the inter-sectarian balance, ironically 
generated by the stability of the consociational system, is 
                                                          
5
 Government support starts with recognition of the existing population and 
emergency situation. Some villages in North-Lebanon are not registered as 
municipality and therefore do not have access to regular services of local 
authorities. Some emergencies are not officially acknowledged as such.  
6
 We use the general term ‘armed conflicts’, since Lebanon has experienced a 
variety of conflicts: the Civil War, inter-state wars (Israel and Hezbollah); 
intra-state war (Lebanese Army- Fatah al-Islam in Nahr el Bared), and non-
state wars (clashes between supporters of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 
the Alawite neighbourhood of Jebel Mohsen and opponents of the Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad, in the Sunni district of Bab al-Tabbaneh in Tripoli). 
(Sarkees, 2010).  
7
 Fragility here should be dissociated from the normative connotations of the 
failed state paradigm. 
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intimately related to the conflicts in Lebanon. Consequently, in 
one of the chapters, we position our exploration of environmental 
and human vulnerability firmly in the context of political fragility. 
The coping capacity and resilience of communities is affected by: 
(i) the multiplicity of political authorities (state and non-state); (ii) 
a plurality of political institutions (de jure policies and de facto 
practices); and (iii) the before-mentioned dynamism of political 
structures (protracted sectarianism and changeable alliances). This 
has been conceptualized as ‘political hybrid order’ which is 
characterized by: 
diverse and competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of 
order, and claims to [that] power co-exist, overlap, and intertwine, 
combining elements of introduced Western models of governance 
and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions of 
governance (Boege et al., 2009:17). 
Vulnerability, the overarching theme of this volume, is thus 
analysed from different perspectives in the various chapters. Yet, 
all chapters indicate that municipalities in North Lebanon have 
been differentially at risk to armed conflict (exposure); that the 
human and environmental conditions in North Lebanon are quite 
diverse, resulting in differential environmental and livelihood 
impacts (sensitivity); and that communities have different coping 
capacities and that resilient communities strongly rely on 
networks and cooperation (resilience). This reveals, clearly, that 
environmental degradation cannot and should not be attributed to 
armed conflict only. For example, the 2007 Israel-Lebanon war 
resulted in large oil spills due to the bombing of the oil plant in 
Jiyyeh. Illegal oil spills from ships are, however, a continuous 
problem for the marine environment in North Lebanon.  
Moreover, specific forms of environmental degradation are 
linked to recovery and economic growth, in other words to 
resilience. The built environment, for example, depends on large 
amounts of sand and stones from the quarry industry, which has 
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been documented of circumventing environmental regulations 
(Leenders, 2012). Vulnerability and resilience are, in other words, 
not easy to pinpoint to one community, or one hazard, and 
communities that have been vulnerable in one sense, have been 
resilient in another. 
 
2. OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
We start this book with two review chapters, one focusing on 
vulnerability and the other conceptualizing resilience. These 
chapters discuss current theory, approaches, and concepts and 
identify gaps. These conceptual chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) will 
be then followed by a chapter describing the socio-economic, 
political, and bio-physical features of the case study area. 
Subsequently, we offer eight empirical chapters that follow the 
main themes of exposure, sensitivity, and resilience. In the final 
discussion, we return to theory, with the question how the 
application of vulnerability and resilience can be applied in a 
context of repeated episodes of armed conflict.  
The empirical chapters are divided over three parts. Part one 
– encompassing Chapters 5, 6 and 7 – particularly focuses on 
exposure and sensitivity. Part two – consisting of Chapters 8 and 
9 – deals predominantly with resilience at individual, community 
and municipal level. Part 3 – comprising Chapters 10 and 11 – 
looks at the international aspects of resilience and the choices that 
donors make in their allocation of aid. 
2.1. Part One – Exposure and Sensitivity 
In Chapter 5, we start with a historical overview of recent 
conflicts, which shows how particular areas in North-Lebanon 
have been more exposed to clashes and episodes of armed conflict 
than others due to its proximity with borders (Syria), the influx of 
refugees (Syrian, Palestinian); existence of Palestinian refugee 
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camps with their own governance system; and political 
polarization among the population, in particular in some 
neighbourhoods of Tripoli. Based on documentary analysis, we 
then examine the relations between armed conflict, degradation of 
land and changes in land use, both as a manifestation of, and in 
response to, biophysical and human vulnerability. To identify land 
degradation and analyze land use changes, we used an evaluation 
model based on satellite data. We also looked at other factors, 
such as artificialization of the coastline and increase in population. 
Based on our findings, we argue that, while armed conflict 
directly contributes to land degradation, it also changes the human 
system in ways that eventually result in further land degradation.  
In Chapter 6, we explore the spatial variation of the impacts 
of conflict on the natural environment and peoples’ livelihoods 
(sensitivity) and contrast potential exposure and sensitivity across 
different areas in North Lebanon’s coastal zone. The mapping of 
spatial variation of ‘sensitivity’ was achieved through a 
combination of literature and document research, a survey of 500 
interviews with citizens across all 24 municipalities of the coastal 
zone in North-Lebanon,
8
 and semi-structured in-depth interviews 
                                                          
8
 The aim of the survey was to collect data that was not available in secondary 
literature, such as age, family size, education level, occupation, income per 
capita, membership of any organization or group, entitlement to land or 
resources (such as land and home ownership), informational assets (such as 
number of people connected to the internet and landlines, and the number of 
people with a mobile number and television), and material assets (such as type 
of lighting, sources of water, and type of health services).  
The sample size was calculated using the formula    
 
       
  
(Israel, 1992:4); 
where n is equal to the sample size, N to the population size, and e to the level 
of precision which is equal to 10% for each region and 5% for the entire study 
area. The level of precision for the entire region was set as 5% for more 
precision. After calculating the number of questionnaires for each area, the 
number of questionnaires to be returned in each village or city was determined 
based on the population of each village and city as a proportion to the total 
population of each area. The participants were chosen based on simple random 
sampling. This approach was chosen for two main reasons. The first being the 
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with the heads of those municipalities and other stakeholders 
encompassing representatives of institutions that were involved in 
post-conflict interventions such as United Nations Development 
Program, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Social Affairs, 
and Ministry of Agriculture. This resulted in a social vulnerability 
index. 
Having explored the meaning and manifestation of both 
exposure and sensitivity in the preceding chapters, Chapter 7 
tackles vulnerability in a comprehensive way by developing a 
nascent framework to measure the political components of 
exposure and sensitivity that builds on existing data from the 
Human Development Index (HDI). The chapter identifies and 
discusses the change in rankings of countries and governance 
indicators and critically explores the various indexes are 
calculations used in HDI rankings. We find that governance plays 
an important role in terms of enhancing or reducing human 
development and thereby vulnerability.  
2.2. Part Two – Resilience  
We devoted a number of chapters on resilience; resilience not 
only to the impacts of armed conflict on the natural environment 
as described above, but also to environmental problems that exist 
independent of armed conflict. We look at resilience at several 
levels: at the individual level, taking ‘agency’ and ‘opportunity 
structure’ as variables affecting ‘empowerment’ and involvement 
in decision-making processes at community level (Chapter 8) and 
at the municipal level, focusing on cooperation between citizens 
and municipalities (Chapter 9). 
                                                                                                                                
lack of official statistical reports providing detailed information about age, 
gender, education, etc. at the local level. The second was the complex nature of 
the population in Lebanon in general, and in the north in particular, which is 
characterized by diverse religious, political, and ideological affiliations.
 
Before 
distributing the survey, a pilot test was carried out for acceptability and 
accuracy, and the questionnaire was subsequently adjusted as required. 
Conflict and Environment in North Lebanon 
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In Chapter 8, we use the same dataset as in Chapter 6 to 
analyze how agency and opportunity structure have affected the 
empowerment of individuals in North Lebanon, and what this 
means for individuals participation in decision-making processes.
9
 
For this, we use the analytical framework by Alsop et al. (2006).
10
 
Empowerment can not only be considered as extension of agency. 
The factors that affect individuals’ likelihood to be involved in 
decision-making at community level shows great variation; while 
the probability of their involvement increases in some 
                                                          
9
 Additional focus groups were organized to gather data on indirect indicators 
of the opportunity structure and understand the relationship between citizens’ 
agency and the opportunity structure, and its influence on the degree of 
empowerment. 
10
 In the survey, data on indirect indicators of agency and direct indicators of 
empowerment were collected from citizens. Indicators were selected from 
Alsop et al. (2006). Some of the indicators were adjusted to fit the context of 
the study site. To assess agency, asset endowments covering information, 
material, financial, organizational, psychological, and human assets were used 
as indicators. Information assets indicators were access to various sources of 
information such as television, internet, telephone, and mobile subscription. 
Materials assets indicators were home and land ownership. Financial assets 
indicators were occupation, income, and employment history. Organizational 
asset indicators were membership of organizations, effectiveness of 
organization, and benefits from organization membership. Psychological assets 
indicators were self-perceived exclusion from community activities and 
capacity to envisage change. Human assets indicators were education level, 
age, gender, marital status, and family size.  
In addition, direct indicators of empowerment were measured in three domains: 
the state domain (with a focus on public service delivery), the market domain 
(with a focus on labour) and the society domain (with a focus on community). 
Indicators for the public services were: quality of public services used, 
percentage of individuals that complained about public services delivery, 
satisfaction with the outcome of a complaint, equitability in addressing needs 
and concerns, influence of political and religious characteristics on the 
authorities’ treatment of people. Indicators for empowerment in the labour sub-
domain, were: control over employment or occupation choices. To measure 
empowerment in the community sub-domain, indicators were: awareness of the 
main local public service decision-makers, involvement in community 
decision-making processes, aspiration to be more involved in community 
decision-making processes, and influence in community decision-making 
processes.. 
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municipalities with the individual’s level of education; in other 
municipalities it is correlated to gender, age and aspiration for life 
change. The willingness of citizens to participate in decision-
making is dependent on whether they trust or distrust the 
outcomes of the decision-making process.  
The influence of trust on citizen’s willingness to cooperate 
with the authorities is again taken up in Chapter 9. Here we use 
the same survey data as in Chapters 6 and 8, but complemented 
these data with participatory data solicited through the Fuzzy 
Cognitive Mapping technique.
11
 We look at the extent to which 
citizens themselves indicate their preparedness to comply with 
existing regulations and to volunteer for environmental 
management initiatives. Their cooperation is, amongst others, 
related to their trust in the functioning of government authorities, 
and directly touches upon the legitimacy of the fragile political 
system. The findings show a complex reality: while trust and 
cooperation, between citizens and stakeholders in the public and 
private sector are indeed important to jointly address 
                                                          
11
 This participatory data was collected from the stakeholders for the case study 
of solid waste management in Al-Fayhaa Union. The Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping 
(FCM) approach was described using an unrelated map representing a neutral 
problem domain. Participants represented stakeholders from the public sector 
(municipalities, municipality union, ministries, public institutes); the private 
sector (private companies; experts; academic and research centres; sectors that 
produce waste; and chambers and syndicates related to solid waste 
management); and grassroots NGOs. Each working group consisted of a 
maximum of six participants and one moderator to facilitate the exercise. Every 
working group was asked to draw a cognitive map to answer the following 
questions: What are the factors that affect or are affected by the solid waste 
management in Al-Fayhaa area? and How do these factors affect each other and 
what is the particular role of trust on these variables?  
To analyze the five maps aggregated by the workshop participants according to 
graph theory, the maps were transformed into adjacency matrices attributing 
values between -1 and 1 to the strengths of relations as mentioned by 
participants (Özesmi and Özesmi, 2003) with 0 being the value of “no relation” 
(Elpiniki and Areti, 2012). These matrices were processed in the FCMapper 
Software Solution and the Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping Aggregator Vs 0.1 
(Bachhofer and Wildenberg 2010. www.fcmappers.net).  
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environmental problems, trust and personal relations are also used 
to jointly circumvent existing environmental regulations. The 
natural resource base is so important for peoples’ livelihoods, that 
the lack of capacity to address environmental degradation, is an 
important manifestation of limited resilience at municipal level.   
2.3. Part Three – International Policy 
In Chapter 10, we explore resilience at an international level, with 
specific attention for the role of aid in reconstruction, linking 
resilience to international policy. Based on a regression analysis 
of statistical data gathered from document databases, the chapter 
explicitly addresses both the contributions for aid and 
reconstruction in Lebanon,
12
 and peoples’ perceptions in the area, 
on the effectiveness of aid to areas that were affected by armed 
conflict.  
In the final chapter, Chapter 11, we investigate the role of 
development aid in North Lebanon’s post-war reconstructions and 
scrutinize the extent to which development aid to post-war 
reconstruction contributes to the region’s coping capacity13 to 
address the environmental effects of conflict. We argue that 
political deliberations substantially shape donors’ allocation 
considerations. To explore the perceptions of both recipients and 
donors, we used Q-methodology to analyze their discourses in 
use.
14
 These discourses were solicited in interviews with 
participants representing municipalities (recipients), non-
                                                          
12
 No figures are available for North-Lebanon for longer periods of time.  
13
 One should question, though, to what extent donor aid has contributed to 
resilience. When the effects of donor aid are more structural (increasing the 
institutional capacity and human resources), one can answer this question 
positively. If, however, it results in donor dependency, it could achieve the 
opposite. 
14
 For a detailed description of the methodology see Takshe et al. (2010). The 
method combines both qualitative and quantitative techniques to extract 
discourses in as subjective way as possible by structuring of opinions, 
judgements and understandings of risk.  
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governmental organizations, research centres, United Nations 
specialized agencies (intermediaries), national and international 
donors, and ministries. The Q-methodology allows us to 
demonstrate that overseas development aid per capita in Lebanon 
is positively linked to not merely GDP per capita, but also to the 
occurrence of armed conflict, which highlights the importance of 
political factors in aid allocation. We thereby question dominant 
claims that development aid is predominantly dependent on socio-
economic development considerations. Moreover, our findings 
show that political motivations for allocating development aid are 
skewed towards some concerns, while disregarding others. While 
the number and intensity of measured violent conflict decisively 
determine aid flows, other crucial concerns – such as perceived 
corruption – do not.  
 
3. CONCEPTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Our point of departure with this book has been to critically 
explore the conflict-environment nexus with an empirical focus on 
North Lebanon. Our contributions to academic knowledge follow 
from this.  
Empirically, we have put North Lebanon on the map as a 
region meriting analysis in its own right – in this case of its 
vulnerability to conflict-induced natural dangers. The North is 
Lebanon’s socio-economically most marginalized region. As a 
consequence of Lebanon’s preoccupation with its original 
heartland in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, moreover, the area is 
often treated as a political periphery as well. This lack of interest 
has for a long time manifested itself in a relatively low number of 
scholarly publications on with North Lebanon (as compared to the 
Mountain and the South).  
Often discussing concrete case-studies, our chapters have 
made clear that, even within this one region, exposure, sensitivity 
Conflict and Environment in North Lebanon 
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and resilience vary per community, depending on spatial and 
socio-economic features. The diversity of the academic 
methodologies applied to our object of study – ranging from 
analyses of remote sensing data to the use of fuzzy cognitive 
mapping and participant observation – makes clear that 
vulnerability should not merely be measured, as in the traditional 
positivist approach to exposure, but interpreted as well, meriting a 
more innovative and constructivist approach to particularly the 
sensitivity and resilience aspects of vulnerability.  
Our findings clearly indicate that, in many cases, armed 
conflict does not so much straightforwardly cause environmental 
risks, but exacerbates or reveals existing environmental issues. 
The bulk of the relations between conflict and environment, 
furthermore, even in an extremely conflict-prone setting like 
North Lebanon, are indirect. The effects of armed conflict on the 
natural environment are mediated by socio-economic and political 
institutions and so are the subsequent effects of these 
environmental hazards on society. It is in understanding these 
mediating variables – governance, institutions, relations – and 
incorporating them in our models or frameworks to analyse 
vulnerability, then, that our main conceptual contribution lays. 
We argue that it is necessary to integrate lessons from the 
complex political reality as explored in detail in this book into our 
vulnerability approach, particularly where it regards the 
multiplicity of political authorities, the plurality of political 
institutions and the instability of political structures that we 
highlighted above. As such, our book does not only offer 
innovative analyses of the multifaceted relations between conflict, 
vulnerability and the natural environment. It also calls for a re-
positioning of the notion of vulnerability in relation to state 
fragility and political hybridity.  
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This can be achieved, in large part, by making explicit the 
political economy dynamics inevitably implied in each analysis of 
vulnerability in conflict-affected situations. In our chapters, we 
have done this by demanding attention for three – out of many 
more possible – aspects of political economy. We have shown 
how trust and accountability, severely undermined by the same 
conflicts that generated the environmental risks in question, are 
crucial in addressing war-induced environmental problems. This 
is however, no clear-cut dynamic:  trust and personal relations are 
used to create and bolster environmental regulations, but also to 
jointly circumvent them. Building on the idea of trust, we have 
also investigated in detail how the notion of a social contract, so 
essential in a situation where political institutions and authority 
are contested, determines the distribution of material and 
institutional resources and thereby variations in resilience. The 
importance of informal governance institutions – personal 
networks, wasta, corruption – also serves to illustrate the 
significance of political economy dynamics for understanding 
how communities are equipped to deal with natural hazards 
caused by conflicts. 
In essence, what we found is that communities’ 
vulnerability to the environmental effects of war in North 
Lebanon varied per community and that this variance depended 
not so much on spatial as on socio-political differences (between 
richer and poorer municipalities, between those communities with 
extensive political ties and those without). Based on these 
findings, we would encourage analysts interested in vulnerability 
to move away from the dominant emphasis on exposure (the 
extent to which a system is confronted with the hazard in 
question) towards more attention for sensitivity (the likely damage 
the hazard will do to these systems) and resilience (the coping 
mechanisms available to mitigate the impacts of hazard).  
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Often, it is not the extent to which a community is 
confronted with environmental threats that is determined by 
dynamics of conflict, but the likely damage such a threat will do 
to the community in question and the response mechanisms 
available to mitigate a threat. A focus on explicating the currency 
of informal and formal institutions shows that vulnerability to 
environmental problems depends on a particular institutional 
setting and it is this setting that, in a ‘post’-conflict and fragile 
political order, is inevitably and importantly shaped by a 
multitude of violent conflicts. Even where war does not affect 
exposure to environmental risk, it crucially determines sensitivity 
and resilience. In this light, the fact that in our studies communal 
structures often seemed more important for determining resilience 
than individual empowerment logically reflects Lebanon’s 
communal political system, where citizenship depends less on 
individual rights than on group membership.  
Focusing on the conflict dimension of environmental 
hazards forces one to acknowledge the politics of vulnerability. 
While the conceptual linkage between environmental vulnerability 
and political economy explored here is still tentative, we would 
ultimately argue to reconfigure the place of ‘politics’ in the 
vulnerability framework, placing it in the centre rather than at the 
margins where it all too often is treated as ‘context’ instead of 
‘essence.’ We should not only concern ourselves with the ‘politics 
of environmental resources’ as causes of violent conflict, but also 
with the politics of exposure, sensitivity and resilience that 
determine vulnerability to the environmental consequences of 
violent conflict. 
Turner et al.’s authoritative vulnerability framework would 
gain much from incorporating insights from the state fragility and 
hybrid political order literature, just as the study of state fragility 
could be enriched by including notions of vulnerability. State 
fragility is, among other issues, concerned with how the 
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consequences of past violent conflict make countries prone to 
future violent conflict. What we have done in this volume, 
essentially, is explore one avenue through which this relation 
operates: we have shown how past conflict affects a country’s 
vulnerability to natural hazards (whether these hazards are caused 
by that conflict or predate it), which, if we want to close the circle, 
in turn might generate susceptibility to future conflict. 
The above, however, demands caution with regard to the 
celebration of resilience, as suggested in Chapter 3 as well. 
Informal trust relations, alternative social contracts and 
unsanctioned institutions can produce effective coping 
mechanisms in the short run.  In the longer run, however, such 
instances of resilience risks reinforcing rather than overcoming 
existing vulnerabilities. Indirect, informal and politicized coping 
strategies can set strong precedents and authorities and donors 
might feel less pressured to move towards rights- and equity-
based measures to boost resilience. This is particularly the case 
with reference to dynamics of international aid. While such aid 
can, of course, contribute to communities’ resilience to the 
environmental effects of war, Part 3 of our book showed that the 
allocation of international aid is privy to political concerns just as 
the internal distributions of resources and social capital in 
Lebanon and in the North are. Lebanon’s multiplicity of political 
authorities, plurality of political institutions and dynamism of 
political structures, ultimately, does not (only) determine how 
much aid it receives, but it does affect who receives this 
international aid on behalf of whom, again underlining the 
prevalence of community over individual in the dynamics that 
determine people’s vulnerability to war-induced environmental 
threats in North Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER 2 
VULNERABILITY 
A Review of the Literature
15
 
Sahar T. Issa 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter reviews the literature on vulnerability. 
Together with Chapter 3, that offers a literature review 
specifically focused on resilience, it lays the conceptual 
foundations for the empirical chapters in this edited volume. 
Vulnerability symbolizes the susceptibility of a certain system to 
the damage caused by a natural or man-made disaster and 
resilience is related to the capacity of this system to handle shocks 
and maintain its fundamental functions and structures. The 
operationalization of vulnerability poses several challenges to 
scholars due to its multidimensional and complex nature. As a 
result, definitions of vulnerability vary between different 
disciplines and even within the same discipline and diverse 
methodological approaches have been developed to assess 
vulnerability. This chapter critically reviews these various 
definitions of as well as theoretical and methodological 
approaches to the notion of vulnerability. 
Keywords: Vulnerability, disasters, multidimensional 
operationalization 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a close, direct, and complex linkage between the natural 
environment and human wellbeing. Environmental degradation 
weakens economic potential as well as human wellbeing and 
dramatically changes the living conditions of communities by 
rendering them more vulnerable (Dabelko and Dabelko, 1995). 
Environmental degradation can have numerous impacts such as 
health and economic problems as well as political instability. It 
can also lead to social issues that threaten individuals, families, 
communities, and social organizations (Khagram et al., 2003).  
As such, negative changes in environmental quality multiply 
the potential for impoverishment, deprivation, and lack of 
empowerment, and hence increase vulnerabilities. As a result, 
some individuals or groups become more sensitive and less 
prepared for dealing with unexpected or increasing environmental 
changes (Matthew et al., 2010). Individuals who depend mostly 
on natural resources as their main source of income are commonly 
the most susceptible to environmental change (Matthew et al., 
2010). In particular, the poor and impoverished people are often 
the most affected by environmental degradation for they are often 
heavily dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods 
(Kumar and Yashiro, 2014). On the other hand, a better 
environment offers opportunities for human wellbeing by 
improving chances of survival, enhancing human capacities, and 
increasing the recognition of basic rights (Khagram et al., 2003). 
In light of increasing occurrence of natural and man-made 
disasters and their consequent environmental degradation, 
measuring vulnerability becomes a necessary and key step in 
order to reduce disaster risk and promote a sustainable future.    
In this chapter, I start by reviewing the literature on 
vulnerability encompassing the various definitions and meanings, 
and the various conceptual frameworks that are developed to 
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assess this concept. I then highlight the importance of building a 
culture of disaster resilience as an effective approach to reduce 
vulnerability and I conclude in the final section.  
 
2. VULNERABILITY 
Vulnerability is a highly debated concept but one that has been 
well covered in the literature (Timmerman, 1981, Cutter, 1996; 
Kelly and Adger, 2000; Bankoff et al., 2004; Wisner et al., 2004; 
Flint and Luloff, 2005; Schröter et al., 2005; Adger, 2006; 
Birkmann, 2006). The term vulnerability has proved difficult to 
define because it is a combination of several factors. Definitions 
of vulnerability vary between different disciplines and even within 
the same discipline depending on the various concepts and 
meanings that the researchers adopt as their starting point (Füssel, 
2006). 
2.1.  Definitions 
In the early 1980s, Gabor and Griffith referred to vulnerability as 
the “threat to which a community is exposed taking into account 
not only the properties of the chemical agents involved but also, 
the ecological situation of the community and the general state of 
emergency preparedness at any given point in time” (Gabor and 
Griffith, 1980:325). Timmerman defined vulnerability as the 
extent to which a system might adversely respond to the incidence 
of a certain threatening event. The extent and type of that adverse 
reaction are partially controlled by the system’s resilience defined 
as the system’s capability to absorb and recover from the 
incidence of a particular threatening event (Timmerman, 1981). 
According to Kates, vulnerability is the “capacity to suffer harm 
or to react adversely” (Kates, 1985:17). Later, Liverman defined 
vulnerability as “the characteristics of places or people that are 
likely to be harmed by meteorological and geophysical events” 
(Liverman, 1990:50). Kelly and Adger explained vulnerability as 
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the capability or otherwise of individuals and groups to react, 
cope with, or adapt to an external pressure affecting their 
livelihoods and wellbeing (Kelly and Adger, 2000:328). Turner et 
al. regarded vulnerability as the extent to which a system or part 
of a system is likely to suffer from threats caused by exposure to a 
certain perturbation or pressure (Turner et al., 2003), whereas 
Wisner et al. (2004) defined it as “the characteristics of a person 
or group and their situation that influence their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a 
natural hazard” (Wisner et al., 2004:11). Another definition of 
vulnerability is presented in Mapping vulnerability: Disasters, 
Development, and People where it is considered as “an internal 
risk factor of the subject or system that is exposed to a hazard and 
corresponds to its intrinsic predisposition to be affected or to be 
susceptible to damage” (Bankoff et al., 2004:37).  
As the various definitions suggest, vulnerability symbolizes 
physical, economic, political, and/or social susceptibility of a 
certain population to damage that is caused by a natural or man-
made disaster. Since this study examines the environmental 
impacts caused by armed conflicts in the coastal area of north 
Lebanon and the consequent effects on the communities’ 
vulnerabilities in this area, vulnerability is defined here as the 
susceptibility of the communities of the coastal area of north 
Lebanon to environmental damage caused by episodes of armed 
conflict and their capacity to cope with threats or damage caused 
in that context. Vulnerability is multidimensional, differential, and 
scale-dependent and is usually associated with existing conditions 
that cause livelihood activities to be highly fragile for a certain 
population. It varies across time, geography, and among and 
within social groups. It is also dependent on the space and unit of 
analysis such as individual, household, region, and system. As 
such, the range of characteristics and driving forces of 
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vulnerability are dynamic and continuously change over time 
(Birkmann, 2006).  
Vulnerability is often associated with terms such as hazard, 
risk, coping capacity, and resilience. A hazard is generally defined 
as a hidden threat or an external risk that can affect an exposed 
system or subject (Bankoff et al., 2004). It is often regarded as the 
probability that a certain event with a precise intensity will occur 
in a certain area during a particular period of time. Combining 
vulnerability and hazard creates risk, which is the potential loss 
experienced by an exposed system. Vulnerability and hazard are 
in a mutual relationship and neither can exist without the other. A 
system cannot be threatened if it is not vulnerable and vice versa: 
a system cannot be exposed if it is not threatened. Thus, if the 
elements of risk are affected, the risk itself is altered (Bankoff et 
al., 2004). Another two key terms associated with vulnerability 
are coping capacity and resilience. Coping capacity refers to the 
sum of the strengths and resources that are present within a 
community or institution that can minimize the level of threat or 
the impacts of the disaster (Birkmann, 2006). Vulnerability and 
coping capacity are manifested whenever vulnerable communities 
are exposed to a threatening experience. Resilience is related to 
the ability of a system to handle shocks and maintain its 
fundamental functions and structures. This implies that the system 
is capable of adapting and learning, and hence being sufficiently 
self-organized to sustain crucial structures and mechanisms within 
an adaptation or coping process (Birkmann 2006).  
2.2.  Themes in Vulnerability Research 
The literature on vulnerability can be divided into three distinct 
streams when it comes to its causal structure. One theme views 
vulnerability in terms of the potential exposure to occurring 
hazards. This approach is illustrated in several studies 
(Quarantelli, 1992; Alexander, 1993; Douglas, 2007; Uzielli et al., 
2008; Bertrand et al., 2010). Physical vulnerability assessments 
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often emphasize how hazardous conditions are distributed and the 
ways in which such circumstances can alter humans and 
structures. 
A second approach identifies social vulnerability as a 
function of the underlying social conditions which are often 
detached from the initial hazard occurrence. Social vulnerability 
researchers treat exposure as a given, and seek forms of 
differential losses among affected communities. Studies that 
assess social vulnerability focus on understanding the ways in 
which communities are exposed to threats, and particularly on 
their potential coping capacity to resist as well as their ability to 
recover from the damaging impact of an event (Bohle et al., 1994; 
Adger, 1999; Dunno 2011; Tate, 2012; Yoon, 2012).  
The third perspective, vulnerability of place, combines both 
biophysical and social approaches. Vulnerability of place is 
considered in terms of biophysical and social vulnerability, but is 
cantered on a specific geographic domain. Researchers that adopt 
this perspective, address vulnerability within a specific geographic 
area to determine the location of vulnerable people and places, or 
within a social place to identify which groups are most vulnerable 
in those places (Cutter, 1996; Boruff et al., 2005; Cutter et al., 
2000; Cross, 2001; Cutter et al., 2008).  
2.3.  Conceptual Frameworks of Vulnerability 
The various definitions of vulnerability are also accompanied by a 
similar diversity of assessment methodologies, such as 
participatory, indicator-based, and simulation-based approaches, 
which are applied to various systems and on diverse spatial and 
temporal scales (Birkmann, 2006; Hinkel, 2010). In reality, the 
scientific definitions offer little guidance on designing 
methodologies to assess vulnerability. In general, definitions are 
operationalized in ways that reflect the generalities of the terms 
used and this results in methodologies that are loosely connected 
to the theoretical operationalized definitions (Hinkel, 2010). 
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Therefore, in operationalizing definitions and designing 
methodologies for vulnerability assessment, normative choices 
have to be made. The key to assessing and understanding 
vulnerability is to determine who are the vulnerable individuals 
and/or groups, to what threats they are vulnerable and where, and 
how various factors interact leading to either attenuation or 
amplification of vulnerability. Thus, vulnerability can be studied 
to highlight the influence of numerous factors on the wellbeing 
and livelihoods of the entities of analysis. It is also important to 
examine the ways in which responses to one factor can increase or 
decrease vulnerability to other factors and how interventions 
affect both present and future outcomes (Turner et al., 2003; 
O’Brien et al., 2009).  
As observed earlier, there are diverse approaches and 
methods used to assess vulnerability. From a risk and hazard 
perspective, the risk-hazard model (RH) has been used to assess 
the risks to particular components that result from their exposure 
to hazards of a certain type and scale (Kates, 1985). This approach 
is descriptive rather than explanatory and is often used in the 
technical literature on disasters. The risk-hazard model is usually 
used to examine physical systems such as the built infrastructure 
and distinguishes between two features that determine the risk to a 
certain system: hazard and vulnerability. A hazard is seen as a 
potentially harmful physical event and is viewed in terms of 
intensity, frequency, location, and probability; vulnerability is 
seen as the association between the severity of the hazard and the 
extent of the damage resulting from such an event (Füssel, 2006). 
This approach is hard to apply to humans because their 
exposure to hazards is largely determined by their behaviour 
which is influenced by various socioeconomic factors (Füssel, 
2006). Another model that stems from the risk-hazard approach is 
the pressure-and-release (PAR) model (Figure 2.1). This 
explanatory model encompasses the global root causes, regional 
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stresses, and local susceptible conditions (Wisner et al., 2004, 
Füssel, 2006). According to Wisner at al. (2004), the root causes 
that contribute to vulnerability are primarily the economic, 
demographic, and political structures that often influence resource 
allocation and distribution among groups and individuals. Further, 
the root causes are linked with the functions of the government 
and military actions (Wisner et al., 2004). Despite this model 
exploring the processes that can influence vulnerability, it fails to 
explicitly consider the significance of place and geography and, as 
with other vulnerability approaches, only emphasizes the 
interconnections of negative processes during catastrophic events 
and disregards capacity building, which can be inherently 
disempowering (Joakim, 2008). 
The political economy approach primarily assesses people’s 
vulnerability by identifying the vulnerable individuals or groups 
and the factors that contribute to their vulnerability (Kelly and 
Adger, 2000). In this approach, vulnerability is conceived in terms 
of the coping capacity of individuals, groups, and communities 
and their adaptation to external pressures that affect their 
livelihoods and wellbeing. Here, the availability of and access to 
resources are considered the main determinants of vulnerability 
(Füssel, 2006). The political economy approach is dominant in the 
literature on poverty and development. 
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Figure 2.1: The Pressure and Release (PAR) Model (Source: Wisner at al., 
2004:51) 
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According to Bohle (2001), vulnerability can be regarded as a 
two-sided concept with both external and internal sides. The 
external side includes exposure to risks and threats while the 
internal side is associated with the capacity to anticipate, deal, 
resist, and recover from the impact of a certain disaster (Bohle, 
2001). From the social geography perspective, the double 
structure of vulnerability depends on distinguishing between the 
exposure to external risks and the capability of the household, 
group, or society to deal with them. Bohle’s conceptual 
framework emphasizes the physical aspect, characterized by the 
exposure to threats and perturbations as a key component of 
vulnerability, and the fact that vulnerability cannot efficiently be 
characterized without simultaneously considering coping and 
response capacity (Figure 2.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Bohle’s Conceptual Framework (Source: Birkmann, 2006:20) 
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The ‘sustainable livelihood framework’ approach to vulnerability 
assessment relies on five key capitals: human, natural, financial, 
social, and physical. This approach was originally developed by 
Chambers and Conway (1991) who regarded livelihoods in terms 
of the capacities, assets, and actions that are necessary to secure a 
means of living (Chambers and Conway, 1991). Within the 
sustainable livelihood framework, the context of vulnerability is 
regarded in terms of shocks, trends, and seasonality, as well as the 
effect of changing structures on livelihood strategies and their 
outcomes. In this context, sustainability is explained in terms of 
the capacity to cope with and recover from perturbations while 
sustaining the natural resource base. The framework emphasizes 
that changing structures in the governmental system or in the 
private sector, and their processes, influence the vulnerability 
context by having major influences on and controlling access to 
the livelihood assets of people (Chambers and Conway, 1991; 
DFID, 1999).  
The sustainability approach highlights empowering local 
marginalized people as an effective means of reducing 
vulnerability (Figure 2.3). As such, it is crucial to consider the 
daily needs of people and communities, rather than simply 
applying general interventions without recognizing the different 
abilities offered by vulnerable people. Within the sustainable 
livelihood framework, access is a fundamental component, and 
this largely depends on the status of social relations. As such, a 
greater emphasis should be placed on the role of power 
relationships in sustainable livelihood research (Birkmann, 2006). 
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Figure 2.3: The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Source: DFID, 1999) 
Turner et al. (2003) developed a conceptual framework to assess 
vulnerability. The framework regards vulnerability in terms of 
exposure, sensitivity, resilience, and coping capacity within the 
context of the human-environment system. In addition, this 
approach considers the various interrelating perturbations and 
stresses as well as adaptation, which is conceived as an important 
component that increases resilience (Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4: Turner et al. Vulnerability Framework (Source: Turner et al.:8076) 
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The various approaches and frameworks developed to study 
vulnerability incorporate both social and physical characteristics, 
but these are generally presented as distinct and independent 
processes (Joakim, 2008). Further, there was a trend visible in the 
literature toward an increasingly detailed examination of the 
social aspect of vulnerability, with physical and environmental 
vulnerability consequently becoming somewhat neglected. In an 
attempt to incorporate both the physical and social dimensions of 
vulnerability, and to recognize the complex interactions between 
them, Cutter started to develop the ‘hazards of place’ model in the 
1990s to give a comprehensive understanding of vulnerability by 
combining the social and physical aspects while emphasizing the 
importance of place (Cutter, 1996; Cutter et al., 2000; Cutter et 
al., 2003) (Figure 2.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: The ‘hazards of place’ model (Source: Cutter, 1996:536) 
 
3. FROM VULNERABILITY TO RESILIENCE 
The concept of resilience represents, in its core, the relationship 
between the natural environment and the society, particularly the 
socio-ecological system’s response to disturbances and pressures 
in order to preserve its functionality (Folke, 2006). There are 
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different interpretations of the term resilience in the current 
literature (Gall, 2013). In some cases, resilience is regarded as the 
capacity to take in shocks or stresses and is therefore more related 
to resistance. In other cases, resilience indicates the regenerative 
capabilities of a certain system including the capability to cope 
with and adapt to cumulative changes and unforeseen shocks 
while sustaining its main functions. This interpretation of the term 
is more linked to the coping and adaptation stage (Birkmann, 
2006). Resilience is also seen as the contrary of vulnerability or as 
the contradictory or absence of human security (Birkmann, 2006).  
The old dominant viewpoints have indirectly supposed a 
steady and considerably resilient environment where resource 
flows might be restrained and nature might self-adjust its 
equilibrium when human pressure was removed (Folke, 2006). 
Such perspectives of static equilibrium centre offer little 
understanding of the transitory behaviour of imbalanced systems. 
In contrast, the resilience viewpoint shifts policies from an 
aspiration to control any alteration in assumed steady systems to 
the management of systems’ abilities to handle and adapt to 
change. Working towards resilience increases the possibility of 
sustaining prosperity and development in fluctuating and 
unpredictable environments (Folke, 2006). It is argued that 
significant social effects might be caused by even minor 
disturbances in a vulnerable system; whereas in a resilient system, 
disturbances can help to generate opportunities for improvement 
and development (Adger, 2006). Thus, in view of increasing 
occurrence of natural and man-made disasters and ongoing 
environmental degradation, measuring vulnerability is 
progressively being regarded as a crucial step for reducing 
disaster risk and for fostering a culture of disaster resilience, in 
order to promote a more sustainable world (Birkmann, 2006).  
Enhancing people’s resilience relies in tackling the factors 
that cause their vulnerability. Enhancing the variety and security 
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of their livelihoods increase their options and opportunities, 
whether in their choice to live or work in other regions that are 
less exposed to threats, or in having more resources to exploit in 
order to deal with and rebound when affected by disastrous events 
(Pasteur, 2011). Hazards and stresses preparedness can 
considerably reduce exposure. A better understanding of long 
term trends allow people to exploit their available resources in 
proper manners in order to adjust to such alterations over time. 
Finally, generating a more empowering governance environment 
will enable people to become capable to access or influence 
decision-making processes, services delivery, and resource 
distribution (Pasteur, 2011). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
As a conclusion, vulnerability is a highly debated concept that 
integrates various academic disciplines, concepts, and 
methodologies. The various approaches and frameworks 
developed to study vulnerability often look at the physical and 
social dimensions of vulnerability as distinct and independent 
processes. There was a trend visible in the literature toward an 
increasingly detailed examination of the social aspect of 
vulnerability, with physical and environmental vulnerability 
consequently becoming somewhat neglected. For instance, the 
risk-hazard model (RH), the pressure-and-release model (PAR), 
and Bohle conceptual framework focus mainly on the physical 
dimension of vulnerability and disregard the coping capacity, 
which is an important component of vulnerability. On the other 
hand, the political economy and ‘sustainable livelihood 
framework’ approaches focus on the social dimension and 
disregard exposure to a certain event. Further, even though the 
framework developed by Turner et al. considers the various 
interrelating perturbations and stresses as well as adaptation, it 
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fails to explicitly consider the significance of place and 
geography. In addition, while the hazards of place model provides 
an innovative approach by combining both the physical and social 
dimensions of vulnerability and recognizing the complex 
interactions between them in a certain geographical area, this 
model remain too general and comprehensive.   
Overall, the various frameworks and approaches reveal the 
varying, complex, and multidimensional nature of vulnerability. 
Measuring vulnerability and creating a culture of disaster 
resilience are being increasingly regarded as vital step for 
reducing disaster risks and for promoting a more sustainable 
world in a time of augmenting occurrence of both natural and 
man-made disasters and current environmental changes. 
Promoting sustainable development also emphasizes the need to 
highlight the importance of the natural environment for humans 
and to protect the natural environment since that the priority is 
generally given to saving lives and minimizing human suffering, 
in times of violent conflict. As such, the emphasis tends to be on 
immediate, direct, and short-terms needs; while environmental 
concerns and indirect impacts are often neglected and viewed as 
of secondary importance (Shambaugh et al., 2001). However, 
even if it appears not unreasonable that environmental concerns 
are regarded as low priority in times of armed conflict and human 
emergencies, the heavy impact of environmental changes on 
communities’ vulnerability and resilience highlights the 
importance of giving the natural environment a high priority 
(Shambaugh et al., 2001). Here, it is important to stress that a 
degraded environment threatens future livelihood security and 
increases humans’ vulnerabilities (Shambaugh et al., 2001). 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESILIENCE 
A Review of the Literature: Queries Beyond the Promise?
16
 
Georg Frerks 
 
 
Abstract: Building on Chapter 2, that explored the definitions and 
conceptualizations of vulnerability at large, this chapter offers a 
critical exploration of the concept of resilience and thereby 
contributes to providing the conceptual foundations for the 
following chapters. Focusing in particular on the fields of 
environmental management and disaster studies, the chapter 
welcomes the notion of social resilience as a way to go beyond the 
capacities of the formal disaster management sector; bring 
political and policy dynamics into assessments of resilience; and 
address potential disempowering effects of the vulnerability 
notion. Including political economy indicators into our analysis of 
resilience, however, also demands a problematization of 
straightforward resilience promotion and merits a deconstruction 
of the claims of retreating neo-liberal states that everyone can be 
equally resilient. 
Keywords: Resilience, environmental management, disaster 
studies, policy and politics 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of resilience has rapidly gained popularity in the field 
of environmental management, disaster studies and emergency 
management. Improving the resilience of individuals, 
communities and societies is thought to be an effective and 
efficient way to reduce prevailing vulnerabilities and thereby the 
risk of disaster, whether in the field of the environment, the 
economy, development or socially or politically.  
The advantage of strengthening resilience is that it can be 
seen as an ‘all-hazard’ approach killing several birds with one 
stone. It is a medicine for many ills. If you have become 
‘resilient’, you can withstand floods, storms, high interest rates, 
inflation, social indifference, environmental damage and political 
arrogance. Resilience seems to have been embraced as the new 
catchword for the decade to come and at present there is an 
avalanche of initiatives, workshops and publications on the 
subject, very much like happened to the notion of vulnerability 
that dominated the disaster discourse in the 1990s.  
In a recent ODI Background Note Tom Mitchell (2012:2) 
discusses various options for including disaster resilience in post-
2015 development goals, including a ‘standalone goal on disaster 
resilience’ or a ‘mainstreaming approach’ incorporating the theme 
in other sector-oriented goals. 
On the other hand, the ascendancy of resilience has also 
attracted serious criticisms. For example, Ben Aguirre and Eric 
Best (2015) consider the current widespread usage of the concept 
of resilience just a ‘fad’, and in fact redundant when applied to 
research and management of disasters, as the strengthening of the 
institutions of society faced with disasters has been already 
ongoing practice for half a century, they state. While taking a 
much less radical stance, Kathleen Tierney, also observed several 
fundamental weaknesses with regard to the resilience approach in 
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a keynote delivered on the subject.17 While acknowledging its 
stimulating force in policy, she wondered whether the concept 
was really innovative or rather ‘old wine in new wineskins’ and 
whether it comprised a sufficiently deep analysis of root causes. 
She, among others, further critiqued its under-theorization of 
power and claimed that there was a need to focus much more on 
the ‘pathologies of power’ that generated wide-spread 
vulnerabilities in society, including different forms of policy 
denial and denigration of initiatives in the face of an unsustainable 
future. By just jumping over those shortcomings, resilience can 
never fully address the factors that cause patterns of vulnerability 
in the first place.  
So what to think of the strengths and weaknesses of 
resilience? Below I give first an overview of the resilience 
concept and approach and then discuss its significance in terms of 
policy and politics. Summing up my arguments at the end, I try to 
conclude what the resilience approach can contribute.  
 
2. THE ASCENDENCY OF RESILIENCE IN 
DISASTER STUDIES AND ITS DEFINITION 
Since the 1990s the field of Disaster Studies has taken on board 
some ideas from environmental systems analysis. Resilience being 
one of them was based on the work of the ecologist Holling. 
Holling defined resilience as “the ability of a system to maintain 
its structure and patterns of behaviour in the face of disturbance” 
(Holling, 1986:296). The envisaged stability is the “propensity of 
a system to attain or retain an equilibrium condition of steady 
state or stable oscillation ... resist any departure from that 
                                                          
17
 Keynote Kathleen Tierney, 3rd Conference on Community Resilience, 
organized by The Center for Community Security and Resilience, Virginia 
Tech, Arlington, USA, in collaboration with the Metropolitan Institute, 
Congress Center, Davos, Switzerland, 24-25 August 2012. 
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condition and, if perturbed, return rapidly to it” (Holling, 
1986:296). It is clear that this ecological line of thinking departs 
from a strong sense of equilibrium and aims at a restoration of the 
original situation.  
However, in disaster management as well as in socio-
political and economic ‘systems’, this re-equilibricizing trend may 
not be desirable, as the earlier situation was often characterized by 
vulnerabilities that enabled the disaster or problematic situation 
occurring in the first place. That earlier situation should preferably 
be transformed and not reinstated.  
In disaster research, the definition of resilience initially 
meant the ability to survive and cope with a disaster with 
minimum impact and damage. However, it was slowly further 
expanded to include additional social and institutional aspects. 
Harrald and Veldhuis (2010) provide an overview of the recent 
debate on resilience in the United States (US) and include a series 
of definitions in use by US departments and in academic 
literature. Box 1 provides three of them showing an increasing 
complexity. 
 
Box 1. Definitions of resilience 
 
Community resilience “is defined as the sustained ability of 
communities to withstand and recover - in both the short and 
the long terms - from adversity” (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2009: 5). 
“Resilience refers to the ability of human systems to respond 
and to recover. It includes those inherent conditions that 
allow the system to absorb impacts and cope with the event, 
as well as post-event adaptive processes that facilitate the 
ability of the systems to recognize, change and learn in 
response to the event” (Cutter et al, 2008). 
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Resilience is “a process linking a set of adaptive capacities to 
a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a 
disturbance. Community resilience emerges from four 
primary sets of adaptive capacities – Economic 
Development, Social Capital, Information and 
Communication and Community Competence” (Norris et al, 
2008). 
 
(Derived from Harrald and Veldhuis, 2010: 9-10) 
 
These definitions emphasize the capacity or ability to anticipate 
risk or disturbance, absorb or limit impact, and bounce back after 
a crisis but -more importantly- they include adaptive community 
capacity, and processes of change, as evidenced in the definitions 
of Cutter et al (2008) and Norris et al. (2008). It must be stressed 
that these capacities and abilities mentioned are not some 
mysteriously in-built systemic property of individuals or 
organizations, but are based on interactive and contingent 
community-level and societal processes involving change, 
entrepreneurship, learning and increased competence. Hence, 
these definitions move far beyond the ecologists’ traditional 
equilibrium thinking. In that sense resilience does not need to be 
only a return to a previous equilibrium, but can aim at a different, 
improved state of affairs.  
In effect, the current debate about disaster rehabilitation 
asserts that rather than ‘building back’ we should be ‘building 
back better’, giving disaster survivors more capabilities, options 
and flexibility in their coping with future adversity, and also 
making progress by structural vulnerability reduction and the 
increase of institutional capabilities. In this connection, the 
strength of an effective resilience approach is that it is ideally 
human-centred and community-focused, but simultaneously 
situated in a larger macro-setting of environmental, macro-
Conflict and Environment in North Lebanon 
48 
economic and policy processes and cognizant of global-local 
dynamics. It is also interdisciplinary and multi-layered, requiring 
new forms of stakeholders’ engagement and public-private 
partnerships.  
One critique on the earlier vulnerability approach in disaster 
management pointed out that it victimized and disempowered 
people. It would engender a fatalistic and passive outlook and take 
away the agency from people, thereby creating external 
dependency. In fact, vulnerability was and still is often externally 
attributed to groups of people, who rarely label themselves as 
vulnerable. Anderson and Woodrow (1989) highlighted already 
two decades ago that people have important physical, social and 
motivational capacities that can offset their vulnerabilities. 
Accordingly, the vulnerability approach increasingly paid 
attention to (individual, group or community-level) coping 
capacities that came to be seen as a major counter force to 
vulnerability as exemplified in a variety of vulnerability and 
capacity analysis (VCA) tools that emerged in disaster policy 
practice. Cannon, Twigg and Rowell (2003) have made an 
inventory of over fifty instruments that deal with such 
vulnerability and capacity aspects. 
The thinking on local disaster capacities has sociologically 
been further influenced by debates on actor-orientation and the 
role of agency. Actor-orientation is a constructivist perspective 
focusing on the making and remaking of society through the self-
transforming actions and perceptions of a diverse and interlocked 
world of actors (Long, 2001). Actor-oriented approaches form a 
counter-balance to approaches that basically see human behaviour 
as externally determined.  
In relation to earlier paradigms in disaster studies the 
resilience approach moves beyond the vulnerability and 
victimization discourse towards agency and capacity, and from 
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short-term coping towards longer-term adaptation and innovation. 
It focuses on process rather than being a static state of affairs, as 
evidenced in the definitions referred to above. It also changes 
from mere adaptation to what can be called a transformative 
approach. This implies that it includes response and coping, but 
simultaneously goes beyond it and is also more geared to social 
and systemic aspects of dealing with disaster rather than only to 
individual and household capacities. In this connection Dovers 
and Handmer (1992) have proposed to differentiate between 
proactive and reactive social resilience. Reactive resilience seeks 
to perpetuate and reinforce the status quo, whereas a proactive 
system accepts change and adjusts to it. 
 
3. RESILIENCE AS A POLICY APPROACH 
Turning to the policy world, it seems to make sense to invest in 
resilience in view of its merits outlined above. This explains that 
the concept is embraced by i.e. the Government of the United 
States, the European Union, several donor agencies and 
government departments in a variety of countries. On the other 
hand, there is as yet fairly little insight in how to translate 
resilience into a workable concept and policy approach. We need 
more substantive work on the operationalization of the concept 
and its use in policy practice. The resilience approach is 
associated with a clear shift in responsibilities and roles in public 
disaster policy and with regard to the composition of the actor 
alliances involved. In the field of disaster management 
collaboration between authorities and citizens was already 
promoted in the 1994 Yokohama and 2005 Hyogo frameworks.  
 It is however necessary to ascertain the impacts of such 
policy shifts on the anticipation and prevention of, and recovery 
after shocks. As grassroots or community-based perspectives have 
often been welcomed merely on ideological grounds or ‘feel-
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good’ sentiments, it is essential to provide for a critical and 
evidence-based framework to inform policy and practice on 
resilience initiatives and enhance their effectiveness. Such a 
framework should include: a) a further definitional delineation 
and conceptual elaboration of resilience, building on the ample 
literature that exists today; b) define descriptive-analytical 
benchmarks or indicators for resilience (also here much work is 
ongoing already); c) collect empirical evidence on the application 
of the resilience approach in practice or work with pilot cases (this 
evidence is still weak); d) analyze the larger policy and political 
context and its impact (see my remarks below) and e) propose 
policy measures to enhance resilience. 
Though such steps can help and promote community and 
societal resilience in disaster-prone or environmentally fragile 
areas, there still remains a need to critically approach the 
resilience paradigm. Whether or not such interventions may have 
a beneficial impact in terms of risk governance and the target 
population also depends on the broader political and economic 
context, as already mentioned by Tierney in her keynote referred 
to above. Therefore I suggest that alongside the policy work 
outlined above, a more politically informed analysis takes place 
that looks at and deconstructs the resilience discourse as a 
political project.  
 
4. RESILIENCE AS A POLITICAL PROJECT 
What are in effect the political underpinnings of the resilience 
approach? It can -in my view- be considered as part of the larger 
neo-liberal project that is taking hold of contemporary society. In 
terms of (risk) governance it relates to a model that includes 
parliamentary democracy, a liberalized economy with a retreating 
state, and western model of security provision based on the 
securitization of certain external threats. Some authors have 
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claimed that this neo-liberal ordering of the world has led on the 
one hand to an interventionist attempt to govern and control parts 
of the globe, implying the erosion of civil rights and liberties, 
while on the other hand it is excluding and marginalizing those 
people deemed useless, who have been called the ‘insecured’ or 
‘surplus life’ (Duffield, 2007) or ‘wasted lives’ (Bauman, 2004). 
The emphasis on resilience indeed seems to be the product 
of a political discourse that seeks to shift the responsibility for 
mediating the impact of disasters from the state to the society and 
therefore may engender the same problems and feelings of 
disenchantment as the neo-liberal project creates in other societal 
domains and the economy at large. 
Reid (2010) suggests that ‘the resilient subject is a subject 
which must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the 
world”. By doing so resilience backgrounds the political, the 
imagining of alternatives and foregrounds adaptivity, accepting 
“the imperative not to resist or secure themselves from the 
difficulties they are faced with”. Coaffee and Rogers (2008) claim 
that the notion of social resilience has been instrumentalized, 
leading to a new governance and policy structure exerting 
domination and causing inequality. They talk in this connection 
about a ‘dark side’ to resilience planning. In a recent keynote 
speech
18
 Duffield observed that the resilience project approach 
under the neo-liberalist project in late capitalism in fact amounts 
to a form of adaptation, avoidance and working around a 
fragmented world in crisis, …. to an endless adaptation or 
bricolage without offering a solution. According to Duffield 
resilience thus boils down to ‘surviving at the edge of extinction’, 
or to ‘living on the ruins’.  
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 Keynote by Mark Duffield at Conference ‘Remote Control, Violence, 
Containment, Technology’, organized by the Centre for Conflict Studies and 
Centre for the Humanities, Utrecht University, 12 December 2014, Utrecht. 
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Though those warnings help us to focus on potential risks 
and dangers resulting from the political context, the ultimate test 
of the resilience approach lies in what it achieves in practice. As I 
said above, evidence is still largely absent or patchy and hence, 
the jury is still out. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In recent years, resilience has rapidly become a mainstream notion 
as a useful addition to hazard and vulnerability. The concept of 
social resilience focuses our minds on the social capacities 
available well beyond the capacities of the formal disaster 
management sector, and is also redressing the victimizing and 
disempowering effects of the vulnerability notion. While having a 
number of strong points, the resilience project also carries risks to 
society. Whether promoting resilience reduces people’s 
vulnerability to disaster is highly dependent on a person’s 
socioeconomic standing. Here, a more differentiated approach is 
called for than the current generalized one to promoting resilience 
implies. In this connection, we should be critical about the fiction 
promoted by the retreating neo-liberal state that everyone can be 
equally resilient. We have to study the potential negative political 
effects the neo-liberal project inheres in order to fully gauge its 
impact on vulnerable disaster-stricken individuals and 
communities, and how it may affect the governance of risk 
ultimately. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NORTH LEBANON 
Bio-Physical, Social, Economic and Political Features of the 
Study Area 
Manal R. Nader, Shadi Indary and Manal Abou Dagher 
 
 
Abstract: Where the previous two literature review chapters have 
set the scene for the subsequent empirical chapters in a conceptual 
sense, this Chapter 4 does so in a regional sense. In the 
introductory Chapter 1, we defined vulnerability as the 
susceptibility of particular communities or systems to specific 
risks and hazards. We argued that three components are essential 
in the analysis: exposure (the extent to which a human or 
biophysical system is confronted with the risk or hazard); 
sensitivity (the likely damage the conflict will do to these 
systems); and resilience (the coping or response mechanisms 
available to the systems to mitigate the impacts of conflict). In this 
chapter, we describe features of the human and bio-physical 
system, with a focus on those features that are most relevant in the 
context of North-Lebanon’s coastal area. These include the 
administrative division; information on meteorological settings, 
on precipitation, air temperature, wind and waves; information on 
tectonic setting and seismicity; fresh water; continental shelf and 
bathymetry; sea currents and sea water salinity; sedimentary 
processes and marine and coastal biodiversity. It also includes 
information on the ‘human’ system: the socio-economic features 
such as demographic features, economic features, information on 
the industrial sector, the energy sector, the tourist sector, transport 
sector, agricultural fisheries; waste water and solid waste 
management. The chapter also provides information on 
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environmental problems in the area, such as sea-filling, fresh-
water contamination; saltwater intrusion into underground 
aquifers; erosion due to sand and pebble extraction and damage to 
the marine environment. 
Keywords: Integrated coastal zone management 
 
1. NORTH LEBANON 
Lebanon is divided into six administrative regions called 
Mohafaza which are further subdivided into 25 districts called 
Caza made up of several cadastral zones except for the Mohafaza 
of Beirut. The Mohafaza of North Lebanon is the second largest in 
the country with a surface area of 2,025 km2  
 
Figure 4.1. Map of North Lebanon 
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Most of Lebanon’s population is concentrated on its Coastal Zone. 
In its most recent estimations, the Central Administration for 
Statistics (CAS) has projected Lebanon’s population at 4 million 
in 1997 and projected it to be 4.3 million by the year 2002 with 
80% living in cities on the coast. This number is expected to 
increase leading to conflicts over the use of coastal resources 
(IOE, 2007 a). 
The coastal area of North Lebanon extends over 100 km 
representing 40% of the entire Lebanese coast (Abou Dagher et 
al., 2012; Mitri et al., 2012). The area encompasses 24 cities and 
villages distributed among five areas: Akkar, Menieh, Tripoli, 
Koura, and Batroun (Figure 4.1). The northern areas are largely 
agricultural, whereas the southern part of this coastline is 
characterized by urbanized areas with a number of large cities 
such as Tripoli and Batroun.  
The population of north Lebanon is estimated to be around 
764,000 inhabitants, representing 20% of the total population of 
Lebanon (CAS, 2007). The north of Lebanon is considered to be 
the poorest and most deprived part of the country, housing 46% of 
the extremely poor population and 38% of the overall poor (El-
Kak, 2000; Das & Davidson, 2011). In addition, this region is 
marginalized and has been historically neglected by the Lebanese 
Government that focuses mainly on the capital Beirut and its 
suburbs (Volk, 2009).  
Conflict and Environment in North Lebanon 
58 
 
2. PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COAST OF NORTH 
LEBANON 
The Lebanese coastline is about 220 km long along a north-south 
axis in the eastern Mediterranean.
19
 The coastline is punctuated by 
12 prominent headlands. The sea cliffs are normally associated 
with wave washed terraces that show typical erosion patterns with 
potholes, blowholes and narrow channels. About 20% of the coast 
is reported to be sandy with some gravel on the landward side. 
The longest sand beaches are those found on the last 16 km in 
northern Lebanon. Other prominent sand beaches and dunes are 
found south of Beirut extending to the airport zone.  
The Northern coastline constitutes around 41% of the total 
Lebanese coast with 100 Km and includes 3 bays, Chekka, El 
Qualamoun and El Abdeh along with two main headlands at Ras-
Al Shaqaa and Tripoli and a variety of river deltas as well as the 
Palm Island Nature Reserve (PINR). The coast is sandy or pebbly 
with typical rocky terraces covered with molluscs such as 
Vermetus triqueter and Dendropoma petraeum, which represent 
an important feature of this coast. This ecosystem enjoys a high 
rate of biodiversity and functions as an important wave barrier 
protecting the coastline from erosion. Some of the sandy beaches 
and sand dunes throughout the coast have been lost to 
development and urbanization.  
The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of international 
importance listed three Lebanese coastal sites with two located 
along the coastal zone of North Lebanon, the Promontory cape 
                                                          
19
 This distance is quite controversial since many discrepancies occur among 
various sources and it is said that the Lebanese coast has currently reached an 
unprecedented 300 km length due to sea filling activities through the years of 
war. 
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and cliffs of Ras Shaqaa and PINR. Since the Ramsar Convention 
defines wetlands as “Areas of marsh, fen, peat land or water, 
whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water 
that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of 
marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six 
meters”, existing Salinas and the numerous river valleys and 
estuaries of the northern Lebanese coast should also be considered 
as potential Ramsar sites in need for protection (United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and Lebanese Ministry of 
Environment (MOE), 2013a; Appendix I, II). In addition, cultural 
and archaeological sites along the northern Lebanese coast are 
numerous (Appendix I) and require protection from urban sprawl 
(Appendix III).  
2.1. Meteorological Setting 
The climate of the Lebanese coast is of Mediterranean subtropical 
type, where summers are hot and dry, and winters are mild and 
wet.  On the other hand, snow covers the mountains of the two 
ranges for several months per year (MOE and United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and ECODIT, 2011).   
Precipitation patterns show large seasonal variations with 
more than 80 % of the annual rainfall typically occurring between 
October and May. The two mountain ranges of Lebanon are 
perpendicular to the path of atmospheric circulation. They 
intercept humidity and receive high rainfall compared to areas 
with similar locations. In general, the northern coastal zone is 
subject to relative high rainfall throughout the year due to location 
of the highest intercepting mountains in North Lebanon. The 
average annual rainfall recorded on the northern coast is 980 
mm/year compared to an average of 887 mm/year in Beirut (IOE, 
2007 a).  
The mean temperature along the northern coastal plains is 
26.7 °C in summer and 10° C in winter with a temperature 
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gradient around 0.57 °C per 100-m altitude (Blanchet, 1976).  
January is typically the coldest month with daily mean 
temperatures falling to -4 ºC in the mountains and 9.3 ºC in 
Tripoli.  The warmest months are July and August, when mean 
daily temperatures can rise to 22 ºC in the mountains and 27 ºC on 
the coast (IOE, 2007 a; FAO-AQUASTAT, 2008).  
Strongest winds are generally observed during the fall 
season.  On the national level, wind data is available at several but 
limited stations.  Since the Mohafaza, and specifically the coastal 
zone area covers a wide range of settings, some variations may 
occur over various sites. The dominant wind in Lebanon has a 
southwest, continental east and southeast direction. Its speed is 
reduced due to the Mount Lebanon range which exerts a big 
influence on wind direction (Table 4.1).   
 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Wind speed km/h  26.9 27.3 29.3 27.9 24.3 
Table 4.1: Data of wind speed at the Tripoli Weather Station from 2001 to 2005 
(Source: Tripoli Environment and Development Observatory (TEDO) Report, 
2006) 
 
Month 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Minimum wave 
height in cm 
23.7 22.1 25.5 22.2 27.7 
Maximum wave 
height  
in cm 
98.7 96.7 101.9 97.6 102.2 
Average in cm 59.1 59.4 63.7 59.9 64.9 
Table 4.2: Wave height recorded at the Tripoli Weather Station from year 2001 
to 2005 
(Source: TEDO report April 2006) 
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Coastal wave environments reflect to a large degree the climatic 
conditions of the region and may influence significantly coastal 
development. Information on coastal wave height, length and 
period is scarce in Lebanon.  The TEDO, nevertheless, has been 
keeping such records for the Union of Municipalities of Fayhaa 
that will also allow the elucidation of the general direction of 
coastal currents Mohafaza (Table 4.2). 
2.2. Tectonic Setting and Seismicity 
Lebanon is located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, 
along the Dead Sea Transform fault system (Figure 4.). This fault 
system in Lebanon has several surface expressions represented in 
major faults (Yammouneh, Roum, Hasbaya, Rashaya and 
Serghaya faults) and in uplifts as high mountainous terrain 
(Mount Lebanon and Anti Lebanon).  Recent work has 
categorized the Lebanese section of the Dead Sea Transform fault 
as being a strong seismic activity zone with the most recent 
earthquake in 2008 where its magnitude was 5.1 (Khair et al., 
2000; Huijer et al., 2011). The geological setting in North 
Lebanon is quite diversified, dominated by layer formations from 
the lower and mid cretaceous era consisting of sandstones 
overlain by extensively fractured thick marine limestone. In the 
Tripoli area and suburbs the layers are from the Quaternary era, 
formed of dunes and lake deposits while basaltic volcanic 
formations from the upper Cenozoic era are found in the northern 
part of Akkar. On the other hand, patches of limestone from the 
Miocene era form an important part of the geologic profile of Al 
Koura and Zgharta regions (Figure 4.) (Walley, 1997).  
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Figure 4.2: Tectonic map of Lebanon (Dubertret, 1955). 
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The topographic feature of North Lebanon is characterized by a 
clear contrast in terrain. This is mainly the outcome of the tectonic 
activity during the intense history of structural build up and uplift 
which left jagged and highly dissected terrain with dense faulting. 
The steepest slope starts at sea level at the Al-Shaqaa headland 
with a perpendicular elevation of more than 300 m. These 
dissected structures explain the existence of many major and 
minor faults. In North Lebanon the most important fault is the 
Akkar fault which is branched from the Yammouneh fault, 
oriented from a North East towards a South West direction, and 
passes through several areas such as Tripoli, Dinnieh, Zgharta, 
Koura and Batroun. Furthermore, there are many minor faults 
which are oriented from West to East in Zgharta, Koura and 
Batroun (IOE, 2007 a). 
2.3. Fresh water 
Lebanon is divided into two hydro-geological provinces: The 
Mediterranean Province comprising the western flanks of Mount 
Lebanon and the Interior Province consisting of the eastern flank 
of Mount Lebanon, Bekaa Valley and the western flank of the 
Anti-Lebanon mountain chain. The underground water in North 
Lebanon is a part of the Mediterranean Province and is a direct 
result of its lithology.  
In North Lebanon there are six perennial rivers which flow 
west from their sources (Table 4.3), the largest one being Nahr El 
Kabir with a length of 58 km, while the Abou Ali River has the 
highest flow averaging 15.17 Mm3/month. The mountainous 
limestone formations of North Lebanon are fissured, fractured and 
rich in faults facilitating the percolation and infiltration of 
snowmelt and rainwater into aquifers. However, these faults can 
form barriers which segregate flow paths of water in different sub-
basins. While the physical properties of aquifers remain almost 
unchangeable over time, the hydraulic and hydrologic 
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characteristics have altered due to uncontrolled groundwater 
tapping (Khair et al., 1994; ECODIT/MOE, 2001; IOE, 2007 a). 
 
Name Caza Length 
(km) 
Flow  (Mm3) Peren
nial 
Index Annual Month
ly 
Avera
ge 
Month
ly 
Maxim
um 
Month
ly 
Minim
um 
El Kabir Akkar 58 190 6.02 13.9 1.8 0.13 
Ostuene Akkar 44 65 2.07 4.01 0.8 0.20 
Araqua Akkar 27 59 2.06 6.27 0.8 0.13 
El Bared Tripoli 24 282 8.94 15.2 2.7 0.18 
Abou Ali Bcharre-
Tripoli 
45 262 15.17 37.3 1.6 0.04 
El Jouz Batroun 38 76 2.4 6.18 0.4 0.06 
Table 4.3: Flow Data for the perennial rivers of North Lebanon (Sources: 
Various including Al Hajjar, 1997) 
 
In addition, there are numerous offshore freshwater marine 
springs in the North (ex. Batroun and Chekka marine spring) 
creating special underwater habitats. The marine springs facing 
Chekka consists of around 17 springs that have a considerable 
discharge estimated at 700Mm3 /yr. Twenty-three out of 34 
springs and boreholes used for public water supply reported on the 
coastal zone are contaminated with faecal coliform.  Primary 
causes of contamination are uncontrolled disposal of wastewater 
into the ground, infiltration of wastewater into ground water 
aquifers, and direct access by humans and animals to water 
sources.  Another major cause of pollution is excessive pumping 
of ground water near the coast resulting in saltwater intrusion into 
underground aquifers (NBSAP/ SAP BIO, 2002).   
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2.4. Continental Shelf; Bathymetry and Sea Currents 
The continental shelf in Lebanon is cut by deep canyons, is widest 
in the north (12 km), narrows down in a north south axis, widens 
up again to 8 km in the south and drops down abruptly to water 
depths of 1500m (Figure 4.3). Beyond this shelf break lays the 
ancient ocean crust. In terms of bathymetry, very few maps have 
been produced and most of the information is scattered. The only 
available maps are for the major ports for navigational purposes. 
 
Figure 4.3: Continental shelf and bathymetric contours of the Lebanese coast; 
(Walley, 1997) 
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Off shore currents follow a north-eastern direction while eddy 
currents form near the shore in a clockwise direction. The eddy 
currents create a southerly movement of sand along relatively 
closed coastal areas often causing constant accumulation of sand 
at the entrances of harbours (Integrated Management of East 
Mediterranean Coastlines (IMAC) 2007; UNEP/MOE, 2013). A 
study performed over El-Mina area in Tripoli and around the 
PINR from March 1991 to February 1992, recorded relative high 
water salinity over the surface of the sea at 39
o/oo
. A remarkable 
decline in the salinity has been mainly recorded over the months 
of December, January and February due to increases in 
precipitation, river discharges and reduction in the evaporation 
factor (Abboud, 1992). The Mediterranean Sea waters have 
become relatively more saline as a result to the construction of the 
Assouan Dam in Egypt that decreased the Nile discharge into the 
Eastern Mediterranean Basin. 
2.5. Sedimentary processes and biodiversity 
There are no comprehensive studies on sedimentary processes on 
Lebanese beaches. However in light of the significant numbers of 
construction and quarries, soil erosion, desertification processes 
and sea filling, deposition of significant quantities of sediments 
mainly at river mouths and sea shore front is expected. The 
concentration of such deposition in specific periods surely has 
acute detrimental effects on marine fauna and flora.  
At the Marine Resources and Coastal Zone Management 
(CZM) Program at the Institute of the Environment (IOB) of the 
University of Balamand’s (UOB) Marine Resources and Coastal 
Zone Management Program (MRCZM) in 2009, a comparison 
between shorelines for the years 1970, 1994 and 2007 was made, 
respectively, using the year 1962 as the reference shoreline. This 
coastal evolution study showed a large amount of artificialization 
along the 100km of the coastal zone of North Lebanon (Annex 
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VII). More than 1,750,000m2 was sea-filled and 931000m2 of 
sand and pebble beaches were lost. Sea-filling and erosion have 
surely affected coastal dynamics and morphology and negatively 
impacted coastal and marine habitats. The question remains if the 
damages on this sediment starved coastline are reversible. Such 
studies are on-going and are being supported by socio-economic 
surveys and analyses within a coastal zone management 
perspective (Abou-Dagher et al. 2012). 
Beach erosion due to sand and pebble extraction from the 
coastal areas and riverbeds has been extensive through the years 
of war, though currently such activities are utterly prohibited by 
law. However, such activities are still being practiced although at 
a much lower rate mainly due to the lack of implementation and 
enforcement of laws and the absence of a national strategy for 
coastal zone management.  
The East Mediterranean basin is considered oligotrophic and 
lacks the nutrient richness of its occidental counterpart. Although 
there are significant discharges of nitrates and phosphates into the 
sea through sewers and rivers, neither eutrophication nor toxic 
algae blooms have been reported on Lebanon's coastal waters.  
The marine and coastal flora and fauna in Lebanon are 
considered to be Mediterranean with some sub-tropical elements. 
Phytoplankton, which includes all microphytic algae, constitutes 
the basis of the food chain in the sea through their primary 
productivity. In addition, macro-zooplankton of various types and 
many species of invertebrates and vertebrates are highly abundant 
in Lebanese waters. Urbanization, industry, domestic wastes, 
garbage and illegal fishing methods are damaging marine 
biodiversity (Appendix V; VI). The sighting of Mediterranean 
monk seal has become a rare phenomenon while the sea horse is 
severely threatened by loss of habitat. Of particular significance is 
the loss of local terraces that are rich in biodiversity and unique to 
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this part of the Mediterranean (NBSAP/ SAP BIO 2002; Bitar 
2008). However, frequent sightings of marine turtles and nesting 
sites have been confirmed in the past years in different locations 
of the Lebanese coast, and more specifically on the beaches of the 
PINR in the North, created under law No 121 on March 9, 1999 
and classified as a Ramsar Site of International Significance in 
2001. The Islands host 42 migratory birds and its sandy beaches 
are habitats for marine turtles. In addition, the islands host ancient 
salt beds and an old lighthouse. This Nature Reserve is public and 
managed currently by a GAC under the tutelage of the Ministry 
Of Environment (MOE) (IOE, 2007 a; TRAGSA GRUPO/MOE, 
2009; MOE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011).  
The Lebanese coastal waters, however, allow for a 
potentially rich biological system. The Lebanese marine 
ecosystem comprises 1685 species of fauna of which 50 are 
commercially important fish species. The number of planktonic 
primary and secondary producers is over 1250 species 
(NBSAP/SAP BIO 2002; Bitar 2008; Nader, 2011). These await 
proper documentation and conservation because they are 
subjected to pollution from land based sources that might lead to 
their extinction. 
 
3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE 
COASTAL ZONE OF NORTH LEBANON 
3.1. Demographics 
Approximately 8870 hectares of the Northern coast is currently 
urbanized having Tripoli as its capital and includes the second 
largest port in Lebanon (Appendix VI; UNEP-MAP/ECODIT, 
2005; Mitri et al., 2012). The population of North Lebanon 
comprises approximately 768,000 inhabitants (CAS, 2004). The 
largest concentration, 325,308 individuals, lives in the cadastral 
area of the Union of Municipalities of Al-Fayhaa. The population 
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density in this cadastral area averages 11 000 ind/km2 (TEDO, 
2006) in comparison to 331 people/km2 in the entire of North 
Lebanon (based on 1996 estimations; Table 4.4). In North 
Lebanon, the birth rate was calculated at 2.09%, contributing to 
1/3 of the national population growth (Figure 4.4). This is leading 
to continuous pressure on natural resources and will consequently 
affect the quality of living in the area. 
 
Caza Population Estimate 
1996 
Population 
density/km2 
Average Household 
size 
Akkar 198,174 251 6.0 
Minieh-
Dinnieh 
96,417 235 5.7 
Tripoli 227,857 8439 5.2 
Zgharta 48,974 270 4.6 
Bcharre 16,831 106 4.7 
Koura 47,540 276 4.4 
Batroun 34,817 121 4.6 
Total 670,610 331 5.3 
Table 4.4: Demographic data per Caza in the Mohafaza of North Lebanon 
(MoSA/UNDP, 1996) 
 
The average age of household heads was found to be 42.5 years 
old (Figure 4.4; Doumani, 2007). In a more recent study held at 
the MRCZM-IOE-UOB under the ERML project, the average 
age of those interviewed in the sample by the socio-economic 
study was 39 years old for the entire coast, with an age of 39 for 
North Lebanon (Figure 4.4; UNEP/MOE, 2013). 
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Figure 4.4.: Distribution of population in North Lebanon according to age 
category by estimation of year 2002 (TEDO report August, 2006) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Average age distribution on the coast (UNEP/MOE, 2013). 
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In North Lebanon, it was very difficult to target women as they do 
not accept to answer the interviewer, or are simply not present in 
the streets which were due to cultural specificities (UNEP/MOE, 
2013) and therefore the higher percentages of male respondents in 
the target area (Figure 4.5; UNEP/MOE, 2013).  
 
Figure 4.6: Percentage of male and female in the sample (UNEP/MOE, 2013) 
Regarding education, less than 25% of the northern has secondary 
education and less than 35% have complementary educational 
level (Figure 4.7).  
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Figure 4.7: Educational level in North Lebanon 
 
The percentage of people not working but looking for a job can be 
considered as a proxy measure of unemployment. The level of 
activity of the labour force participation rate is therefore the sum 
of the percentage of those working and those looking for a job. 
Results of the distribution of the labour force for the North 
Lebanon coastal zone is 91% compared to 80% for the coast as a 
whole (Figure 4.8; UNEP/MOE 2013 b).  
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Figure 4.8: Percentage of the working status on the coast. 
 
Figure 4.9 summarizes the distribution of the working population 
and the percentage of the respondents working in each sector of 
economic activity. 
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Figure 4.9: Percentage of the working respondents in each economic sector 
A - Agriculture, hunting and forestry; B – Fishing; C - Mining and quarrying; 
D – Manufacturing; E - Electricity, gas and water supply; F – Construction; G 
- Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods; H - Hotels and restaurants; I - Transport, 
storage and communications; J - Financial intermediation; K - Real estate, 
renting and business activities; L - Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security; M – Education; N - Health and social work; O - 
Other community, social and personal service activities; P - Activities of 
private households as employers and undifferentiated production activities of 
private households; Q - Extraterritorial organizations and bodies 
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Results show that less than 3% of the interviewees work in the 
primary sector, (agriculture and fisheries), 3.71% work in 
manufacturing and majorities work in the services sector with an 
impressive 48% in retail trade activities (UNEP/MOE, 2013 b).  
3.2. Economics 
3.2.1. The industrial sector 
In 1994, the Lebanese Ministry of Industry (MOI) launched an 
industrial census with the assistance of the German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ). This census updated in 1999 shows that 
approximately 17% of industrial establishments are located in 
North Lebanon and employ over 14,000 workers. Most (over 
80%) are small manufacturing plants that employ less than 10 
individuals. The MOI census allocated industrial activities to eight 
primary industrial branches which cover nearly 89% of the 
industrial sector (Table 4.5). The largest part of the Lebanese non-
metallic mineral industry is located in Batroun Caza between 
Selaata (55 km to the north of Beirut) and Chekka (60 km to the 
north of Beirut) and contributes significantly to air and marine 
pollution (Karam and Tabara, 2004). In Chekka, there are two 
cement factories: Holcim (HC) with a total production capacity of 
2.5 million tonnes/year with the highest market share in Lebanon 
(41.1 percent) and Ciementerie du Liban (CLi) with a total 
production capacity of 1.65 million tons/year with a preliminary 
output impact of US$ 211.8 million and 918 workers in 2005 
(Doumani, 2007). In addition, the Lebanon Chemicals Company 
(LCC) S.A.L produces approximately 664,000 tons/year of 
sulphuric acid, 180,000 tons/year of phosphoric acid and 85,000 
tons/year of phosphatic fertilizers in the free zone of Selaata. This 
export oriented industry, whose exports are exclusively destined 
to Europe, releases 300,000 tons/year of gypsum slurry into the 
sea contaminated with heavy metals (cadmium) and residual 
sulphuric acid making it one of the major hot spots on the 
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Lebanese coast. The preliminary outcome impact amounts to US$ 
139.5 million and are not official figures (Karam and Tabara, 
2004; IOE, 2007 a; Doumani, 2007). Also, the piping industry is 
one of the major branches represented by the factory of Future 
Pipes, a major Polyethylene, Polyvinyl chloride and fibre-glass 
factory located in the Akkar coastal plain. 
 
Mohafazat Caza Municipality 
Number of 
factories member 
of Association of 
Lebanese 
Industries (ALI) 
in the 
municipalities 
Total Number of 
factories in the 
municipalities 
North 
Akkar 
Bebnine 0 6 
Mhammaret 0 3 
Menieh-
Denieh 
Menieh 2 23 
DeirAammar 0 6 
Beddaoui 0 18 
Tripoli 
Mina 5 72 
Tripoli 7 161 
Koura RasMasqa 0 6 
Tripoli Qalamoun 2 18 
Koura Enfeh 1 7 
Batroun 
Chekka 5 12 
Selaata 2 2 
Batroun 1 8 
Table 4.5: Number of industries on the Lebanese coast (only 20% of these 
facilities are members of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists (ALI)) 
Source: Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (CCIA) 2011; 
Industrial Directory 2012 
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Those are distributed into eight large industrial branches (Table 
4.6).  
 
Industrial Branch 
Quantity: 
Lebanon 
% 
Quantity: North 
Lebanon 
% 
Food products and 
beverages 
4,480 23 1,020 28.7 
Leather and leather 
products 
1,290 6.6 117 3.5 
Textiles 804 4.1 115 3.3 
Clothes & dyeing fur 2,263 11.6 286 8.3 
Wood products 2,249 11.5 151 4.4 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 
2,530 13 551 16 
Fabricated metal 
products 
3,553 18.2 477 13.8 
Furniture and other 
manufactured goods 
2,352 12 770 22 
Total 19,521 100 3,487 100 
Table 4.6: Distribution of the eight largest industrial branches in North 
Lebanon 
Source: MOI, 2000 
 
North Lebanon though is well-known for its small artisanal 
industry like stone cutting, soap making, salt extraction, and 
pottery making. Many of those trades are being lost for other large 
industrial initiatives. For example, boat construction is one of the 
oldest artisanal industry that is traditionally performed on the El 
Mina quayside and consists of wooden and fibreglass boats. This 
activity suffered extensively from the 2006 Israeli War on 
Lebanon and has lost most of its craftsmen. The preliminary 
output impact, household income and craftsmen are respectively 
US$ 0.33 million, US$ 0.13 million and 30 in 2005 (IOE, 2007 a; 
Doumani, 2007).    
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In North Lebanon, there are three main power plants 
producing electricity. Leaking storage tanks and the process of 
loading and unloading heavy fuel oil via sea pipelines result in 
constant leakages and some accidental spills in the marine 
environment.  
The Deir Amar Thermoelectric Plant generates a total 
capacity of 435 MW and was established between 1998 and 2000. 
It was designed to work on natural gas supplied from Syria 
through pipelines by the year 2002. The pipeline was to be later 
extended to the Zahrani power plant but the work was 
discontinued due to political reasons. The Deir Amar Power Plant 
is currently operating on fuel oil that is responsible for the largest 
part of accounted SO2 emissions in the region. Therefore, the 
price of not substituting the plant to gas is resulting in 
unfortunately forgoing huge financial and environmental benefits. 
The non-substitution to gas is preventing savings in the plant’s oil 
consumption that were estimated at US$ 150 million per year in 
2002 prices (based on a Brent oil/barrel at US$ 20 in 2002) and 
US$ 450 million per year in 2007 prices (based on US$ 60). 
Moreover, environmental health effects especially due to benefit 
losses for not reducing sulphur, NOx, CO2 and PM10 emissions 
were estimated at US$ 206 million between 2005 and 2020.  This 
mismanagement is compounded by another missed opportunity in 
terms of carbon funding, which could have helped defray the cost 
of the switch and improved the financial state of the troubled 
Electricité Du Liban (EDL) and even more importantly eased the 
balance of payments pressures. These positive effects could have 
also been compounded should the Zouk, Jiyyeh and Zahrani 
power plants (collectively 1,388 MW installed capacity and 1,250 
MW effective capacity) were switched to gas. 
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The Hreicheh Thermoelectric Plant located to the North of 
the town of Enfeh with a 75 MW installed capacity and 42 MW 
effective capacity, while the Abou Ali Hydroelectric plant 
produces a capacity of 1.5 MW and El Bared generates a capacity 
of 15 MW. These two plants negatively impact coastal 
environments by blocking river water behind dams and trapping 
nutrients and organic matter and preventing them from reaching 
the marine environment.  
3.2.2. The tourism sector 
Thirty seven hotels and touristic resorts are located on the 100 Km 
North Lebanon coastline (UNEP/MOE b., 2013). The impact of 
traditional tourism has been expressed in different forms 
according to the type of practice. For example, on the coastal 
zone, the deteriorating effect of manmade marinas and 
embankments on coastal biocenoses, which is vital for the 
spawning and feeding of coastal organisms, did not halt the 
additional construction of such urban structures. Those resorts 
have greatly reduced the access to public beaches, and a vast 
majority of them are illegally built on public maritime domains 
(Table 4.8; Abou-Dagher et al., 2012). The various coastal 
marinas and sea fronts are currently used for recreational activities 
such as unregulated recreational fishing, scuba diving, jet-skiing 
and boating. The concentration of recreational activities within 
beach resorts and open-air restaurants in all seasons swells traffic 
and the number of visitors leading to an increase in green-house-
gas (GHG) emissions and in the amounts untreated solid waste 
and wastewater. Due to serious deficiency in traffic management, 
the main roads leading to and from tourist destinations are 
crowded and sometimes grid locked during peak hours by 
enthusiasts. Those areas host a large number of restaurants, 
nightclubs and coffee shops, and offer magnificent vistas (MOE/ 
ECODIT, 2001; MOE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011). 
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Ecotourism, on the other hand, occupies a humble share in 
comparison to traditional tourism. Detailed data on the ecotourism 
sector in North Lebanon is lacking in exception to the number of 
visitors to the PINR. The visitors’ number to PINR fluctuated in 
the last 5 years between 24,000 and 31,000 (TEDO, 2006).  On 
the other hand, cultural tourism is focused mainly on the Tripoli 
Citadel. 
 
Mohafaz
at 
Caza Municipality 
Numbers of 
hotels and 
tourist resorts 
Percentage of 
tourism entities 
by municipality 
North 
Tripoli 
Tripoli 10 3.18 
Qalamoun 2 0.63 
Koura Enfeh 1 0.31 
Batroun 
Chekka 15 4.77 
Batroun 9 2.86 
Table 4.7: Number of hotels and touristic resorts on coast by municipality 
 
However, the number of people visiting this archaeological site 
has steadily decreased from 16,085 in 1998 to 7,085 in 2005. 
Until June 2006, the number of visitors to Tripoli Citadel had 
reached 4,709 (TEDO, 2006). Additionally, the armed clashes in 
and around the city Tripoli since 2008 till date have severely 
reduced the number of visitors to Tripoli in particular and to the 
northern coastal zone of Lebanon in general (UNEP/MOE, 2013 
b).  
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Table 4.8: Number of sea construction activities in the four Cazas with 
coastlines 
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3.2.3. Transportation sector 
Lebanon encompasses more than 1.2 million registered vehicles 
with almost 75% as private cars. The length of Classified Road 
Network (CRN) in North Lebanon is approximately 1,558 km 
(MOE/Ecodit, 2001) forming 26% of the national CRN. There are 
three primary road axes passing through the coastal zone: 1) the 
Coastal International Road from Madfoun to Arida; 2) the Coastal 
International Road from Madfoun to Abboudieh (at the Syrian 
border); and 3) the Northern Expressway from Madfoun to Arida 
(Table 4.9). The two Coastal International roads have a common 
segment stretching from Madfoun to Abdeh (Table 4.9; Table 
4.10).Visual observations show that the largest part of traffic 
volume is on the Expressway and the main International Coastal 
Road from Tripoli till the Syrian border, of which a significant 
part consists of trucks transiting between Lebanon and its 
neighbouring countries such as Syria and Iraq (MOE/ ECODIT, 
2001; CAS, 2008; MOE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011). 
 
Road20 Length (km) 
The Coastal International Road from Madfoun to Arida 
(at the Syrian border) via Tripoli 
77 
The Coastal International Road from Madfoun to Abboudieh 
(at Syrian border) via Tripoli  
83 
Constructed Segment of The Northern Expressway from Madfoun to 
Tripoli (segment from Tripoli to Arida still under construction)  
42 
Table 4.9: Primary road axes in North Lebanon 
 
The pace of construction and development of road networks have 
not kept up with population growth. Unplanned and poor roads 
have compromised the landscape and ecosystem integrity on the 
northern coastal zone. Coastal roads have promoted urban, 
                                                          
20
 Both road networks have common segments stretching from Madfoun to 
Abdeh (57 km). 
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opportunistic and uncontrolled sprawl in the form of ribbon 
construction strips as observed on the Abdeh-Halba road. 
 
Road Length (km) 
Batroun- Tannourine Road 35 
Chekka- Cedar via Amioun Road 60 
Tripoli Ehden Road via Zgharta 35 
Tripoli Bcharre via Ehden Road 50 
Tripoli-Sir Ed-Dinnieh Road 23 
Tripoli-Khayat  via Abdeh Road21 55 
Table 4.10: Secondary road axes in North Lebanon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Ribbon construction in the rectangle along Aabde-Halba road 
(Akkar) 
(Source: Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and ECODIT-
IAURIF, 1997) 
 
                                                          
21
 Common segment with the Tripoli-Abdeh road (15 km). 
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According to a land use survey conducted in 1999 (Lebanese 
Ministry of Public Works and Transportation (MOPWT), 1999), 
42.1 % of lands adjacent to international roads were built up 
(UNEP/MOE, 2013 b).  
The second largest commercial marine port in Lebanon is 
located in Tripoli (Table 4.11). On the other hand, the major 
industries in the North have their own private ports. The cement 
industries in Chekka possess a private marina for the import and 
export of material while the Chemical Company in Selaata uses its 
private port to import sulphur to produce sulphuric acid and to 
export the produced chemical fertilizers. Furthermore, the thermal 
power plant in Deir Amar includes a port and offshore pipelines 
for refuelling purposes  
 
Year Number of 
Entering 
Commercial Ships 
Ship Capacity 
(1000 barrels) 
Number of 
oil Tankers22 
Capacity of oil 
Tankers 
(1000 barrels) 
2001 494 801 60 600 
2002 437 707 76 795 
2003 474 845 79 715 
2004 543 919 82 763 
2005 424 657 66 650 
Table 4.11: Transport activity via Tripoli port 2001 to 2005 (CAS 2001-2005) 
 
Marinas induce visual quality degradation to the aesthetics of the 
landscape. The view of the ports, ships, cargos and artificial lights 
disturb the natural beauty of the coast and lead to the degradation 
of marine and coastal ecology where the location of the port 
affects the aquatic fauna and flora through changes in water 
quality. Piles, concrete surfaces and other constructions create 
new habitats for undesirable new species. Most have been 
identified as invasives introduced accidently through ship ballast 
                                                          
22
 Number of tankers is independent from the number of commercial ships. 
North Lebanon 
 
 85 
water carried from one geographical area to another (Marine 
Work Group, 2011). Docking, transfer, reloading of a variety of 
goods, especially refuelling and chemical transport from industrial 
ports poses major threats in case of accidents due to lack of 
maintenance and technological upgrading (Doumani, 2007; 
UNEP/MOE, 2013 b). 
North Lebanon is home to two small airports located in the 
coastal strip. The Hamat Airport was created in 1976 for special 
tourist trips and for the export of agricultural produce while the 
Qleyat Airport was created for military purposes. Currently, both 
airports are used by the Lebanese army. Future plans intend to 
transform the Qleyat air field into a commercial airport. 
Increasing air traffic will surely lead to an increase in further 
development of the areas surrounding the airport and most 
probably pushing this coastal region further into becoming a 
highly industrialized area. Information on the future Hamat 
Airport is lacking. 
3.2.4. Agriculture 
The agricultural sector contributes about 6% of Lebanon’s Gross 
Domestic Product (Doumani, 2007). Cultivated lands occupy 
approximately 24% of Lebanon’s territory, amounting to 248,000 
hectares. In North Lebanon, the surface area of cultivated lands is 
approximately 63,000 hectares with 35% classified (22,000 
hectares) as irrigated (Table 4.12; UNEP/MOE, 2013b). The 
agricultural activity is concentrated in the Akkar plain and the 
narrow coastal plain stretching from Batroun to Tripoli where five 
main types of crops are planted: cereals, olives, fruit trees, 
industrial crops (beet, tobacco, and vineyards) and vegetables 
(Table 4.13). Forty percent of the land used for olives is found in 
the Akkar and Koura Cazas.  
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Mohafazat Caza Municipality 
Agricultural area 
in 2010 (ha) 
Agricultural area 
in percentage of 
total municipal 
surface (2010) 
North 
Akkar 
Qleyat 14916994.20 75.90 
Mqaiteaa 3316801.88 90.80 
Qoubbet-Chamra 3319513.59 93.13 
Bebnine 6052282.19 89.43 
Mhammaret 2777518.21 72.06 
Menieh-
Denieh 
Bhanine 5455514.74 83.26 
Menieh 8012127.51 80.89 
Borj El-
Yahoudiyeh 
1282277.04 60.83 
DeirAammar 1837411.20 52.44 
Beddaoui 2863929.85 51.84 
Tripoli 
Mina 454406.50 11.88 
Tripoli 9929445.09 49.07 
Koura RasMasqa 3520317.31 46.97 
Tripoli Qalamoun 1393679.14 44.27 
Koura Enfeh 4902407.05 48.25 
Batroun 
Chekka 2952384.41 36.76 
Heri 380747.48 26.20 
Hamat 2460483.85 24.81 
Selaata 188099.85 9.28 
Batroun 2007475.74 42.99 
Koubba 557628.60 48.61 
KfarAabida 963603.36 26.86 
Table 4.12: The area of the agricultural land in the different coastal 
municipalities of North Lebanon 
Source: Classification LULC (refer to section 5.2) 
 
Uncontrolled pumping of underlying aquifers in the area for 
irrigation purposes resulted in a significant drawdown of the water 
table along with a remarkable degradation of irrigation water 
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quality due to sea water intrusion. In general surface and well 
water are consumed on an equal share for agricultural activities 
that use mostly surface irrigation methods (MOE/ECODIT, 2001). 
 
Type of Crop Occupied surface area 
Cereals 12038 
Fruit Trees 13568 
Olives 20963 
Industrial Crops 3777 
Vegetables 12858 
Total 63204 
Table 4.13: Land Use for Major Type of Crops in North Lebanon (hectares) 
(Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and FAO, 2000) 
 
The surface area of agricultural production in Greenhouses 
occupies approximately 1100 hectares which forms 1.7% of the 
total cultivated surface in North Lebanon (MOA/FAO, 2000). The 
extensive mode of production implies a massive usage of 
pesticides and agrochemicals. Clear and accurate figures on these 
practices are not available. On the national scale, Lebanon 
imported in year 1999 approximately 1,538 tons of pesticides. The 
largest part consisted of insecticides and fungicides (MOE/ 
ECODIT, 2001) with the highest amount of pesticides used in 
vegetable production. In addition, a study on the indiscriminate 
and uncontrolled use of agrochemicals reported a 30% additional 
dosages being applied by farmers (Farajalla, 2005; UNEP/MOE, 
2013). Furthermore, crops are being sprayed with no respect to the 
withdrawal period necessary before harvesting posing health risks 
to consumers.  
On a positive note, the Government of Lebanon signed the 
Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants, and 1998, 
the MOA banned imports of 110 pesticides that are considered 
potent and persistent in the environment. Furthermore, many local 
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and environmental NGOs are providing targeted extension 
programs to local farmers in a variety of agricultural disciplines 
including the promotion of organic farming. 
3.2.5. Fisheries and water management  
Lebanese fisheries are artisanal or traditional. During the nineties 
the Lebanese Government implemented a program to rehabilitate 
15 fishing harbours along the Lebanese coast, including 4 in 
North Lebanon: Al Abdeh (250 boats), El Mina (1000 boats), El 
Qualamoun (50 boats) and Batroun (80 boats). Living marine 
resources are managed by the Ministry of Agriculture, while the 
Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPWT) is in charge of 
the fishing boat registry (Majdalani 2005; Sacchi and Dimech 
2011). The Lebanese fishing fleet totals 2,662 registered fishing 
boats spread along the entire coast. The main gears include 
trammel nets, gill nets, long lines, purse seine nets (lampara) and 
beach seines. Fishing usually occurs to a maximum depth of up to 
200 m, while most activities take place at an average depth of 50 
m. The fishing grounds, gears and habits are similar along the 
Lebanese coast. Logbooks are not used and catch reporting from 
fishers, when existing, tend to be underestimates. Moreover, 
illegal fishing techniques using dynamite and nets with small 
mesh size are chronic problems that, even though reduced, have 
not been completely resolved.  
In addition, historical fisheries data are sporadic and the 
country lacks information on stocks, by-catch and discards 
(Majdalani 2004; Bitar 2008; Nader et al. 2012a; Nader et al. 
2014). Nevertheless, the past few years have seen the launching of 
several initiatives to address the problems plaguing the sector. In 
2006 the MRCZM-IOE-UOB initiated a data collection program 
of commercial fisheries in North Lebanon. This includes landings 
and effort in the Mohafaza (governorate) of North Lebanon and 
Akkar, covering 45% of the Lebanese coastline.  
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Figure 4.11: Major fishing ports in North Lebanon (Nader et al. 2012b) 
 
Currently, information about fishing gear, species, quantity, price 
and size is collected on a weekly basis for 88 commercial species 
from the four major ports in North Lebanon: Batroun, Qalamoun, 
Tripoli and Abdeh (Figure 4.11). On the other hand, effort data 
are obtained from the records of the Lebanese Army that registers 
boat activity on a daily basis. Gathered information is entered in 
the Fish Landing Operational Utility for Catch Assessment 
database (FLOUCA) allowing the generation of monthly and 
yearly trends of catch, catch per unit effort (CPUE), and average 
price for the monitored species. The main goal of the initiative is 
to establish long-term monitoring of commercial fish landings and 
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effort in order to contribute to developing appropriate 
management plans based on scientific data to sustainably benefit 
from the resource (Nader et al. 2012b). Furthermore, the Lebanese 
National Council for Scientific Research (CNRS), through the 
National Centre for Marine Sciences (NCMS), implemented the 
CANA project funded by the “Italian Cooperation for 
Development in Lebanon and Syria” and the Lebanese 
Government. The overall objective is to increase the knowledge of 
coastal and marine environments towards drawing responsible and 
sustainable development outlines while preparing guidelines for 
an integrated coastal policy. In addition, the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in collaboration with the CNRS-NCMS and the 
CANA team, launched in June 2012 the project PescaLibano. Its 
main objective is to provide “technical assistance to the Ministry 
of Agriculture in the field of fishery development”. On another 
front, the EastMed-Project by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in collaboration with 
the Ministry of Agriculture in Lebanon and funded by Greece, 
Italy and the European Community, is supporting the 
development of regionally-consistent fisheries management plans 
among the Eastern Mediterranean countries. The project’s longer-
term development objective aims at contributing to the sustainable 
management of marine fisheries in the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
thereby supporting national economies and protecting the 
livelihoods of those involved in the fisheries sector. Within this 
context, an agreement was signed between the FAO-EastMed 
project and the IOE-UOB to initiate a “Pilot Survey on Fisheries 
Dependent Data Collection in Lebanon Including Training”. The 
IOE-UOB contributed to improve and implement the national 
fisheries dependent data collection program through the expansion 
of FLOUCA into FLOUCA Web and through training related 
staff of the Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture on the expanded 
application. FLOUCA Web operates as an internet-driven system 
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with outposts at selected major ports of the Lebanese coastline 
and is quite transparent in its operations. As can be seen, several 
initiatives have been launched in the past few years to properly 
and sustainably manage marine and coastal resources, taking into 
consideration the well-being of coastal communities.  
All the above listed studies provided the baseline data for 
reconstructing the historical fisheries catch of Lebanon from 1950 
till 2010. Available patchy historical information supported by the 
estimates generated by FLOUCA allowed  calculating the values 
of total catches for Lebanese coastal regions from 1950 to 2010 
for a total of 345,000 t, that being 2.4 times the 141,000 t reported 
by the FAO on behalf of Lebanon. This evaluation provided a 
more comprehensive measure of fisheries catches in Lebanese 
coastal regions since it covered a broad range of sectors such as 
artisanal, subsistence and recreational fishing in addition to 
discard estimates (Nader et al. 2014). 
There are two major sources of coastal water pollution 
plaguing the northern coast of Lebanon: solid waste and domestic 
and industrial wastewater discharges. Sinking garbage covers 
considerable areas of the neritic zones of the Lebanese coast and 
degrades natural benthic substrates while pollution from 
wastewater constitutes a serious health problem. Winds, waves 
and currents, driven by the prevailing winds move pollutants at 
sea progressively shoreward. Deposits of organic matter reduces 
the concentration of dissolved oxygen while wood and solid waste 
along the shores create unsightly and sometimes dangerous 
conditions for the public (NBSAP/SAP-BIO 2002; 
UNEP/MOE/ECODIT, 2011; UNEP/MOE, 2013 a).  
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Table 4.14: Inventory and status of the waste water treatment plants along the 
coastal zone of North Lebanon 
Source: CDR Progress Report 2011 
Generated waste water in the Northern district is of 137.6-142 
thousand m3/day with an average of 0.15 m3/day/capita. Hotspot 
areas include Al-Abdeh, Tripoli, Enfeh, Chekka and Selaata. In 
these areas, approximately 74,300 m
3
/day of sewage are 
discharged which is equivalent to a Biological Oxygen Demand 
(BOD) charge of 10,850 tons per year. Industries release an 
additional estimated 6,000 m
3
/day via 13 identified short sea 
industrial outfalls. Furthermore, Tripoli landfill generates an 
estimated 24,000 MT of leachate per year. In addition, 300,000 
tons per year of gypsum are released into the sea from the 
Lebanon Chemical Company located in Selaata, which might 
contain Cadmium (Table 4.14; Doumani, 2007).  
Only two out of ten sewage treatment plants (Chekka, 
Batroun) had been constructed in the last few years and awaiting 
operation while others are under construction. A wastewater 
treatment plant serving 2000 residential units has been operational 
in Batroun for the past year (UNEP/MOE b., 2013). Other sources 
of water pollution include effluent from tanneries, rock-sawing 
industries and oil refineries. Within this context, various levels of 
heavy metals were detected in marine coastal waters near 
industrial facilities such as the Selaata Chemical Plant, Chekka 
Mohafazat Caza Municipality Water treatment plant 
 North Akkar Bebnine Under preparation 
 North Tripoli Tripoli 
Achieved and awaiting 
operation 
 North Batroun Chekka 
Achieved and awaiting 
operation 
 North Batroun Batroun 
Achieved and awaiting 
operation 
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cement factories and the Akkar pipe industries 
(MOE/UNEP/ECODIT, 2011; UNEP/MOE, 2013 a).  
Urban solid waste had been uncontrollably disposed off in 
many illegal dumpsites like in the Akkar coastal plain and in the 
many valleys of the Mohafaza. However, the Tripoli sanitary 
landfill remains by far the largest recipient of municipal waste 
where litter of approximately 400,000 people continues to flow on 
a daily basis at an average daily rate of 0.95 Kg/day/capita (Table 
4.15). The Tripoli landfill has been upgraded and rehabilitated but 
still poses threat through leachate generation and benthic litter. To 
date, no plans for new landfills on the northern coastline are 
drawn and no other significant point source pollution from urban 
solid waste was identified (MOE/UNEP/ECODIT, 2011; 
UNEP/MOE, 2013).  
Year Dumped Waste /Year (kg) Dumped Waste /Day (kg) 
2001 101,082,000 276,940 
2002 103,900,000 284,620 
2003 97,900,000 290,480 
2004 107,102,000 293,430 
2005 108,229,520 296,520 
Table 4.15: Quantity of waste in Tripoli landfill from 2001 to 2005 (Source: 
TEDO report August 2006) 
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APPENDIX I 
Cultural and ecological sites along the coastal zone of North 
Lebanon 
 
Site Name Location/ Municipality Conservation Status Sources 
Aarida 
estuary 
Qleiaat. Recommended/proposed 
conservation. 
CDR/ECODIT/IAURI
F, 1997. 
  
Cheikh 
Zennad 
Beach 
Qleiaat. Recommended/proposed 
conservation. 
MOE; 
CDR/ECODIT/IAURI
F, 1997. 
  
Salinas and 
wetland of 
Qleiaat 
Qleiaat. Recommended/proposed 
conservation. 
CDR/ECODIT/IAURI
F, 1997. 
  
Coastal dunes 
of Akkar 
Plain 
Qleiaat. Recommended/proposed 
conservation. 
CDR/ECODIT/IAURI
F, 1997. 
  
  
Mqeitaa. 
QoubbetChamra. 
Aarqa river 
estuary 
QoubbetChamra. National conservation. MOE, Decision no. 
188/1998.   
City of 
Orthosia in 
El Bared 
River 
Mhamrat.  N/A23   
Terraces of 
El Mina 
beach 
El Mina.  N/A    
Terraces and 
Beach of 
southern 
Tripoli 
towards 
Qalamoun 
Tripoli. National conservation. Decree No. 
3362/1972. 
Qalamoun. 
RasEnfeh Enfeh.  N/A    
Salinas, wall 
promenade of 
Enfeh and 
Enfeh.  N/A    
                                                          
23
 N/A: Information Not Available. 
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Site Name Location/ Municipality Conservation Status Sources 
Our Lady of 
Natour 
Monastery 
Heri - 
Chekka 
beaches 
Chekka.  N/A    
Heri.  N/A   
Offshore 
freshwater 
marine 
springs in 
Chekka 
Chekka.  N/A  
Promontory 
cape and 
cliffs of 
RasShaqaa 
and Saydet El 
Nouriyeh 
Monastery 
Hamat. Recommended/proposed 
conservation - 
International 
conservation. 
CDR/DAR/IAURIF, 
2005; 
 IMAC, 2009; 
MOE/IUCN/AECID, 
2011; 
CDR/ECODIT/IAURI
F, 1997. 
Selaata 
terraces 
Selaata. N/A   
El Jawz 
River estuary 
Koubba. National conservation. MOE, Decision no. 
22/1998  
Batroun 
National 
Marine Hima 
at the 
National 
Centre for 
Marine 
Sciences  
Batroun. National conservation. MOA, Decision no. 
129 of 1991. 
Historical 
Center and 
Fishing 
Harbor of 
Batroun 
Batroun.  N/A   
Beaches of 
Kfaraabida 
Kfaraabida.  N/A   
Fadaous 
ancient tell 
Kfaraabida. None. Recently discovered.  
Medfoun 
rocky area 
Thoum 
(kaemakamiyeh). 
 N/A   
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APPENDIX II 
Priority and Ranking of Ecologically Sensitive Areas in 
Lebanon 
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APPENDIX III 
Priority and Ranking of Culturally Sensitive Areas in 
Lebanon 
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APPENDIX IV 
Clustered high priority sites 
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APPENDIX V 
Land Change Land Use (LCLU) change detection map 
between 1998 and 2010 on the coastal zone of North Lebanon 
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APPENDIX VI 
Artificialized forested and agricultural land on the coastal 
zone between 1998 and 2010 at North Lebanon and other 
Mohafzat 
 
 
0.2% 
Series1, 
Mount 
Lebanon, 
287.82, 40% 
Series1, 
North , 153.9, 
21% 
Series1, 
South, 
278.1, 39% 
Perentage of artificialized forested land on the 
coastal zone between 1998 and 2010 per 
Mohafazat 
Beirut 
Mount Lebanon 
North  
South 
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Series1, Mount 
Lebanon, 
88.74, 18% 
Series1, North 
, 158.67, 33% 
Series1, South, 
234.45, 49% 
Precentage of artificialized agricultural land on the 
coastal zone between 1998 and 2010 per Mohafazat 
Mount Lebanon 
North  
South 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPOSURE 
Land Use and Land Degradation in Times of Violent 
Conflict
24
 
George Mitri and Sahar T. Issa 
 
Abstract: This Chapter 5 is the first of the selection of chapters 
empirically developing the concepts that were theoretically 
explored in Chapters 2 and 3. It initiates the book’s Part 1 that is 
dedicated to empirical investigations of North Lebanon’s 
exposure and sensitivity to armed conflict and its environmental 
effects. The chapter investigates exposure to environmental 
damage and land degradation in association with armed conflict. 
In this context, exposure to environmental damage depends on 
location, proximity to the source of threat, probability or 
frequency of the event, intensity, duration, and spatial impact. 
Overall, we argue that while recurrent armed conflicts directly and 
indirectly contributed to increased exposure to environmental 
damage and land degradation, other factors related to human 
activities could also worsen the environmental situation.  
Keywords: Armed conflicts, exposure, environmental damage, 
land degradation 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In times of conflict, the environment falls at the bottom list of 
intervention priorities, while more focus is given to saving lives, 
                                                          
24
 With permission of all publishers involved, parts of this chapter are based on: 
Issa, S.T. 2014. A Glimmer of Hope? An Assessment of Vulnerability and 
Empowerment in the Coastal Area of North Lebanon. PhD Thesis. Enschede: 
University of Twente. 
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reducing human sufferings, and responding to people needs 
(Shambaugh et al., 2001). However, the natural environment 
should be considered as a high priority due to the essential 
dependence of many communities on a healthy environment 
(Shambaugh et al., 2001).  
Lebanon’s history is marked with much turbulence, political 
instability, and recurring episodes of armed conflict. The various 
outbreaks of armed conflicts have had significant impacts in terms 
of fatalities and injuries, population displacement, insecurity, 
economic disruption, as well as direct and indirect impacts on the 
natural environment. 
One of the recent Lebanon’s armed conflicts, in which  
environmental impacts of war received global attention, was the 
2006 Israel-Lebanon War. More specifically, the bombing of the 
oil tanks in Jiyyeh, and the resulting oil spill severely affected the 
marine and coastal environments in the eastern Mediterranean. 
Overall, this war resulted in substantial environmental 
degradation, later estimated to a value of USD 729 million (Das 
and Davidson, 2011). Eight years later, Israel was asked by the 
United Nations General Assembly to compensate Lebanon for 
$856.4 million in oil spill damages it caused during the July 2006 
war. The vote asked Israel to offer "prompt and adequate 
compensation" to Lebanon and other countries affected by the oil 
spill's pollution. Yet, environmental damages created by many 
other episodes of conflicts and wars in Lebanon have received less 
attention.  
It is worth noting that recurring episodes of armed conflicts 
in Lebanon proved to increase people’s negligent behaviour 
towards their surrounding environment. This is worsened by other 
factors such as urbanization, the lack of environmental 
management, uncontrolled activities in various sectors, including 
industry, tourism, agriculture, and transport. Such activities are 
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exerting environmental pressure on Lebanon, particularly in its 
coastal areas (IMAC, 2009). Even though we acknowledge the 
significant impacts of daily human activities on the natural 
environment, we will only focus in this work on the 
environmental damage caused by armed conflicts. 
In this chapter, we start with a literature review about 
environmental security and its association with armed conflicts. 
Then, we present a historical overview of the various episodes of 
armed conflicts in Lebanon with an emphasis in the following 
section on exposure to environmental damage. Afterwards, we 
focus on discussing the relationship between repetitive armed 
conflicts in North Lebanon and exposure to land degradation. The 
main conclusions of this chapter are highlighted in the final 
section. 
 
2. ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
The concept of environmental security emerged in the early 1970s 
as part of the process of putting the environment on the 
international political agenda (Gleditsch, 1998). Since then, 
scholars have increasingly focused their efforts on examining the 
threats that can emerge from environmental disruption and their 
causal relationship with violent conflict (Graeger, 1996; 
Gleditsch, 1998; Stalley, 2003; Brauch, 2007). In the article 
Environmental Security and Peace, Jon Barnett (2007) defines 
environmental security as the “ability of individuals to avoid or 
adapt to environmental change so that things that are important 
to their well-being are not sustainably negatively affected” 
(Barnett, 2007:5).  
The literature on environmental security can be divided into 
four broad categories of research (Graeger, 1996; Rønnfeldt, 
1997; Selim, 2004; Renner, 2006; Barnett, 2007; Buhaug and 
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Theisen, 2012). The first category reveals how environmental 
degradation and scarcity can induce violent or non-violent conflict 
(Homer-Dixon, 1991; Elliott, 1996; Theisen, 2008). The second 
category associates resource wealth to conflict (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2001; Le Billon, 2001; Humphreys, 2005). The third 
category addresses the impacts of armed conflicts on 
environmental degradation (Kanyamibwa, 1998; Westing et al., 
2001; Khagram and Ali, 2006). Finally, the fourth category 
considers environmental peacemaking (Conca and Dabelko, 2002; 
Dabelko, 2006; Swatuk, 2004).  
According to the literature, research on the environment as 
it relates to violent conflict largely focuses on the debate as to 
whether and why environmental degradation and scarcity, natural 
resource wealth, or dependence on natural resources can result in 
violent conflict (Baechler, 1998; De Soysa, 2002; Khagram and 
Ali, 2006; Bernauer et al., 2012). Less research has addressed 
environmental impacts of armed conflicts or the relationship 
between environment and peace. This highlights the need for 
further systematic and focused research on this aspect of the 
environmental security debate (Khagram and Ali, 2006).  
Efforts to examine environmental impacts of armed 
conflicts date back to the 1970s when exploring the negative 
environmental effects of the Vietnam War (Westing 1971; 
Westing, 1972; Westing 1975; Westing, 2013). Al-Lihaibi and 
Ghazi (1997), Husain (1998), and Price (1998) later studied the 
environmental effects of the 1991 Gulf war. Kanyamibwa (1998) 
examined the influence of the Rwandan war on biodiversity and 
conservation. Draulans and Krunkelsven (2002) and Nackoney et 
al. (2014) investigated the impact of armed conflict on forest areas 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Other scholars have also 
offered empirical evidence of environmental effects resulting 
from armed conflicts (Rose, 1993; Dudley et al., 2002; Kengni, 
2013). 
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Armed conflicts can have both direct and indirect 
environmental impacts (Partow, 2008). Direct impacts are those 
that result exclusively and directly from military activities, for 
instance, chemical spills, demolition waste from infrastructure 
destruction, pollution, land mines, natural resources destruction, 
as well as the destruction of habitats and loss of wildlife 
(Shambaugh et al., 2001; Al-Duaij, 2002; OECD, 2008; Partow, 
2008). The environmental damage caused by such impacts is well 
documented in the literature (Price, 1998; Dicks, 1999; Ekanayake 
and Ofori, 2000; Leaning, 2000; Peterson et al., 2003; Gangolells 
et al., 2009; Corn and Copeland, 2010; Upton, 2011). Indirect 
impacts can be credited wholly or partly to the conflict and to 
related war economy. Such impacts encompass population 
displacement, absence of environmental governance, and the 
halting of development and conservation programs (Shambaugh et 
al., 2001; OECD, 2008; Partow, 2008). Displaced people and 
refugees can have significant effects on the environment and these 
aspects have been well covered in the literature (Kibreab, 1997; 
Urdal, 2005; Gomez and Christensen, 2010). Further, conflicts 
tend to aggravate already prevailing environmental issues. For 
instance, they can exacerbate inadequate agricultural practices and 
deforestation, and may cause desertification, drought, erosion, soil 
contamination and loss of fertility, as well as the disappearance of 
some species. Armed conflicts may also lead to the over-
exploitation of natural resources for both basic survival and for 
commercial purposes. The irrational removal of natural resources 
causes food shortages and deforestation that can, in the longer 
term, have negative effects on the means of survival for local 
residents (Huseynov, 2011). 
Environmental impacts also occur before and after armed 
conflicts for various reasons, often with subsistence, strategic, or 
commercial causes, and often for political, social, and economic 
reasons (Barnett, 2007). The pre-conflict phase, including military 
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preparation and training, poses several risks to the environment. 
Military activities also produce significant waste from the 
manufacture and storage of weapons, and from the usage of toxic 
substances (Al-Duaij, 2002). Post-conflict periods are often 
coupled with ongoing and sometimes even more serious 
environmental impacts in meeting requirements of country’s 
reconstruction and population resettling programs. In addition, 
return of refugees to their homes often results in natural resources 
being over-exploited, and the breakdown of economic and 
environmental governance often disrupts waste collection 
arrangements, increasing pollution and risk of infectious diseases 
(Huseynov, 2011). Also, military waste poses a significant 
environmental problem by polluting the natural environment for 
many years.  
Environmental destruction is unavoidable in times of armed 
conflict (Huseynov, 2011). The actual environmental impacts of 
armed conflicts depend on several factors such as type of conflict, 
its magnitude and duration, types of weapons and chemicals used, 
and ecosystems present in specific geographic locations (Leaning, 
2000). Identifying the nature of conflicts is crucial to determining 
their impacts on local communities and the environment that 
surrounds them. This is critical to understanding political, social, 
economic, and environmental consequences, a necessary step 
towards developing mitigation strategies (Shambaugh et al., 
2001).  
 
3. A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS IN LEBANON 
Lebanon has experienced a series of armed conflicts during the 
past four decades. These ranged from civil conflicts to full-scale 
wars. In this chapter, we focus on four significant episodes of 
armed conflicts. These included the 1982 Israeli Invasion, the 
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2006 Israel-Lebanon War, the 2007 Nahr El Bared Clashes, and 
the Tripoli Clashes of 2008. These specific episodes of armed 
conflicts were chosen due to their severe impacts on the study 
area in North Lebanon, particularly on natural environment and 
local communities.  
After gaining independence from France, Lebanon 
committed to an unwritten National convention in 1943 for a 
power-sharing agreement according to a division’s framework 
among the different religious sects, namely, Sunnis, Shi’a, Druze 
and Maronite Christians. Nevertheless, political tensions 
exacerbated after the Palestinian refugees’ arrival in 1948. After 
its exclusion from Jordan in 1970, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) founded its activities in Lebanon. This move 
caused successive Israeli military interventions in 1973, 1978, 
1981 and 1982 (Barakat et al., 2008). 
In 1982, Israel started a full-scale invasion causing large-
scale destruction and population displacement (Barakat et al., 
2008). This event started on June 6, 1982 and persisted for 
approximately 11 months. Approximately 170,000 people died, 
over 800,000 individuals were displaced, and the material damage 
was estimated around US$ 12 billion (El Masri et al., 2001).  
In July 2006, Israel started another war lasting for 31 days 
and resulting in massive loss of life and livelihoods. Over one 
million people were displaced, around 1,200 people died, and 
5,000 individuals were injured. As a direct result of this war, 
several thousands of people lost their jobs or sources of 
livelihoods, and around 100,000 people emigrated. The economy 
was heavily affected in all sectors and infrastructure destruction 
was significant (UNDP, 2006). 
On May 20, 2007, clashes exploded between the Lebanese 
army and an Islamist group called Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr el 
Bared Camp, a Palestinian refugee camp located in North 
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Lebanon. The camp was founded for Palestinians who escaped the 
1948 Arab-Israeli War (UNRWA, 2008). The clashes continued 
for 105 days and resulted in a full destruction of the Nahr el Bared 
Camp, forcing the majority of the 27,000 Palestinian refugees, as 
well as resident Lebanese citizens from neighbouring areas, to 
move away from the targeted area and its surrounding. It was 
reported that 169 Lebanese soldiers, 287 insurgents, and 47 
civilians died, and around 400 - 500 soldiers were injured (Chit, 
2009).  
In 2008, different rounds of armed clashes have started 
between the Alawites in Jabal Mohsen and the Sunni 
neighbourhood of Bab Al Tabbaneh. The first round of five month 
clashes started on May 7, 2008 causing social and economic 
disruption in Tripoli (International Crisis Group, 2010). The 
clashes in Tripoli have resulted in more than 190 deaths and 1,200 
injuries since the start of the Syrian War in 2011 (Médecins Sans 
Frontières, 2013). In this work we consider the first round of 
armed clashes in 2008.  
 
4. EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
Indicators used to measure exposure to environmental damage 
included location, proximity to the source of threat, probability or 
frequency of the event, its intensity, duration, and spatial impact 
(Issa et al., 2014).  
The addressed episodes of armed conflicts in Lebanon 
differed in terms of nature, magnitude, and scale. In terms of 
location, most of the study area, namely the coastal area of North 
Lebanon, was affected in some way during the 1982 Israeli 
Invasion and the 2006 Israel-Lebanon. The Nahr el Bared Clashes 
in 2007 were located in Nahr el Bared Camp in the coastal area of 
North Lebanon and the 2008 Tripoli Clashes concerned two 
neighbourhoods located in Tripoli.  
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Proximity to armed conflict events is seen as an important 
variable of exposure. Even though the 2007 Nahr el Bared 
Clashes were focused within the Nahr el Bared Camp, adjacent 
municipalities were severely affected, in particular the six 
municipalities surrounding the camp: Bhanine, El Mhamra, 
Bebnine – Abde, Der Amar, Menieh, and Beddawi. It was also 
reported that other nearby municipalities, such as Qobbet Chamra 
and Klayaat, were also targeted during the clashes. Similarly, the 
2008 Tripoli Clashes located between two neighbourhoods in 
Tripoli had direct impacts not only on Tripoli, but also on 
surrounding municipalities such as Beddawi. Thus, areas in 
proximity to armed conflict events incurred increased 
vulnerability to the deterioration of the natural environment (Issa 
et al., 2014).  
The frequency and intensity of armed conflicts were also 
considered as important indicators. Frequency refers here to the 
number of armed conflict events in an affected area and intensity 
refers to nature of damage affecting the natural environment. The 
coastal municipalities of Akkar and Menieh were the most 
affected in terms of frequency and intensity. The seven coastal 
municipalities of Akkar (Arida, Cheikh Zennad, Tal Hayat, 
Klayaat, Qobbet Chamra, Bebnine-Abde, and El Mhamra) and the 
four municipalities of Menieh (Bhanine, Menieh, Der Amar, and 
Beddawi) were exposed to all four episodes of armed conflicts. In 
addition, these areas were severely impacted by the various events 
of armed conflicts, particularly the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War and 
the 2007 Nahr el Bared Clashes. The coastal municipalities of 
Akkar and Menieh areas suffered both direct and indirect 
environmental impacts. Direct impacts included an oil spill 
resulting from the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, infrastructure and 
building damage resulting from both the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War 
and the 2007 Nahr el Bared Clashes, and land degradation 
resulting from the 2007 Nahr el Bared Clashes. The Iraqi 
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Petroleum Company (IPC) located in Beddawi municipality in 
Menieh area was damaged during the 1982 Israeli Invasion 
causing severe environmental impacts. The various indirect 
impacts included population displacement and severe impacts on 
agriculture and fisheries as result of the 1982 Israeli Invasion, the 
2006 Israel-Lebanon War, the 2007 Nahr el Bared Clashes, and 
the 2008 Tripoli Clashes (Issa et al., 2014). Indirect impacts were 
greater than direct impacts in Akkar and Menieh since agriculture 
and fisheries were the most important sectors in these areas 
alongside trade (Issa et al., 2014). Fishermen and farmers were 
among the most vulnerable and poorest families, particularly in 
Akkar and Menieh areas which were considered among the 
poorest and most deprived areas in Lebanon (Hanafi, 2008; 
Mouchref, 2008).  
Municipalities in the Batroun and Koura areas have been the 
least affected in terms of frequency and intensity (Issa et al., 
2014). Batroun area includes seven coastal municipalities 
(Chekka, El Hery, Hamat, Selaata, Koubba, Batroun, and 
KfarAabida) and Koura area three municipalities that have a 
coastline (Ras Maska, Kelhat, and Enfeh). In terms of frequency, 
Batroun and Koura areas were exposed to two of the four armed 
conflicts: the 1982 Israeli Invasion and the 2006 Israel-Lebanon 
War. In terms of intensity, damage to natural environment was 
minor and not all municipalities were subjected to damage. For 
instance, a displacement of population as a result of the 1982 
Israeli Invasion was only recorded in the city of Batroun. The oil 
spill during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War affected most of the 
coastal municipalities. In addition, the tourism sector was affected 
in Batroun and El Hery although the impacts were observed over 
a relatively short period of time (Issa et al., 2014).  
Tripoli area is composed of the municipalities of Tripoli, El 
Mina, and Qalamoun. The frequency and intensity of armed 
conflicts differed among the municipalities of this area. The 
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Tripoli municipality was exposed to four episodes of armed 
conflicts, whereas El Mina and Qalamoun municipalities were 
exposed to two episodes of armed conflicts, namely the 1982 
Israeli Invasion and the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War. The intensity 
of armed conflicts was considered as moderate. As for the 
municipality of Tripoli, the impacts included the oil spill during 
the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War and population displacements 
during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, the 2007 Nahr el Bared 
Clashes, and the 2008 Tripoli Clashes. The latter caused 
infrastructural damage in the neighbourhoods where the clashes 
occurred. In El Mina and Qalamoun, the impacts included harm to 
the fishery and tourism sectors and population displacement as a 
result of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War (Issa et al., 2014).  
The combination of the different indicators, encompassing 
location, nature, onset, frequency, intensity, and proximity to 
armed conflict, revealed variation in exposure to environmental 
damage along the coastal area of North Lebanon. The results 
indicated that Akkar and Menieh areas received the highest level 
of exposure and Tripoli area received a moderate level of 
exposure, while Koura and Batroun areas received low levels of 
exposure (Issa et al., 2014). 
 
5. LAND DEGRADATION 
One of the main and common environmental impacts resulting 
from armed conflicts is land degradation. In this context, land 
degradation is recognized as a serious ecological and socio-
economic concern due to its effects on environmental conditions 
and on local communities (Mitri et al., 2014). According to Mitri 
et al. (2014) environmental research related to effect of wars and 
armed conflicts on the biophysical environment is still limited in 
depth and fragmented.  
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The various events of armed conflicts in the coastal area of 
North Lebanon have resulted in severe impacts on land cover 
encompassing land reclamation from the sea, unplanned 
construction, new road systems, and quarrying (IMAC, 2007). 
Over the past four decades, around 1,020 ha of vegetation cover 
was lost, located mainly in Tripoli and its surroundings (Mitri et 
al., 2014). The highest rate of vegetation cover loss in the study 
area was between the years 2006 and 2007 (Mitri et al., 2014). 
During the 2007 Nahr el Bared Clashes, agricultural land 
and greenhouses in municipalities adjacent to the Nahr el Bared 
Camp were directly affected by conflicts resulting in land 
degradation (Hanafi, 2008; Mouchref, 2008; UNDP & UNRWA, 
2008). Apart from soil contamination and its environmental 
consequences, recurrent armed conflicts put socio-economic 
pressures on farmers including the loss of harvesting seasons and 
restricted access to lands. Land was left uncultivated throughout 
conflicts and, as a result, farming practices changed. Accordingly, 
some agricultural lands experienced increases in certain 
agricultural activities, adoption of excessive irrigation, and 
extensive use of pesticides in an attempt to recover losses. These 
lead eventually to increased risk exposure to land degradation 
(UNDP, 2007). Illegal seafront dumping sites and landfill 
activities had sprung up along the coastal area of North Lebanon 
following the earlier 1975 Civil War (IMAC, 2007). Around 265 
ha of sea in different locations along the coastal area of North 
Lebanon have been transformed into land, mainly in Chekka, 
Tripoli, Bhanine, and El Mhamra. Most of these changes in the 
coastal area have occurred between 1984 and 2006 (Mitri et al., 
2014). Illegal activities such as uncontrolled seafront dumping 
reflected lack of environmental governance as indirect impact of 
armed conflict, through the breakdown of law enforcement and 
order, and weaknesses in authorities’ ability to control or 
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effectively manage resources during and after periods of armed 
conflict (Shambaugh et al., 2001; Huseynov, 2011). 
Extensive quarrying activities along the coastal area of 
North Lebanon represented another example that reflected lapses 
in environmental governance. Such activities were mostly illegal 
and resulted from increased demands for construction materials 
due to an increasing population and needs for post-conflict 
reconstruction activities (IMAC, 2007; Mitri et al., 2014). 
Quarrying activities exerted pressure on the natural environment 
through changing land cover as well as damaging and destroying 
natural habitats and vegetation cover (IMAC, 2007; Mitri et al., 
2014).  
It was emphasized that mapping and monitoring land 
degradation is essential for designing and implementing post-
conflict recovery plans and informed policy decisions (Mitri et al., 
2014). Accordingly, Mitri et al. (2014) aimed at evaluating the 
effect of repetitive armed conflicts on land degradation along the 
coastal zone of North Lebanon using multi-temporal satellite data, 
desk study information, and field data. Modelling the effect of 
repetitive armed conflicts on exposure to land degradation 
comprised (1) assigning a composite land degradation index to 
cadastral units, and (2) mapping exposure to land degradation 
associated with repetitive armed conflicts (Mitri et al., 2014). 
Independent ratings for individual strata and synoptic scores for 
the entire cadastral unit were given. Ratings considered criteria 
such as level of change in vegetation cover, increase of population 
density, interruption of accessibility to land, damage to the 
landscape and distance to the conflict centre. An investigation of 
the results showed that a total area of 1,107 ha was classified as 
high exposure to land degradation. This corresponded to 9% of 
the total extent of the study area. Most of the lands associated 
with high exposure to land degradation were located across the 
municipalities of Menieh, El Mhamra and Bebnine - Abde north 
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of Tripoli. This explained the severe effect of the Nahr el-Bared 
armed conflict in 2007 on increased exposure to land degradation 
in those municipalities. Also, Tripoli and Beddawi (to the north of 
Tripoli) were exposed to high exposure to land degradation 
mainly due to (1) their closeness to conflict areas, (2) urban 
sprawl, (3) increase in population density and (4) unplanned 
incremental urban development at the edges of the cities.  
Despite the fact that armed conflicts might directly and 
indirectly impact the natural environment through land 
degradation, the research done by Mitri et al. (2014) revealed that 
other factors such as increase in population number and urban 
sprawl, climate change, policies and politics, and lack of law 
enforcement, might also contribute to land degradation.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter aimed at investigating exposure to environmental 
damage and land degradation in association with recurring 
episodes of armed conflicts. On one side, it was shown that 
exposure to environmental damage varied among the different 
geographical areas studied in function of location, proximity to 
the source of threat, probability or frequency of the event, its 
intensity, duration, and spatial impact. On the other side, it was 
shown that exposure to land degradation was a result of both 
direct and indirect impact of recurring episodes of armed 
conflicts. Indicators such as loss in vegetation cover, artificialized 
coastline, increase in population number, interruption of 
accessibility to agricultural land, damage to the landscape, 
distance to conflict centre, fire affected areas and vegetation 
recovery proved to be useful in explaining a number of aspects 
related to land degradation when using satellite remote sensing 
data in combination with field data. However, we acknowledge 
that recurrent armed conflicts are not the sole cause of 
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environmental damage and land degradation. Other factors such 
as increase in population number, urban sprawl, uncontrolled 
construction and planning, absence of environmental governance 
and lack of law enforcement, politics, and climate change can also 
lead to environmental damage and increase environmental 
vulnerabilities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SENSITIVITY 
Understanding Vulnerability in the Context of Armed 
Conflict
25
 
Sahar T. Issa 
 
 
Abstract: Building on the preceding Chapter 5, which focused on 
exposure, the current chapter investigates the manifestations of 
sensitivity to conflict and its environmental consequences in 
North Lebanon. Chapter 6 identifies features and manifestations 
of vulnerability that are particularly relevant to the coastal area of 
north Lebanon. It examines the spatial variation in vulnerability to 
armed conflict by means of the ‘hazard-of-place’ model by Cutter 
(1996). It is argued that the spatial variation of the effects of 
armed conflict on the natural environment and people’s 
livelihoods is affected not only by exposure to the environmental 
damage caused by episodes of armed conflict but also by the 
sensitivity and coping capacity of the communities in the coastal 
area of north Lebanon.  
Keywords: Sensitivity, armed conflict, environmental 
degradation 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Armed conflict and environmental degradation have a reciprocal 
relationship. While most armed conflicts result in some form of 
                                                          
25
 An earlier version of this chapter is published as: Issa, S.T., Van der Molen, 
I., Nader, M.R. and Lovett, J.C. 2014. Spatial “Variation of Vulnerability in 
Geographic Areas of North Lebanon,” European Scientific Journal, 2: 276-288. 
I am grateful for the publisher for granting permission for reprinting. 
Conflict and Environment in North Lebanon 
 130 
environmental degradation, pressure on the natural environment 
can also further exacerbate tensions and become a trigger for 
armed conflict. Environmental degradation coupled with other 
stress factors, such as unemployment, high levels of inequality, 
and weak governance, can aggravate poverty and social problems, 
thereby increasing individual and community vulnerabilities 
(Shambaugh et al., 2001; Khagram et al., 2003; Renner, 2006; 
Barnett, 2007; Huseynov, 2011). As such, the natural environment 
is directly associated with humans and their wellbeing, and 
particularly of the most impoverished, vulnerable, and least 
empowered (Khagram et al., 2003).  
Most of the literature on environment and violent conflict 
focuses on the debate as to whether and why environmental 
degradation and scarcity, natural resource abundance, or a 
dependence on natural resources can induce violent conflict 
(Baechler, 1998; De Soysa, 2002; Bernauer et al., 2012). 
However, the environmental impacts of armed conflict and the 
effects of these environmental impacts on peoples’ livelihoods are 
less researched in comparison to the other two themes (Khagram 
and Ali, 2006).  
Lebanon’s history is marked with much turbulence, political 
instability, and recurring episodes of armed conflict. The various 
outbreaks of armed conflict have had significant impacts in terms 
of fatalities and injuries, population displacement, insecurity, 
economic disruption, as well as direct and indirect impacts on the 
natural environment. According to the literature, environmental 
degradation reduces economic potential and human wellbeing and 
changes people’s living conditions by rendering them more 
vulnerable (Dabelko and Dabelko, 1995). In Lebanon, social 
divisions are reflected in spatial heterogeneous clusters 
characterized by diverse political, religious, and ethnic 
affiliations. There are 18 known religious communities and there 
are various foreign population and ethnic groups (Das and 
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Davidson, 2011). This diversity makes Lebanon a good subject to 
study the spatial variation of vulnerability within its geographical 
areas since vulnerability research emphasizes the importance of 
profiling differential vulnerability, for systems, or their elements, 
are seldom equally vulnerable (Turner et al., 2003).  
In this chapter, I identify the features and manifestations of 
vulnerability that are particularly relevant to the coastal area of 
north Lebanon and I examine the spatial variation in vulnerability 
in different geographical areas of this region within the context of 
armed conflict. I define vulnerability as the ‘susceptibility of the 
communities of the coastal area of north Lebanon to 
environmental damage caused by episodes of armed conflict and 
their capacity to cope with threats or damage caused in that 
context’. The analytical framework is based on the ‘hazards of 
place’ model. The findings are based on 500 questionnaire 
surveys among citizens in the study area, 24 semi-structured 
interviews, 17 in-depth interviews with various stakeholders, and 
secondary literature.  
In the next section, a brief literature review on ‘vulnerability 
of place’ concept is presented. Then, the findings are presented 
and discussed. The final section highlights the main conclusions 
of this chapter. 
 
2. VULNERABILITY OF PLACE 
The inspiration for this chapter into understanding vulnerability, 
how it is manifested, and how it varies geographically within the 
study area stems from the ‘Hazards of Place’ theory as developed 
by Cutter (1996). When studying the ‘vulnerability of place’, 
‘place’ is specifically highlighted in the context of “people living 
in hazardous places or in places made to be hazardous, not 
through choice but through external social, political, and 
economic forces” (Lewis and Kelman, 2010:193). Thus, the 
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inhabitants of a place often inherit and become subjected to the 
vulnerability of that place. According to Lewis and Kelman 
(2010), events that occurred in the recent or even the distant past 
of a certain place can affect not only the occupants of that place at 
the time they occurred, but also the inhabitants that follow: future 
generations for many years and maybe permanently. In addition, 
events that occur in a certain place may accumulate and through 
this become a manifestation of vulnerability of people, regardless 
of whether those people grew up there or moved in at a later stage. 
This is true not only for the inhabitants of a certain place, but also 
for people living in adjacent, proximate, and even distant areas. 
For example, displaced people and individuals who migrate as a 
result of vulnerability, or as a result of the manifestation of 
vulnerability in a disaster, can affect near or far communities 
through the ‘vulnerability of place’ from where they came (Lewis 
and Kelman, 2010). 
As such, ‘vulnerability of place’ refers to people’s 
vulnerability in a specific geographic location and identifies its 
casual structure, spatial variation, and possible means for its 
reduction (Cutter et al., 2000). It combines potential exposure and 
social response but within a specific area. This approach was first 
conceptualized by Cutter (1996) who developed the ‘hazards of 
place’ model of vulnerability. This model is exploratory in nature, 
and integrates both the physical and social aspects of vulnerability 
by tying them to specific places. Emphasizing the place offers the 
opportunity to study some of the fundamental social and physical 
characteristics that contribute to vulnerability, and also to evaluate 
their interaction and intersection (Cutter et al., 2000). 
‘Vulnerability of place’ may change over time depending on 
variations in the risk, mitigation, and settings within which 
hazards take place. 
The ‘hazards of place’ model was chosen as an analytical 
framework for various reasons. First, since the model combines 
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physical and social aspects of vulnerability, it sits at the 
intersection of the different models and theories used to study 
vulnerability. As such, it allows a more holistic understanding of 
vulnerability. Another reason for adopting this model is its focus 
on a specific geographic domain, which fits the purpose of this 
study that addresses a specific local area: the coastal area of north 
Lebanon. This approach will highlight the particular features of 
each area studied within the context of an overarching model. 
Third, the model recognizes the dynamic nature of vulnerability, 
and how small changes in its constituents can produce wider 
changes in ‘vulnerability of place’. In addition, this model regards 
people as active participants within the vulnerability process with 
its emphasis on the importance of mitigation. Finally, Cutter’s 
model encompasses a wide array of factors in providing an 
overview of vulnerability. It involves quantitative indicators such 
as age, education level, and gender, while also focusing on factors 
that are hard to assess and analyze using quantitative approaches. 
This necessitates the use of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods that lead to a better understanding of the topic being 
studied.  
Based on the ‘hazards of place’ model of vulnerability, the 
interaction between risk and mitigation produces an initial hazard 
potential, which is affected by the social fabric and the geographic 
context (Cutter, 1996). The social fabric covers various 
demographic and socioeconomic features of the population in the 
area, in addition to the perceptions and experiences of the 
community regarding risks and hazards. The geographic context 
encompasses the geographic characteristics of the area as well as 
the exposure and proximity to hazardous events (Cutter et al., 
2000). The interaction between the social fabric and the hazard 
potential generates a social vulnerability, while the interaction 
between the geographic context and hazard potential leads to 
physical vulnerability. ‘Vulnerability of place’ results from the 
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interaction between physical and social vulnerabilities (Cutter et 
al., 2000; Cutter et al., 2003). In this model, ‘vulnerability of 
place’ presents a feedback loop to the risk input and the mitigation 
of origin that allows an increase or decrease in both risk and 
mitigation, resulting in either increasing or decreasing 
vulnerability (See figure 5.1 taken from Cutter, 1996:536). From 
this perspective, the model is fundamentally dynamic and 
identifies the complex and continuously varying nature of 
vulnerability (See figure 5.1, taken from Cutter, 1996:536). 
In measuring ‘vulnerability of place’, physical vulnerability 
is measured in terms of exposure. Indicators associated with 
exposure often involve proximity to the source of threat, the 
probability or frequency of an event, and its magnitude, duration, 
or spatial impact (Luers, 2005; Adger, 2006; Gallopín, 2006). 
Social vulnerability is often measured by the quality of 
settlements and infrastructure, special needs’ population, 
socioeconomic status, gender, race, and similar facets (Cutter, 
1996; Cutter et al., 2003, Bankoff et al., 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The ‘hazards of place’ model (Source: Cutter, 1996:536) 
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: VARIATION IN 
VULNERABILITY 
The results showed variations in ‘vulnerability of place’ among 
the five geographic areas of the Lebanese northern coast. This can 
be explained by different combinations of factors encompassing 
physical and socio-economic aspects. The results obtained for 
physical vulnerability have been presented and discussed in 
details in Chapter 4 on exposure. In the next section, I will briefly 
present the main features of physical vulnerability. Then, the 
results and discussion on social vulnerability will follow. The 
results for physical and social vulnerability are then combined and 
integrated into the ‘hazards of place’ model to produce the 
‘vulnerability of place’. 
3.1.  Physical Vulnerability 
In this chapter, physical vulnerability is assessed in terms of 
exposure to armed conflict. Location, nature, plus the onset, 
frequency, intensity, and proximity to armed conflict are 
important factors in determining vulnerability and are used as 
indicators in this research to measure physical vulnerability (Table 
5.1).  
 
Physical Vulnerability 
Indicators 
Location 
proximity to the source of threat 
Frequency of the event 
Intensity or magnitude 
Duration 
Spatial impact 
Table 5.1: Indicators used for assessing physical vulnerability 
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When considering these factors, the results show that Akkar and 
Menieh areas have the highest levels of physical vulnerability, 
with lower levels in Tripoli, Koura, and Batroun (Figure 5.2). 
Various episodes of armed conflict took place in the coastal area 
of north Lebanon, particularly in Akkar, Menieh, and Tripoli. For 
example, the 2007 Nahr el Bared Clashes took place in Nahr el 
Bared Camp and severely affected the surrounding municipalities. 
The frequency and Intensity of armed conflicts are also important 
factors. By frequency I refer to the number of armed conflict 
events in an affected area and by intensity to the nature of the 
environmental damage in the affected areas. The coastal 
municipalities of Akkar and Menieh districts were the most 
affected in terms of frequency and intensity with more episodes of 
armed conflict than in the other areas. The municipalities in the 
Batroun and Koura areas were the least affected in terms of 
conflict frequency and intensity. 
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Figure 5.2: Physical vulnerability in the coastal area of north Lebanon
26
 
 
3.2.  Social Vulnerability 
In order to assess social vulnerability, a social vulnerability index 
was calculated for each of the five areas using the standardization 
technique (Briguglio, 1995; Kaly et al., 1999; St. Bernard, 2007) 
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also known as Min Max rescaling (Yoon, 2012). The indicators 
included in the index were age, number of household members, 
education level, access to information (Internet subscription, 
mobile subscription, landline subscription, and television 
ownership), material assets (home and land ownership), access to 
public services (access to water, electricity, and health insurance), 
occupation, income, and organization membership (Table 5.2). 
The vulnerability for each indicator in the dataset was calculated 
using the formula V = (X – Xmin)/(Xmax – Xmin), where V is 
the degree of vulnerability arising from the indicator for each 
area, X is the value of the indicator included in the vulnerability 
index for each area, and Xmax and Xmin are the maximum and 
minimum values of the indicator across all five areas. This 
calculation results in a score between 0 and 1. This calculation 
was performed for each indicator to be included in the index, and 
then an average of all V's was calculated to give ‘an index’. The 
index was calculated for each of the five areas (Akkar, Menieh, 
Tripoli, Koura, and Batroun). They could then be ranked, with a 
higher score indicating a lower vulnerability. 
 
Social Vulnerability 
Indicators 
Age  
Number of household members 
Education  
Internet subscription  
Mobile subscription 
Landline subscription 
Television ownership 
Home ownership 
Land ownership 
access to public services (water, electricity, and health insurance) 
Occupation  
Income 
Organization membership 
Table 5.2: Indicators used for assessing social vulnerability 
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The results (Table 5.3) showed that the coastal communities in 
Akkar area were the most vulnerable of those within the study 
area followed by those in Tripoli area. The coastal communities in 
Batroun area showed the lowest levels of social vulnerability, with 
Menieh and Koura areas showing medium levels of social 
vulnerability. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Social vulnerability Index for each of the five areas of the Lebanese 
northern coast 
 
 
The fact that the coastal communities in Akkar area show the 
highest level of vulnerability was also supported by findings from 
the semi-structured and in-depth interviews as well as in the 
secondary literature. Akkar area has been classified as one of the 
most deprived areas in Lebanon (Hanafi, 2008; Mouchref, 2008; 
Das and Davidson, 2011). The existing situation of deprivation in 
Akkar area results from a combination of various reasons. A full 
examination of these reasons is beyond the scope of this study 
although the most important reasons are discussed here. The 
foremost characteristic of this area was the persistence of feudal 
system until the early 1970s and this had a major influence on the 
socioeconomic situation in the area. A ruling elite of large estate 
landowners used to control powerless labourers and residents who 
used to work as sharecroppers on the feudal lands. The feudal 
nature of the society has now been replaced by wealthy and 
powerful families. In addition, Akkar area reveals all the typical 
characteristics of poor and marginalized rural communities, with 
poor infrastructure and low quality services in addition to other 
features such as limited sources of income and inadequate support 
from government and civil society (Mouchref, 2008). This 
situation is due to the centralized system operating in the country 
where most of the economic and development projects have 
Area Batroun Koura Tripoli Menieh Akkar 
Social Vulnerability 
Index (SVI) 
0.61 0.54 0.43 0.52 0.38 
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historically been focused on Beirut, with the peripheral areas 
being marginalized leading to unequal growth between the 
different areas of the country. This fact was emphasized during 
the interviews and survey, with most participants reporting that 
they felt neglected by the Lebanese government and marginalized 
from the rest of the country.  
Another reason for this finding is the dependence of the 
communities in Akkar and Menieh on natural resources for 
income generation such as agriculture and fisheries, whereas areas 
such as Tripoli, Batroun, and Koura that depend on other 
economic sectors for income production are less impacted by 
environmental damage resulting from armed conflict and 
therefore show lower levels of vulnerability. The findings are 
consistent with the literature on vulnerability of place as 
addressed by Cutter et al. (2003) who explain that environmental 
change – as caused by episodes of armed conflict in this case - can 
result in a form of economic vulnerability for areas that rely on a 
single economic sector for income generation, particularly those 
that rely on natural resources such as for agriculture, fisheries, and 
tourism. This vulnerability is particularly evident in the areas of 
Akkar and Menieh where agriculture, fishing, and trade are the 
most important sectors. Fishermen and farmers are among the 
most vulnerable and poorest families in these areas, and were the 
most impacted as a result of armed conflicts (FAO, 2006; 
Mouchref, 2008). As an example, the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war 
resulted in fishermen along the northern coast, and in particular in 
these two areas, losing their only source of income as they were 
forbidden to go to sea during the period of conflict and further 
suffered from pollution caused by an oil spill (FAO, 2006; UNDP, 
2007; World Bank, 2007). The clashes at Nahr el Bared in 2007 
aggravated the situation. Fishermen from areas adjacent to the 
Nahr el Bared Camp were banned from going to the sea, 
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experiencing major loss of income and forcing them into debt and 
poverty (Hanafi, 2008; Mouchref, 2008).  
Farmers in these areas experienced similar impacts. The 
2006 Israel-Lebanon War and its aftermath caused large losses 
due to difficult access to agricultural lands, which made 
harvesting impossible and led to the degradation of crops, 
obstructions to the transportation of agricultural products and 
monopoly control of prices (FAO, 2006; Mouchref, 2008). The 
Nahr el Bared Clashes in 2007 had a more direct and severe 
impact on the farmers in this area. Agricultural lands, 
greenhouses, and roads were severely damaged, and farmers were 
unable to reach the fields resulting in crop deterioration. 
Transportation of products to the market was also hampered by 
the fighting. As a consequence, farmers lost their income from 
harvests for two successive years and found themselves in a 
downward spiral of debt (Mouchref, 2008). It is important to also 
mention that fishermen and farmers in these areas suffer from 
socioeconomic problems that frequently place them in a cycle of 
poverty and debt. For example, they often suffer from extreme 
weather conditions during winter which can result in losses in 
their only source of livelihood, leading to other problems such as 
difficulties in accessing medical care, low income, poverty, and 
lack of access to any training opportunities that might exist. 
Further, the results also show that the areas with the 
highest levels of social vulnerability (Akkar, Menieh, and Tripoli) 
are showing increasing levels of social and economic problems 
such as violence, drugs, unemployment, robberies, children 
labour, schools drop-outs, poverty, and gender inequality. These 
problems in turn can increase a community’s vulnerability and 
threaten human security.  
Other factors that can contribute to vulnerability, and which 
were used as indicators to assess social vulnerability, are 
socioeconomic conditions, deficiency in access to resources 
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including knowledge, information and technology, inadequate 
access to political authority and representation, the type and 
density of infrastructure, social wealth including social networks 
and connections, individuals with special needs, the homeless, and 
seasonal tourism (Bankoff et al., 2004). Akkar and Menieh are 
classified as some of the most deprived areas in Lebanon (Hanafi, 
2008; Mouchref, 2008; Das and Davidson, 2011). They present all 
the typical characteristics of poor and somewhat isolated rural 
communities, with weak infrastructure and low quality services. 
Other features such as limited income sources, low levels of 
education, and inadequate support from the government and civil 
society have produced a malicious cycle of poverty and increased 
the level of marginalization, thus increasing vulnerability. The 
social and economic marginalization of Akkar, which is remote 
from the economic and political centre of the country, is also due 
to the centralization that started in the late 18
th
 century and 
continues to this day. As such, most economic and development 
projects in Lebanon have historically focused on Beirut, while 
areas on the peripheries have been marginalized, leading to 
unequal growth between the different areas of the country. This 
was emphasized during the interviews when most of the 
participants reported that they felt neglected by the Lebanese 
government and marginalized from the rest of the country.  
In addition to the social sensitivity of these areas, the results 
showed a low level of coping capacity in all the five areas studied. 
To assess the coping capacity, the following indicators were used: 
perceptions regarding the level of preparedness to disasters, the 
presence of emergency plans, and the institutional capacity to deal 
with disasters. During the interviews, the heads or their 
representatives of the municipalities were asked about their 
perceptions of their institutional capacity to deal rapidly with the 
impact of a disaster, a violent conflict in this case, on affected 
environmental resources. They generally reported a very limited 
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or weak institutional capacity in all the five areas. According to 
local leaders and survey participants, the municipalities of Menieh 
and Batroun require expertise, personnel, and equipment. Most of 
the heads and their representatives noted that they suffer from low 
financial budget and from government negligence. Particularly in 
Akkar and Menieh, especially they are exposed to and affected by 
extreme weather conditions and armed conflict. When asked 
about their level of preparedness for disasters in general, and for 
conflicts in particular, all areas’ leaders mentioned that there were 
no emergency plans to cope with armed conflict. However, the 
heads or their representatives of several municipalities, mainly 
those where agriculture was a major economic sector, recorded a 
higher level of preparedness to extreme weather conditions, 
especially in winter. In terms of the existence of any emergency 
plans, the interviews revealed that there were no emergency plans 
in Akkar, Menieh, Koura, and Batroun. According to the leaders 
of the municipalities in Batroun area, it is the government’s 
responsibility to provide emergency plans and not the 
municipalities. The leaders of the municipalities in Menieh area 
noted that the lack of a financial budget and assistance were 
important reasons for not being prepared for disasters and for not 
having any plans. The findings show a low level of coping 
capacity, mainly due to the negligence and marginalization of 
these areas by the government, which, in turn, can increase people 
vulnerability. 
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Figure 5.3: Social vulnerability in the coastal area of north Lebanon 
 
3.3.  From Risk to Vulnerability of Place 
Based on the ‘hazards of place’ model, combining the results for 
physical and social vulnerabilities resulted in differences in 
‘vulnerability of place’ among the five areas of the Lebanese 
northern coast as follows: Akkar and Menieh show the highest 
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levels of vulnerability followed by Tripoli, with Koura and 
Batroun showing lower levels of vulnerability (figure 5.4).   
According to the model, ‘vulnerability of place’ provides a 
feedback loop to the inputs of risk and mitigation, enabling an 
increase or decrease in both risk and mitigation, resulting in either 
increasing or decreasing vulnerability (Cutter, 1996). This 
argument is supported by the results, where areas such as Akkar, 
Menieh, and Tripoli that experienced an increase in, or several 
episodes of, armed conflict showed an increase in vulnerability. In 
addition, in these areas there is a lower level of mitigation and 
preparedness for risks than the other areas. As such, these areas 
need to increase their mitigation processes in order to decrease 
their vulnerability. However, other areas such as Koura and 
Batroun who have experienced fewer episodes of armed conflict 
showed a lower level of vulnerability than other areas but also low 
levels of mitigation. 
It is also important to observe that the model suggests that a 
higher level of ‘vulnerability of place’ can increase the risk of 
armed conflict. This means that areas such as Akkar, Menieh, and 
Tripoli have a greater risk of armed conflict than other areas. An 
examination of recent political events in these areas, which show 
higher levels of violence due to armed conflict, supports this with 
the recent clashes in Tripoli being a good example. However, 
vulnerability is not the only trigger for armed conflict. While a 
high level of vulnerability can create a situation that increases the 
risk of armed conflict, other reasons can also cause conflicts or 
potential conflicts such as the political situation in the country or 
spillovers from the war in Syria. However, this study does not 
address the reasons and factors that can trigger armed conflict. 
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Figure 5.4: Vulnerability of place in the coastal area of north Lebanon 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has assessed and identified the spatial variation in 
communities’ vulnerabilities to the deterioration of the natural 
environment caused by various episodes of armed conflict within 
five coastal areas of north Lebanon. Results showed that the 
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variation of vulnerability does not only result from exposure to 
armed conflict but also from existing conditions including the 
sensitivity and coping capacity of the communities.  
The areas of Akkar and Menieh showed the highest levels of 
vulnerability followed by Tripoli. In comparison, Koura and 
Batroun areas showed lower levels of vulnerability. In other 
words, the areas that were most exposed to the episodes of armed 
conflict and were most impacted by the consequent environmental 
damage (Akkar, Menieh, and Tripoli) have higher levels of 
vulnerability than the areas of Koura and Batroun which 
experienced fewer episodes of armed conflict. However, exposure 
and magnitude are not the only factors that affected ‘vulnerability 
of place’ in these areas. Other factors such as existing 
socioeconomic and political conditions as well as coping capacity 
affect vulnerability. In addition, the findings showed that the areas 
with high levels of social vulnerability, notably Akkar, Menieh, 
and Tripoli, have seen an increase in social and economic 
problems such as violence, drugs, unemployment, robberies, and 
poverty. I also saw that low levels of coping capacity to deal with 
disasters, and particularly with armed conflicts, in terms of 
preparedness, presence of emergency plans, and institutional 
capacity to deal with disasters in all five areas. Combining the 
results for the physical and social aspects of vulnerability, it was 
possible to identify variations in ‘vulnerability of place’ among 
the five areas along the coastal area of north Lebanon. Akkar and 
Menieh were found to have the highest levels of ‘vulnerability of 
place’ followed by Tripoli, with Koura and Batroun showing 
lower levels of vulnerability.  
The model used in this chapter provides a holistic 
understanding of vulnerability by combining both the physical and 
social dimensions of vulnerability and recognizing the complex 
interactions between them. In addition, the focus on place is quite 
an innovative approach because it emphasizes the exceptional 
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features that are unique to every area, as shown by the results of 
this research. The coastal area of north Lebanon is a good 
illustration of how vulnerability can vary within a relatively small 
area, hence highlighting the uniqueness and exceptional features 
of the areas under study.  
While the concepts of vulnerability and resilience have to an 
extent been addressed in the literature, they have not been 
systematically studied in the Lebanese situation, particularly not 
from the approach and context used in this thesis. As such, the 
approach used and the obtained results provide innovative insights 
in the academic debate on vulnerability, and offers an in-depth 
and interdisciplinary analysis of the complex relationship between 
the conflict, the natural environment, and vulnerability.   
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CHAPTER 7 
VULNERABILITY 
Measuring Political Vulnerability through the Human 
Development Index  
Roula Al Daïa 
 
Abstract: Marking the last chapter of Part 1 of this book, Chapter 
7 combines insights from Chapters 5, on exposure, and 6, on 
sensitivity, to develop a comprehensive approach to vulnerability 
from the perspective of human development. Taking the 2014 
Human Development Report (HDR) as a stepping stone, the 
chapter identifies and discusses the change in rankings of 
countries when governance indicators are incorporated into the 
Human Development Index (HDI) to obtain a Modified Human 
Development Index (MHDI). Several indexes are calculated, 
taking into consideration various weighing options. However, 
emphasis is placed on MHDI2, which gives an equal weight to all 
considered dimensions (income, health, education and 
governance). Over a period from 2005 to 2012, discrepancies 
were found between the HDI and MHDI2, which implies that 
governance plays an important role enhancing or reducing human 
development. Ultimately, the chapter argues that the analysis of 
the MHDI2 during this period reflects the impacts of governance 
shocks better than HDI.  
Keywords: Vulnerability, Human Development Index, 
Governance Indicators, Modified Human Development Index 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article aims to construct an indicator accounting for a 
country’s vulnerability to the general governance and political 
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context, and more specifically the impact of governance on human 
development. The literature on vulnerability is broad; and it 
targets several dimensions, often with an emphasis on natural 
hazard. There seems to be more than twenty-five definitions of 
vulnerability (Birkmann, 2006). In this respect, Birkmann (2006) 
emphasizes a paradox: ‘we aim to measure vulnerability, yet we 
cannot define it precisely’ (Birkmann, 2006:11). The UN/ISDR 
(United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction(UN/ISDR) defines vulnerability as ‘the conditions 
determined by physical, social, economic and environmental 
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a 
community to the impact of hazards’ (UN/ISDR, 2004:16). In 
other instances, vulnerability is defined as ‘potential for attributes 
of a system to respond adversely to the occurrence of hazardous 
events" (Kaly et al, 1999:17).  Guillaumont (2008) defines 
(economic) vulnerability as the resultant of the following 
influences: size and frequency of exogenous shocks, exposure to 
shocks, and the capacity to react to shocks or resilience. Very 
often, the concepts of vulnerability and resilience and largely 
interconnected, with economic resilience defined as the ability to 
‘recover quickly from a shock and withstand the effect of a shock’ 
(Briguglio et al., 2008:5). Measuring vulnerability has proven to 
be a challenge; and several measures have been proposed.  
The next section (section 1) presents a literature review 
including a brief review of vulnerability measures as well as 
related concepts. Section 2 presents the methodology based on a 
new vulnerability definition; as well as the rationale behind the 
proposed index. It also reports the result of the correlations, 
rankings and calculations. Section 3 concludes with an overview 
of the main results as well as considerations regarding the use and 
suitability of the proposed  index. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Governance, Armed Conflict And Economic 
Performance 
The relationship between an institutional setting and economic 
performance has been investigated in the literature. For instance, 
Rodrik (1998) finds that democracies exhibit a better performance 
in terms of less randomness and volatility, better shock 
management and more desirable distributional outcomes. Rivera-
Batiz (2002) uses an endogenous growth framework to show that 
democracy (with its positive governance implications) is an 
important determinant of total factor productivity.  
More generally, the political context cannot be dissociated 
from economic performance since political components are 
actually an important component affecting the economic growth 
of a country. For instance Jong-A-Pin (2009) developed a growth 
model showing the impact of political instability in the long run 
on economic growth. Glick and Taylor (2010) studied the impact 
of war on international trade and concluded that it had a highly 
disruptive impact in this respect.  
Focusing on armed conflict, which is a situation epitomizing 
political instability, it was found to have a major disruptive impact 
on economic growth. In this perspective, Collier et al. (2003) 
provide an extensive review of the impact of armed conflict. 
Among the impacts, they emphasize the following: an increase in 
military expenditures which leads to resources being diverted 
from productive uses and therefore a negative impact on GDP, the 
destruction of infrastructure and facilities, increased risk of 
murder, slower growth, fatalities and population displacement, 
persistence in capital flight, even after the conflict has ended, 
persistence in loss of social capital and corruption, regression in 
terms of political indicators, deterioration in the political situation, 
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an increase in the mortality rate, more diseases and psychological 
trauma. 
Some of those effects have been already highlighted 
theoretically by Collier (1999) who also emphasized the dissaving 
effect. In the same paper, the author has also highlighted the 
adjustment of the capital stock through capital flight. It is worth 
noting that these contribution come in the wake of Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998) who investigated the impact of four variables on 
the occurrences and the duration of civil war. They found a 
negative relationship between income and the risk of civil war, a 
non-monotonic effect of natural resource endowments on the 
occurrence of armed conflict (higher resources means higher risk 
of conflict at the beginning then limited risk of conflict later on), 
and larger population also increases the risk of civil war. Finally, 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization is significant, however more 
fractionalized societies are not more prone to armed conflict. 
2.2. Vulnerability Literature 
Exposure to shocks is often referred to in the literature through the 
concept of vulnerability. In this section I discuss a number of the 
indices that were developed to measure vulnerability. However, 
vulnerability literature often focuses on economic vulnerability as 
well as environmental vulnerability, which differ from 
vulnerability to armed conflict, and the focus of vulnerability 
literature seems to be on Least Developed Countries and Small 
Island Developing States.  
Several vulnerability indicators can be found in the 
literature. In a seminal article, Briguglio (1995) proposed to build 
a Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) for Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS). Three variables have been included: 
exposure to foreign economic conditions (measured as the ratio of 
exports and imports to GDP), insularity and remoteness 
(measured as ratio of transport and freight costs to exports 
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proceeds), and proneness to natural disasters (therefore civil strife 
is not included) This index showed that SIDS tend to be more 
vulnerable than other countries  according to the proposed index. 
In the same line of thought, another Economic Vulnerability 
Index was calculated by Guillaumont (2008). It is composed of an 
exposure index (accounting for smallness, location and 
specialization) and a shock index (accounting for natural shocks 
and trade shocks). Results show that Guillaumont's EVI is higher 
in the LDCs relative to other group of countries (except SIDS), 
and does not show any tendency to decrease.  
On national levels, Adrianto and Matsuda (2002) propose 
the calculations of economic vulnerability indices for small 
islands from environmental disasters with an application to Japan. 
Cutter, Boruff and Shirley (2003) propose a social vulnerability 
index to environmental hazards and apply it to US counties. They 
conclude that ‘those factors that contribute to the overall score 
often are different for each county, underscoring the interactive 
nature of social vulnerability—some components increase 
vulnerability; others moderate the effects’ (Boruff et al., 
2003:242). Cutter and Finch (2008) further find that in the case of 
the United States, there was evidence that vulnerability to natural 
disasters has become more dispersed through time between 1960 
and 2000, along with a steady reduction even though important 
regional variabilities still remain.  In addition, major factors 
affecting vulnerability are urban density, race/ethnicity and socio-
economic status.  
Further applications of vulnerability can also be found in the 
case of food insecurity and climate change (Bohle et al., 1994) 
and the environment. In the latter case, an environmental 
vulnerability index was proposed and constructed (Kaly et al., 
1999) for SIDS. The three criteria included risks to the 
environment (natural and anthropogenic), the innate ability of the 
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environment to cope with the risks (resilience) and ecosystem 
integrity (the health or condition of the environment as a result of 
past impacts). 
In the same line of thought, Peduzzi et al. (2009) developed 
a model for human losses and computed a Disaster Risk Index. 
They found that human vulnerability can be linked to the level of 
development of a country as well as the quality of its 
environment.  
In addition, Yoon (2012) considered the relationship 
between social vulnerability and disaster losses in the Gulf of 
Mexico and Atlantic coastal areas. The author emphasized that the 
construction of vulnerability indices can be classified between 
inductive and deductive aggregation methods. His results show 
that 'coastal counties with more vulnerability in terms of social 
achieved status are positively associated with disaster damages, 
while variations in the development of the index using deductive 
and inductive measurement approaches produce different 
outcomes’ (Yoon, 2012:823). 
While most of these authors focus on vulnerability, others 
take the resilience point of view; economic resilience is defined as 
the ability (provoked by more or less adequate policies) of an 
economy to rebound after exogenous shocks stemming from 
economic openness (Briguglio et al., 2008). They argue that 
‘economic well-being of nations is more dependent on man-made 
policies than on inherent vulnerabilities. The results also confirm 
that adequate policy approaches can be used to successfully 
overcome the handicaps posed by vulnerability’ (Briguglio et al., 
2008:13). Therefore, they propose a resilience index with four 
principal components: macroeconomic stability, microeconomic 
market efficiency, good governance and social development. 
All vulnerability indexes presented above focus on either 
economic or natural disaster aspects; but none takes into 
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consideration political factors, which, when they change, are a 
source of exogenous and endogenous shocks to economics. Civil 
wars, bordering conflicts all have an impact on countries and 
societies and it makes sense to include them. Very few records 
can be found about the integration of armed conflict in. in this 
respect, Cortez and Kim (2012) examine the possibility of 
including armed conflict as a criterion for the identification of 
least developed countries in the EVI and that conflict is currently 
included in indirect ways. They find that the explicit inclusion of a 
conflict indicator does not significantly change the classification 
of LDCs.   
2.3. The Human Development Index as a Vulnerability 
Indicator? 
On a more global level and in the field of economic development, 
the most important indicator that comes to mind is the Human 
Development Index (HDI) developed by A. Sen and adopted by 
the United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) (UNDP, 
1990). The underlying principle is the central concept of 
developing people's capabilities. According to the first Human 
Development Report (UNDP, 1990), the capability of a person 
represents different combinations of functioning that a person can 
achieve. The functioning refers to the important things that a 
person can do or be (such as being well-nourished, living long, 
interacting within a community). Therefore, enlarging a person's 
choice translates into enhanced capacities.  
Furthermore, developing capabilities goes through 
developing human resources and economic opportunities where 
people can use those capacities. In its formulation, The HDI has 
three main components; emphasizing three central dimensions: 
education, health and income. The Human Development Report 
proposes augmentations based on gender and inequality. (UNDP, 
2010) This indicator has been extensively quoted, used, criticized 
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in the development literature. For instance, Noorbakhsh (1998) 
proposed improvements on the HDI, therefore resulting in a set of 
alternative indices which appeared to perform well in terms of 
index properties of lack of redundancy. Further augmentations of 
the HDI were proposed by Ranis, Stewart and Samman (2005) 
incorporating notably political components. Cheibub (2010) 
discussed the inclusion of "political capabilities" in the HDI. 
Gamlath (2013) proposed a "Modified Human Development 
Index" incorporating the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010a). 
The linkage between human development and vulnerability 
is implicitly inferred from the above review, since part of 
measuring vulnerability is about unveiling gaps and weaknesses 
for better prevention and policy responses. The first formal 
linkage to be established between Human Development and 
Vulnerability (to the author’s best knowledge) can be found in the 
Human Development Report 2014 which states that ‘Vulnerability 
threatens human development - and unless it is systematically 
addressed, by changing policies and social norms, progress will be 
neither equitable nor sustainable’ (UNDP, 2014:10). In addition, 
the report considers that approaching human development would 
not be complete if vulnerability and resilience issues are not 
addressed. The report also mentions several type of shocks 
causing vulnerability, including natural hazards, financial crises; 
and places emphasis on political dimensions of shocks and armed 
conflict.  
The 2014 Human Development Report does not propose a 
new measure for human vulnerability. The main objective of this 
section is to construct an indicator that integrates both 
components of development and governance. In this perspective, 
the composite indicators are largely inspired by the work of 
Gamlath (2013) who incorporated governance measures into the 
HDI. However, unlike Gamlath (2013), several measures will be 
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constructed with different weights being attributed to components 
of the index. In addition, the evolution of the calculated indices 
will be traced over the 2005 – 2012 period in order to map out the 
change in rankings that result from different calculations relative 
to the change obtained from HDI. The dynamics of vulnerability 
and its impact are especially important because:  
When individuals face vulnerability and when their lives 
are persistently restricted in the wake of a shock, their 
capabilities may be harmed over the long term […] 
Vulnerability reflects threats to choices and capabilities. 
If human development is about widening choices, human 
vulnerability stems quintessentially from a restriction of 
the choices critical to human development—choices for 
health, education, command over material resources and 
personal security. (UNDP, 2014:18, 23). 
 
3. METHODOLOGY: TOWARDS THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW INDEX 
Therefore, in this section I propose a new definition of 
vulnerability, incorporating the two major concepts of capabilities 
and vulnerability: vulnerability is defined as the potential loss in 
capabilities following a shock, whether exogenous or endogenous. 
The capabilities according to this definition therefore encompass 
four main components: 
- The three traditional components of HDI: income, health 
and education 
- A governance dimension index 
Concerning governance indicators, the World Wide Governance 
Indicators
27
 proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi were 
adopted. They are six: voice and accountability, political stability 
                                                          
27
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home retrieved 
August, 2014 
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and no violence, regulatory quality, rule of law, government 
effectiveness and control of corruption. (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2010a). The definition of each component is 
reproduced in the below box. 
 
Box 1. The Six Governance Indicators and Their Definitions 
 
1. Voice and Accountability (VCA): capturing perceptions of the extent 
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV): 
capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism  
3. Government Effectiveness (GE): capturing perceptions of the quality 
of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies 
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ): capturing perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
5. Rule of Law (RL): capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence  
6. Control of Corruption (CC): capturing perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state 
by elites and private interests 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010a:4) 
 
These indicators are constructed in such a way that they range 
from very low governance (-2.5, but it can go even below that) 
and very high governance (corresponding to a value of +2.5 or 
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above). The methodological details about the construction of these 
indicators can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2010a). 
Next step is to construct a composite governance index 
using the six indicators. The first step is to normalize each 
indicator using the below formula: 
    
        
         
 
Where Xit is the normalized value of a given indicator and xmin 
and xmax represent the minimum and maximum possible values, 
taken at (-3) and (+3) respectively, following Gamlath (2013). 
The normalized indicators are represented by the symbols shown 
in table 1.1. The closer the indicator is to one, the better is the 
performance in terms of the considered dimension of governance. 
 
Indicator Symbol of Normalized Value 
Voice and Accountability VA 
Political Stability and No Violence PSNV 
Regulatory Quality RQ 
Rule of Law RL 
Government Effectiveness GE 
Control of Corruption CC 
Table 7.1. Vulnerability Indicators Symbols 
 
Then a composite index was constructed by taking the geometric 
mean of the above normalized indicators. This index was called 
the WGI for World Governance Index. 
                        
 
 
Aggregation might be problematic, especially if one considers the 
critiques that have been addressed to these indicators. The six 
components of WGI have been criticized in the literature, most 
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notably by Langbein and Knack (2010) who find that the six 
indicators 'appear to be measuring the same broad concept' 
(Langbein and Knack, 2010:350). Thomas (2010) considers that 
the indicators lack construct validity. Criticisms were however 
answered by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010b, 2010c). 
Others critics have also previously been addressed by the authors 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007). In the case of the 
present article, should one view or another prevail, the calculated 
index is representative of either the average of a broad concept or 
a composite indicator of several facets of governance.  
Calculations were then performed for all countries and all 
years. The figures in annex 1
28
 trace the evolution of the WGI 
index for a large sample of countries between 1996 and 2012. 
Overall, there is no clear trend as to the evolution of governance 
worldwide and this could be attributed to the fact that governance 
is an institutional quality that takes decades to construct. Some 
countries have occasional peaks, which might be due to political 
shocks or sudden changes in governance.  
The next step – the central piece of the methodology – was 
to construct a composite index taking into consideration both 
components of human development and governance in accordance 
with the new integrated definition of vulnerability and 
capabilities. This resulted in the calculations of four development 
indices. These have been named MHDI (Modified Human 
Development Index using the same terminology as Gamlath 
(2013)). There are four of them: MHDI1, MHDI2, MHDI3 and 
MHDI4. All four indices are a combination of HDI and WGI, 
with different weights.  
Calculations were performed for a consistent set of 
countries covering the period 2005 till 2012. The reason behind 
                                                          
28
 The annexes referred to in the text are available via the author 
(roula.aldaia@balamand.edu.lb) or editors (stel@msm.nl). 
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choosing this time span is to take into consideration the latest HDI 
dataset issued by the UNDP’s Human Development Report29 for 
consistency purposes and to be able to include the largest sample 
of countries. For instance countries with missing values of WGI 
or HDI were dropped from the sample in order to make it possible 
to make consistent comparisons in the change in ranking across all 
indexes. Therefore, a common set of 171 countries with 
governance and HDI data has been identified, for years 2005, 
2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
Going back to the computation of the MHDIs, in the first 
approach, the index is assumed to be a broad measure of 
development regardless of its components. Hence, this approach 
calculates an indicator named the MHDI1 as the geometric mean 
of HDI and WGI. Therefore: 
               
In the second approach, governance is seen as one component of 
the modified human development index with the same weight as 
the other components, namely, education, health and income. 
Therefore, the MHDI2 (Modified Human Development Index 2) 
is calculated as follows: 
                    
Since: 
          
 
 
(where E, H and I are education, income and health respectively) 
Therefore, the above formulation implies that: 
                
 
 
                                                          
29
 http://hdr.undp.org/en/data, August 2014 
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Hence, MHDI2 is the geometric mean of the traditional HDI 
components along with WGI, giving them all the same weight. 
Ranking of selected countries are provided in annexes. 
Since this article would like to place emphasis on political 
instability and armed conflict, the third MHDI, called MHDI3 is 
calculated as the geometric mean of HDI with only one of the 
governance indicators, PSNV only: 
                                
 
 
The fourth indicator, MHDI 4, incorporates the HDI with all 
values of governance except PSNV. Therefore: 
                     
MWGI stands for Modified World Governance Index and is the 
geometric mean of all governance indicators except PSNV: 
                    
 
 
Rankings according to each index were then calculated, taking the 
sample of 171 countries; the country with the highest human 
development or modified human development index value ranked 
first of 171, while the country with the lowest value ranked 171
st
. 
Details of index values and ranking can be found in the annexes. 
Before presenting index calculations and rankings, the 
results of correlation analysis are reported. For instance, over the 
considered period, the components of the governance index, 
namely Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and No 
Violence, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Government 
Effectiveness and Control of Corruption seem to be highly, 
positively and significantly correlated with each other for all 
considered years (annex 2). It is to be noted, however, that 
Political Stability and no violence has the lowest correlation with 
the other components relative to the other bivariate correlations 
and this is valid through all considered years. 
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The correlation between WGI and GDP per capita (in 2005 
constant Dollars, data from the World Development Indicators 
Database) also seems to be strong and positive for all the 
considered years. When looking at the correlation between each 
governance indicator and GDP per capita (taken in logarithmic 
form), even though all coefficients are highly significant, the 
correlation between GDP per capita and VA and PSNV is not 
very strong, in all cases, it is lower than the correlation between 
GDP per capita and RG, RQ, RL and CC (annex 3).  
As for the correlation between governance indicators and 
the traditional HDI, it is strong and positive and exhibits the same 
patters as the correlation between GDP per capita and governance 
components and governance as a whole (annex 4) 
Taking the change in HDI rank between 2005 and 2012, it 
was found that fourteen countries witnessed a gain or loss of more 
than ten positions. They are presented in the table below. 
 
Countries which have lost more 
than 10 HDI positions 
Countries which have gained more than 10 HDI 
positions 
Solomon Islands -11 
Tonga -13 
Seychelles -15 
 
Botswana 11 
Belarus 13 
China 13 
Hong Kong Sar, China 14 
Saudi Arabia 14 
Azerbaijan 15 
Singapore 17 
Turkey 18 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 20 
Rwanda 21 
 
Table 7.2. Significant Gains and Losses in HDI Positions (With Number of 
Positions Lost or Gained) 
Source: HDR 2014 (see footnote 2), author’s calculations 
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Concerning MHDI1, the interesting feature is that the inclusion of 
governance in the value of the Human Development Index causes 
for some countries a negative percentage variation whereas with 
the HDI, the lowest variation over the period for the considered 
group of countries was 0%. This feature (the negative growth of 
MHDI) is also present in the three other MHDI indicators. 
Concerning the change in ranking for the considered period, the 
countries showing gains and losses greater than ten positions are 
presented in the below table. 
 
Countries Which Have Lost More Than 10 MHDI1 
Positions 
Countries Which Have 
Gained More Than 10 
MHDI1 Positions 
Iceland -11 
Venezuela, Rb -11 
Thailand -13 
Egypt, Arab Rep. -14 
Greece -14 
Algeria -16 
Maldives -16 
Mauritania -16 
Madagascar -18 
Yemen, Rep. -18 
Lebanon -20 
Pakistan -22 
Libya -23 
Mali -23 
Fiji -25 
Syrian Arab Republic -45 
 
Angola 11 
Bangladesh 11 
Colombia 11 
Lao Pdr 11 
Liberia 11 
Serbia 11 
Uzbekistan 11 
Tonga 12 
Cape Verde 13 
Belarus 15 
Iraq 15 
Zambia 18 
Indonesia 19 
Georgia 24 
Rwanda 35 
 
Table 7.3. Significant Gains and Losses in MHDI1 Positions (With 
Number of Positions Lost or Gained) 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 
2014 (See Footnote 2)  
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Moving to MHDI2, the results in terms of gain and loss between 
2005 and 2012 are presented below.  
 
Countries Which Have Lost More Than 10 
MHDI2  Positions 
Countries Which Have Gained 
More Than 10 MHDI2 
Positions 
Yemen, Rep. -11 
Algeria -12 
Greece -12 
Pakistan -15 
Fiji -17 
Lebanon -17 
Libya -17 
Madagascar -18 
Syrian Arab Republic -19 
 
Bangladesh 11 
Zambia 11 
Angola 12 
Indonesia 12 
Peru 12 
Cape Verde 13 
Belarus 17 
Botswana 18 
Georgia 19 
Rwanda 26 
 
Table 7.4. Significant Gains and Losses in MHDI2 Positions (With Number of 
Positions Lost or Gained) 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014 
(See Footnote 2) 
 
Concerning MHDI3 and MHDI4, the winners and losers are 
presented in tables 7.5 and 7.6. 
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Countries Which Have Lost More Than 10 
MHDI3  Positions 
Countries Which Have Gained More 
Than 10 MHDI3 Positions 
Jordan -11 
São Tomé And Principe -11 
Turkey -11 
Madagascar -14 
Egypt, Arab Rep. -18 
Mauritania -18 
Greece -20 
Maldives -20 
Mali -20 
Palestine -20 
Yemen, Rep. -21 
Tunisia -22 
Lebanon -25 
Pakistan -27 
Bahrain -30 
Libya -51 
Syrian Arab Republic -70 
 
Colombia 11 
Liberia 11 
Namibia 11 
Nepal 11 
Brazil 12 
Serbia 12 
United States 12 
Angola 13 
Russian Federation 13 
Singapore 14 
Côte D'ivoire 16 
Poland 16 
Sri Lanka 16 
Zambia 16 
Botswana 17 
Indonesia 19 
Timor-Leste 21 
Azerbaijan 22 
Iraq 22 
Rwanda 26 
Uzbekistan 34 
 
Table 7.5. Significant Gains and Losses in MHDI3 Positions (With Number of 
Positions Lost or Gained) 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014 
(See Footnote 2) 
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Countries Which Have Lost More Than 10 
MHDI4  Positions 
Countries Which Have Gained More 
Than 10 MHDI4 Positions 
Greece -12 
Samoa -13 
Venezuela, Rb -14 
Madagascar -16 
Fiji -19 
 
China 12 
Zambia 12 
Belarus 15 
Cape Verde 16 
Georgia 17 
Botswana 18 
Rwanda 22 
 
Table 7.6. Significant Gains and Losses in MHDI4 Positions (With Number of 
Positions Lost or Gained) 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014  
 
If MHDI3 is adopted, thirty-eight countries in total would have 
gained or lost more than ten ranks. Using MHDI4, twelve 
countries would have gained or lost more than ten ranks. Results 
are summarized in table 7.7. 
 
Index Number of Countries That Gained or Lost 
More Than 10 Ranks 
HDI 13 
MHDI1 31 
MHDI2 19 
MHDI3 38 
MHDI4 12 
Table 7.7. Number of Countries Having Gained or Lost More than 10 Ranks 
By Index 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014 
(See Footnote 2) 
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It is clear that the inclusion of the governance index with the 
PSNV component in it causes higher variability in rankings across 
time when the adopted index is MHDI1 and MHDI2 relative to 
HDI. However, MHDI4, which does not include the PSNV 
indicator does not differ much from HDI in terms of evolution. 
Another way of viewing things is to calculate the magnitude 
of the difference between HDI variation in rank over the 
considered period and the variation in rank of each of the 
considered MHDIs over the same period. For instance, if country 
A has gained (between 2005 and 2012) two positions in terms of 
HDI but has lost three positions in terms of MHDI1, then the 
magnitude is equal to five in absolute value. This calculation 
allows seeing to what extent these variations in indicators go hand 
in hand with the variations in HDI. For example, Libya has the 
same ranking in terms of HDI in 2005 and 2012, however, it has 
lost twenty-three positions in terms of MHDI1. So the gap is large 
relative to a country like Cuba which has witnessed also no 
change in HDI rank but has gained seven positions in terms of 
MHDI1. Four gaps were therefore calculated in absolute value to 
show this magnitude. A cut-off of  ten was adopted (as a rule of 
thumb, and inspired by Gamlath (2013)). A negative magnitude 
means a loss relative to HDI whereas a positive magnitude implies 
a gain. The below table reports the countries for which the 
magnitude was found to be greater than ten in absolute value. 
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MHDI1 – HDI MHDI2 - HDI 
Cameroon -11 
China -11 
Côte D'ivoire 11 
Moldova 11 
Togo 11 
Uzbekistan 11 
Zambia 11 
Azerbaijan -12 
Cape Verde 12 
Egypt, Arab Rep. -12 
Paraguay 12 
Haiti 13 
Hong Kong  
Sar, China -13 
Mauritania -13 
Albania 14 
Madagascar -14 
Rwanda 14 
Saudi Arabia -14 
Turkey -15 
Maldives -16 
Seychelles 16 
Indonesia 17 
Iraq 17 
Lebanon -18 
Thailand -18 
Venezuela, Rb -18 
Yemen, Rep. -18 
Pakistan -19 
Serbia 21 
Algeria -22 
Fiji -23 
Libya -23 
Mali -23 
Georgia 25 
Tonga 25 
Iran, Islamic Rep. -26 
Syrian Arab  
Republic -36 
 
Serbia 11 
Turkey -11 
Yemen, Rep. -11 
Cape Verde 12 
Pakistan -12 
Thailand -13 
Madagascar -14 
Venezuela, Rb -14 
Fiji -15 
Lebanon -15 
Tonga 16 
Libya -17 
Algeria -18 
Iran, Islamic  
Rep. -19 
Georgia 20 
 
 
 
 
37 countries, 16 with positive magnitudes 
and 21 with negative magnitudes 
15 countries, 4 with positive 
magnitudes and 11 with 
negative magnitudes 
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Table 7.8. Relative Magnitude of Change In Rank Vis-À-Vis HDI for Each 
MHDI Index 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014 
(See Footnote 2) 
MHDI3 - HDI MHDI4 - HDI 
Algeria -11 
Congo, Rep. 11 
Djibouti 11 
Timor-Leste 11 
Ukraine 11 
Poland 13 
United States 13 
Russian  
Federation 14 
Sri Lanka 14 
Albania 15 
Greece -15 
Hong Kong Sar,  
China -15 
Mauritania -15 
Thailand -15 
Togo 15 
Egypt, Arab Rep. -16 
Côte D'ivoire 17 
Haiti 17 
Indonesia 17 
Jamaica 17 
Tonga 17 
Palestine -19 
Maldives -20 
Mali -20 
Bahrain -21 
Yemen, Rep. -21 
Serbia 22 
Lebanon -23 
Tunisia -23 
Iraq 24 
Pakistan -24 
Iran, Islamic Rep. -27 
Turkey -29 
Uzbekistan 34 
Libya -51 
Syrian Arab  
Republic -61 
  
 
Madagascar -12 
Algeria -15 
Cape Verde 15 
Serbia 16 
Tonga 16 
Fiji -17 
Georgia 18 
Iran, Islamic Rep. -18 
Venezuela, Rb -21 
 
36 countries, 18 with positive 
magnitudes and 18 with negative 
magnitudes 
9 countries, 4 with positive 
magnitudes and 5 with negative 
magnitudes 
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Overall the inclusion of governance seems to cause great 
discrepancies relative to HDI only in the case where the 
considered governance dimension includes political stability and 
no violence in its construction and therefore this specific 
dimension of governance seems to play an important role in the 
change in rankings. 
As mentioned previously, MHDI2 represents the most 
conservative estimate since it gives an equal value to governance 
and to other indicators of the traditional HDI. If one wishes to 
emphasize the political stability per se, then MHDI4 might seem 
more appropriate; however, it does not take into account the fact 
that political instability might have an impact on other governance 
indicators and therefore an impact on the capabilities of countries 
as well as their vulnerability.  
Focusing on MHDI2, the difference in ranking between HDI 
and MHDI2 was computed for all countries and all available 
years. Countries with ranking difference between HDI and 
MHDI2 of more than ten positions (plus ten or minus ten) were 
highlighted. They are shown in the below table: 
 
2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Botswana 
Cape Verde 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Equatorial 
 Guinea 
Iran, Islamic 
 Rep. 
Iraq 
Afghanistan 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Botswana 
Cape Verde 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Iran, Islamic  
Rep. 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Azerbaijan 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belize 
Benin 
Botswana 
Cape Verde 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Algeria 
Azerbaijan 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Benin 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Cape Verde 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Algeria 
Azerbaijan 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Benin 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Cape Verde 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Equatorial  
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Israel 
Kazakhstan 
Lesotho 
Libya 
Madagascar 
Mauritius 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Paraguay 
Russian  
Federation 
Samoa 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
South Africa 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Thailand 
Turkey 
United States 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela, Rb 
Palestine 
 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Mauritius 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Oman 
Russian  
Federation 
Samoa 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Turkey 
United States 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela, Rb 
Palestine 
 
Dominica 
Ecuador 
Fiji 
Finland 
Iran, Islamic 
 Rep. 
Iraq 
Jamaica 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Libya 
Mauritius 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Russian  
Federation 
Samoa 
Saudi  
Arabia 
South  
Africa 
Sudan 
Tonga 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela, 
 Rb 
Yemen, Rep. 
 
Equatorial  
Guinea 
Finland 
Iran, Islamic  
Rep. 
Iraq 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Libya 
Mauritius 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Pakistan 
Russian  
Federation 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Saudi Arabia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Syrian Arab 
 Republic 
Tonga 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela, Rb 
Palestine 
Yemen, Rep. 
 
Guinea 
Finland 
Georgia 
Iran, Isl. Rep. 
Iraq 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Libya 
Mauritius 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Pakistan 
Russian  
Federation 
Samoa 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
South Africa 
Suriname 
Syrian Arab 
 Rep. 
Tonga 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela, 
 Rb 
Palestine 
Yemen, Rep. 
 
Table 7.9.List of Countries that Have Lost or Gained more than 10 MHDI2 
positions between 2005 and 2012. 
 
The countries presented in the above table were then classified 
according to the frequency of persistence in the classification. For 
instance 18 countries were found in all 5 years. They are 
presented in the below table along with the difference between 
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HDI and MHDI2 for each year. First, the gap in ranking between 
HDI and MHDI2 in absolute value is on average 20 positions. In 
addition, in the considered sample, 10 countries exhibit permanent 
loss in ranking of HDI relative to MHDI2, whereas 8 countries 
exhibit a permanent gain for the considered period.  
Group 1 
Country 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 
HDI 
classification30 
Azerbaijan -11 -16 -19 -17 -21 H 
Belarus -31 -25 -31 -35 -27 H 
Botswana 24 31 29 31 31 M 
Cape Verde 11 21 19 24 23 M 
Costa Rica 15 13 15 13 16 H 
Cuba -20 -24 -24 -21 -19 VH 
Dominica 21 21 24 24 25 H 
Iran, Islamic Rep. -12 -25 -31 -29 -31 H 
Iraq -21 -18 -15 -13 -14 M 
Libya -33 -23 -36 -43 -50 H 
Mauritius 17 18 15 14 12 H 
Myanmar -18 -19 -20 -18 -14 L 
Namibia 13 20 17 18 18 M 
Russian Federation -18 -17 -16 -18 -21 H 
Samoa 26 26 26 24 25 M 
South Africa 21 16 17 18 18 M 
Uzbekistan -15 -12 -13 -14 -13 M 
Venezuela, Rb -26 -36 -40 -40 -40 H 
Table 7.10. Group 1 Countries 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014 
 
                                                          
30
 VH = Very High Human Development, H = High Human Development, M = 
Medium Human Development, L = Low Human Development, HDR 
classification adopted 
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The countries presented in the above table were then classified 
according to the frequency of persistence in the classification. For 
instance eighteen countries were found in all five years. They are 
named  Group 1 countries and presented in the below table along 
with the difference between HDI and MHDI2 rankings for each 
year. First thing to notice is that the gap in ranking between HDI 
and MHDI2 in absolute value is on average equal to twenty 
positions. In addition, in the considered sample, ten countries 
exhibit permanent loss in ranking of HDI relative to MHDI2, 
whereas eight countries exhibit a permanent gain for the 
considered period.  
Overall, for the group of countries, the values of the gaps do 
not show great variability from year to year which seems to 
suggest that these countries have structurally worse or better 
performance in terms of governance. Given that the data is 
considered between 2005 and 2012, the conclusion for this group 
is that they might have been subject to a "governance shock" prior 
to the study period, with everlasting effects.  
The second group that has been identified as having a gap 
between HDI and MHDI2 greater than ten for three or four of the 
considered years. The characteristic of this group is that the 
average gap is close to twelve, which is lower than for the first 
group. This makes sense because since ten was chosen as the cut-
off, these countries could easily fall out of the selection sample. 
Taking a closer look, one might focus on the year of entrance of 
Group 2 countries, I find some interesting features. First there are 
those that enter the group, leave and re-enter. These are: Chile, 
Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Palestine. For most cases, these countries are closer to Group 1 
since they exhibit a semi-structural pattern when it comes to the 
gap between MHDI2 and HDI.  
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Group 2 
Country 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 
HDI 
Classification 
Algeria 0 -9 -12 -16 -18 H 
Barbados 8 9 13 13 15 H 
Benin 10 10 11 12 11 L 
Chile 12 10 13 11 9 VH 
Equatorial Guinea -12 -9 -10 -11 -11 M 
Finland 7 5 14 13 13 VH 
Jamaica 9 13 15 17 15 H 
Kazakhstan -15 -10 -7 -13 -13 H 
Lebanon -7 -24 -14 -16 -22 H 
Lesotho 12 10 14 14 15 L 
Pakistan -2 -9 -12 -18 -14 L 
Saudi Arabia -12 -10 -13 -21 -20 VH 
Sudan -8 -11 -14 -12 -10 L 
Syrian Arab 
Republic -14 -10 -10 -15 -24 
M 
Tonga 0 5 15 14 16 
L 
Palestine -14 -16 -7 -11 -12 M 
Yemen, Rep. -3 -8 -11 -14 -14 L 
Table 7.11. Group 2 Countries 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014  
 
The second category consists of countries that enter in a given 
year and sustain the gap. These are: Algeria, Barbados, Finland, 
Lebanon and Yemen. If I focus on the three countries with 
negative gaps, namely, Algeria, Lebanon and Yemen, recent 
history shows that these countries have experience political 
turmoil and unrest. For instance Lebanon has experienced armed 
conflict in 2006 - Israel war- and 2007 - Nahr el Bared events - 
(UNDP 2009) and Yemen has also witnessed unrest due to what 
was related to the Arab spring. The PRIO (Peace Research 
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Institute Oslo) database shows records of the Israel War on 
Lebanon for 2006, however, the database stops at 2008
31
. 
Concerning where those three countries stand in terms of HDI 
classification (very high human development (VH), high human 
development (H), medium human development (M) and Low 
Human Development (L), there is no clear prevalence for one or 
the other HDI classification that could be linked to the evolution 
of the gap between HDI and MHDI2. Current media records show 
that Algeria and Yemen were also subject to political instability. 
The remaining countries of the list show up twice or once, 
therefore one cannot make conclusions in that respect. Taking a 
closer look at the countries with negative HDI – MHDI2 gaps in 
both groups, they are: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Libya, Myanmar, 
Russia, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Algeria, Lebanon, Yemen. The 
interesting feature of this group is the existence of four countries 
belonging to the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) Region. 
Taking a closer look at the evolution of HDI and MHDI2 for those 
countries, I find that, between 2005 and 2012, Algeria has 
witnessed an improvement in HDI rank versus minor deterioration 
in the situation of Lebanon, and none for Libya and Yemen. 
 
Country/ 
HDI Rank 
2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 
Algeria 90 89 85 84 84 
Lebanon 58 61 62 58 60 
Libya 48 48 48 63 48 
Yemen, Rep. 139 142 140 137 139 
Table 7.12. HDI Evolution for Algeria, Lebanon, Yemen and Libya 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014  
                                                          
31
 www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-
X-2009/ retrieved August, 2014 
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When MHDI2 is considered, over the considered period, all four 
countries lose (twelve positions for Libya, seventeen for Lebanon, 
seventeen for Libya and eleven for Yemen. As for the difference 
in ranking between HDI and MHDI2, it reaches up to fifty 
positions in 2012 for Libya.  
 
Country/Rank MHDI2 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 
Algeria 90 98 97 100 102 
Lebanon 65 85 76 74 82 
Libya 81 71 84 106 98 
Yemen, Rep. 142 150 151 151 153 
Table 7.13. MHDI2 Evolution for Algeria, Lebanon, Yemen and Libya 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014 
(See Footnote 2) 
 
Overall, the relationship between MHDI 2 and HDI is near linear 
by construction, actually it’s a tautology to say that HDI is 
strongly correlated to MHDI2 since it represents approximately 
three quarter of MHDI2. The below scatter represents the 
relationship between the two indexes for year 2012.  
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Figure 1. HDI and  MHDI2 Values  Scatter 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014 
 
Another way of viewing this relationship is by taking a look at the 
relationship between HDI and the absolute value of the difference 
between HDI and MHDI2. The below scatter is obtained: 
 
 
Figure 2. HDI and HDI - MHDI2 Values Scatter 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on WGI (See Footnote 1) and HDR 2014 
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The interesting feature is that the gap between HDI and MHDI2 
becomes larger for HDI ranks between 50 and 100, therefore in 
the midrange of the classification. This is explained by the fact 
that the change in rank between MHDI2 and HDI is most 
significant for countries falling in the high to medium level of 
human development.  
The authors also attempted to check whether the adoption of 
MHDI2 caused major changes in the classification of countries as 
they are in the HDI, namely as very high, high, medium and low 
human development. Taking the sample of 171 countries, they 
were divided into four groups: three groups of forty-three 
countries ranked as very high, high and medium human 
development and a group of forty-two countries for the bottom 
low human development. The classification was performed based 
on the ascending HDI and MHDI2. Then the change in the 
classification was checked for year 2012. It was found that, 
overall, forty out of the 43 forty-three countries that ranked very 
high in HDI also ranked very high in MHDI2. On the lower end of 
the spectrum, 40 out of the 42 low development countries 
according to HDI still ranked as low development in MHDI2. 
Results were found to be less conclusive for both the high and 
medium level of development countries. For high levels of 
development, only thirty-three countries out of forty-three kept 
the same level of classification and for medium development 
countries, and thirty-four out of forty-four kept the same level of 
development (annex 13). This finding seems to show that on a 
global level, one might consider that HDI and any modified 
version of HDI are redundant, since the majority of countries keep 
their classification. However, this result has to be nuanced by the 
fact that the inclusion of the governance makes a difference for 
some countries first within the high development group (for 
instance the United States lost eight positions from one measure to 
the other but stayed in the same group), and also, more markedly 
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in the other groups. For instance Lebanon stayed in the high 
development group but lost twenty-two positions. Since the size 
of a single group is around forty countries, it all depends on the 
initial position of this country in terms of HDI as well as the 
magnitude of the change implied by the inclusion of the 
governance indicator. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned previously, the correlation between the ranks of 
HDI and MHDI2 is very high. One might therefore be tempted to 
consider that both measures are redundant. However, even though 
it seems logical that a better HDI rank means that the country 
performs better in terms of capabilities, the fulfilment of those 
capabilities requires a suitable institutional framework. When this 
institutional and political framework is accounted for by 
governance index, some countries exhibit changes in ranks and in 
categories of human development. Within a given year, this 
change might not appear to be significant or to significantly alter 
the category of development; however, taken in a dynamic 
perspective, a shock in terms of governance could have long-
lasting effects and the accumulation of those effects might lead, if 
the country does not have enough resilience, to a loss in 
capabilities. Taking the example of Lebanon, between 2005 and 
2012, it has only lost two ranks in terms of HDI but seventeen 
ranks in terms of MHDI2. Between those two years, Lebanon has 
witnessed changes in political events (2006, 2007 and 2008, 
UNDP, 2009) that might have caused a net loss in terms of 
political stability. If a large definition of human development is 
adopted, then, the capabilities of the country were seriously 
affected; this however does really not show up in HDI. In the 
introduction of the present article, it was also mentioned that very 
often, vulnerability and resilience are two sides of the same coin. 
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Applying this to Lebanon, I can propose the following paradigm: 
HDI variations in terms of value and ranking and development 
categories can be considered as an indicator of resilience since it 
is generally acknowledged that the level of development as 
measured by the HDI takes more time to change than the seven-
year period that was considered. However, the evolution of 
MHDI2 which has greater variability can be taken as a measure of 
vulnerability. More time periods of observation of both indicators 
are needed for a given country, but it might be interesting to 
investigate how long the HDI and MHDI2 ranks take in time after 
a shock has occurred to go back into ranks that are approximately 
close as is the case for instance for the very high development 
countries.  
On another front, adopting MHDI2 can better inform policy 
makers about the urgency of reinforcing governance and 
designing institutions that allow their countries to better absorb 
the shocks. The reduced changes from year to year in HDI might 
give a false sense of security, whereas MHDI2, which is more 
volatile and more sensitive to negative shocks, might urge policy-
makers to take action to protect national economies. Indexes such 
as the HDI and the EVI are informative in nature and they allow 
to summarize a given dimension into one measure. Debate has 
been ongoing about their use and their validity relative to one-
dimensional indicators such as GDP per capita (Klugman, 
Rodriguez and Choi, 2010). Even if it remains globally true that 
changes in HDI over the 2005 – 2012 period have been 
accompanied by changes in MHDI2 in the same direction, the 
average magnitude of the difference taken in absolute value is 
higher for MHDI2 relative to HDI is higher (4.8 for MHDI2 
versus 4.04 for HDI for year 2012; the t-test also showed that 
those two averages are significantly different); therefore 
suggesting that the MHDI2 is able to give more visibility to 
variations in levels of human development driven by governance.  
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In general, the literature on vulnerability and resilience 
addresses negative shocks; however, the MHDI2 results show that 
improvements in governance might also bring about positive and 
significant changes in ranking. Further avenues of research might 
be explored in the future if more data becomes available, notably 
through the construction of Vector Autoregressive Models with 
impulse response functions allowing to assess the impact of a 
governance shock on economic development.  
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CHAPTER 8 
RESILIENCE AT AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
Geographic Variation in Degrees of Empowerment
32
 
Sahar T. Issa and Roula Al Daïa 
 
 
Abstract: The current chapter is the first of two chapters together 
comprising Part 2 of our edited volume that is dedicated to 
empirically exploring different manifestations of resilience to 
environmental effects of armed conflict. Each chapter approaches 
resilience from a different organizational level. In this Chapter 8, 
degrees of individual empowerment in the coastal area of North 
Lebanon are researched. For this, we use the analytical framework 
by Alsop, et al. (2006), which regards empowerment in terms of 
two components: agency and opportunity structure. Agency and 
opportunity structure play a large role in terms of services 
delivery, labour and job opportunities, and participation in the 
community. We therefore focus on three sub-domains at the local 
level including public service delivery, labour and community 
development. Results show how individual empowerment in north 
Lebanon has been affected by the combination of agency and 
opportunity structure, with education being a particularly 
                                                          
32
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important determinant of empowerment, especially in the most 
deprived areas.  
Keywords: Empowerment, agency, opportunity structure 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Empowerment is broadly regarded as ‘increasing poor people’s 
freedom of choice and action to shape their own lives’ (Narayan, 
2005:4). Research on empowerment connects human wellbeing to 
the larger social and political environment by highlighting 
people’s capabilities and discovering the influence of social 
issues, rather than focusing on risk factors and blaming the 
victims (Perkins and Zimmerman, 1995). Empowerment has a 
multidimensional, complex, and dynamic nature (Samman and 
Santos, 2009). It refers to both a process and an outcome. The 
processes and outcomes of empowerment differ in their apparent 
shape because there is no specific standard that can fully 
determine its meanings in different contexts or populations 
(Perkins and Zimmerman, 1995). Therefore, definitions of 
empowerment vary depending on the discipline, objectives of the 
research or intervention, and approaches used to assess it, and are 
generally associated with terms such as agency, autonomy, 
freedom, power, control, participation, integration, choice, and 
change (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Brown, 2005; Lokshin and 
Ravallion, 2005; Malena and Heinrich, 2005; Moser, 2005; 
Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007).  
This chapter identifies the different degrees of 
empowerment that individuals have in the coastal area of north 
Lebanon within the context of armed conflict. The coastal area of 
north Lebanon is of particular interest for three main reasons. 
First, this area has been exposed to various episodes of armed 
conflict. Second, this area is also considered to house the poorest 
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and most deprived families in Lebanon. Third, and as might be 
expected from the previous description, another characteristic is 
the government’s neglect of this area.  
We follow the analytical framework developed by Alsop et 
al. (2006) who define empowerment as “a group’s or individual’s 
capacity to make effective choices, that is, to make choices and 
then to transform those choices into desired actions and 
outcomes” (Alsop et al., 2006:10). The framework views 
empowerment in terms of two components: agency and 
opportunity structure; and distinguishes between degrees of 
empowerment. Alsop et al. analytical framework is outlined in the 
World Bank publication Empowerment in Practice: From 
analysis to implementation, which provides a set of indicators that 
can be universally applied and compared for measuring agency, 
opportunity structure, and degrees of empowerment. The findings 
are based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods, including an analysis of 500 questionnaire surveys 
distributed to citizens in the study area, and two focus group 
discussions with local authorities. 
The chapter is structured as follows: we start by presenting a 
brief literature review on empowerment, agency, and opportunity 
structure. We then discuss the findings and draw conclusions in 
the final section.  
 
2. EMPOWERMENT, AGENCY, AND 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
Empowerment is usually conceived in terms of two components: 
agency and opportunity structure. Agency refers to an actor’s 
capacity to visualize options, express preferences, and make 
purposeful choices (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005; Ibrahim and 
Alkire, 2007). According to Sen (1999), agency is what an 
individual is free to do and accomplish in the quest for purposes 
or values that this individual perceives as important. 
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Consequently, “having greater freedom to do the things one has 
reason to value is (1) significant in itself for the person’s overall 
freedom, and (2) important in fostering the person’s opportunity 
to have valuable outcomes” (Sen, 1999:18). However, considering 
agency as synonymous with empowerment is problematic 
(Drydyk, 2008). It is important to understand that the ability to 
perform as an agent is not equivalent to the achievement of 
desired outcomes (Petesch et al., 2005). Even when people have 
the ability to visualize options and make choices, they may not be 
capable of using their agency efficiently and may be inhibited by 
their opportunity structure. Here, the opportunity structure refers 
to the institutional environment that comprises the formal and 
informal contexts within which the actors function (Alsop and 
Heinsohn, 2005; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007). Petesch et al. (2005) 
argue that one’s opportunity structure is influenced by three major 
factors: the accountability of institutions, the performance of 
groups in power, and the implementation capacity of the state. 
These three factors set the contexts and opportunities that shape 
individuals’ and groups’ capacities to participate, influence, and 
hold institutions liable (Petesch et al., 2005). As such, agency and 
opportunity structure have a mutual relationship that leads to 
differing degrees of empowerment. The relationship between 
agency and opportunity structure is highlighted by social theorists 
such as Giddens (1984) who emphasize the importance of 
considering structures and agency as ‘dual’, in that they are both 
the medium and the results of actions that form social systems 
(Giddens, 1984).  
The degree of empowerment can be measured in terms of 
existence, usage, and actual accomplishment of choices by 
determining whether an individual has an opportunity to make a 
choice, whether they can truly take advantage of the opportunity 
to choose, and whether the decision leads to a preferred outcome 
once the choice is made (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005; Alsop et al., 
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2006). Various factors including the socioeconomic and 
geographic status of a person or group can influence the existence 
of choice, which may not always exist. The use of choice relies on 
the actual benefit accruing to an individual or a group arising from 
an opportunity to choose. The achievement of a choice depends 
on the extent to which the desired result has been accomplished. 
An individual’s empowerment can be studied in different 
domains. Generally, three main domains are perceived, each 
divided into further sub-domains, which indicate in what areas 
and parts of their lives that individuals are empowered. The 
‘State’ domain, in which an individual is considered as a civic 
actor, is divided into three sub-domains: politics, justice, and 
public service delivery. The ‘Market’ domain, in which an 
individual is considered an economic actor, is divided into labour, 
goods, and private services sub-domains. The ‘Society’ domain, 
in which an individual is considered a social actor, is divided into 
two sub-domains covering family and community. Even though 
prior assumptions should not be made about empowerment 
relationships between different domains or sub domains, the 
degree of empowerment in one domain can be associated with 
similar degrees of empowerment in a different domain or sub-
domain (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005; Alsop et al., 2006). 
According to Alsop et al. (2006), empowerment within 
domains and sub-domains can be experienced at various levels (or 
administrative boundaries): macro-, intermediary, and local. The 
macro-level may be the national level or that of the state. The 
intermediary level may correspond to the district, and the local 
level to the village or city. It is important to note that the degree of 
empowerment at one level is not necessarily the same as that on 
another level.  
When measuring empowerment, the data collected do not 
necessarily have to cover all the domains and levels of the 
analytical framework. The number of domains, sub-domains, and 
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levels considered mainly depends on the nature and purpose of the 
research. Usually, two to six domains and one to three levels are 
included in a study (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005). In this chapter, 
the degrees of empowerment in the public services delivery sub-
domain within the state domain, the labour sub-domain within the 
market domain, and the community sub-domain within the society 
domain are all addressed at the local level. 
  
 
Figure 8.1: The Relationship between Outcomes and Correlates of 
Empowerment (Source: Alsop et al., 2006, p.10) 
 
3. STUDY AREA 
The study area encompasses the coastal region of north Lebanon. 
The northern coastline covers 100 km, roughly 40% of the entire 
Lebanese coast (Mitri et al., 2012a). The area incorporates 24 
cities and villages grouped into five areas: Akkar, Menieh, 
Tripoli, Koura, and Batroun. The coastal area of north Lebanon is 
predominantly agricultural, although its southern part is more 
urbanized with a number of major cities such as Tripoli and 
Batroun (Institute of the Environment, 2007). North Lebanon is 
home to about one-fifth of the total population of Lebanon, with 
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approximately 764,000 inhabitants (Central Administration of 
Statistics, 2007). 
The coastal area of north Lebanon has been involved in 
several episodes of armed conflict, resulting in severe impacts on 
the social, economic, and political levels as well as on the 
environment (Mitri et al., 2012b). The north of Lebanon is 
considered to be the poorest and most deprived area of the 
country, with 46% of the nation’s extremely poor population and 
38 %of the poor population (Das and Davidson, 2011). This 
region has historically been neglected by the Lebanese 
government, which concentrates its efforts mainly in Beirut and 
its suburbs (Volk, 2009). 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: DEGREES OF 
EMPOWERMENT IN THE COASTAL AREA OF 
NORTH LEBANON 
4.1.  State Domain: Public Service Delivery 
In terms of the public services delivery sub domain of the state 
domain, the citizens from the coastal area of north Lebanon 
complained about the poor quality of public services. Although 
the survey shows that houses in the coastal area of north Lebanon 
are connected to the electricity grid, major instabilities and power 
supply disruptions are common. The number of hours per day 
when electricity is available differs from one city or village to 
another. In several villages of Akkar, it was reported that 
electricity is only available for two to three hours a day. The 
significant failures in the electricity supply put an extra burden on 
the population by forcing them to search for alternatives such as 
subscribing for electricity from private providers or buying private 
batteries or generators, with the associated additional costs of fuel. 
Further, and particularly in Akkar, not everyone can afford private 
generators or to subscribe for electricity. The results indicate that 
large percentages of the populations in Menieh, Tripoli, Koura, 
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and Batroun are able to afford the extra costs of private sources of 
electricity: 76% of the coastal population in Menieh, 82% in 
Tripoli, 91% in Koura, and 95% of the coastal population in 
Batroun. In comparison, only 51% of the coastal population in 
Akkar are able to afford public and private sources of electricity, 
with the other 49% relying on public sources. It is notable 
however, that residents in several villages in Akkar reported that 
they had recently been connected to the electricity grid. 
Results also showed that many citizens in the coastal area of 
north Lebanon do not use the public water system. Batroun area 
had the highest percentage of people using the public piped water 
system at 52%, whereas only 17% of the citizens in Akkar use the 
public system. This is due to various reasons such as the quality of 
water and access to public water sources. For example, 37% of 
citizens in Akkar, 17% in Menieh, 49% in Tripoli, 41% in Koura, 
35% of citizens in Batroun reported that they buy bottled water 
from private companies because they do not trust the quality of 
water provided by the public system. In Akkar and Menieh, 
around 45% of the population rely on either private or public 
wells for their water because they cannot afford other alternatives; 
whereas in Koura, citizens reported that the water was polluted 
and they preferred other alternatives such as bottled water. People 
living in the El Mhamra village in Akkar reported that they had 
only recently been able to access public water. However, during 
field visits, they reported receiving warnings from the 
municipality council six months later that the water was polluted 
and it was better not to use it. Several villages, notably Arida and 
Cheikh Zennad in Akkar, still do not have access to the public 
water system. In addition to issues with the services mentioned 
above, citizens and local authorities complained about other 
public services such as public schools, hospitals, and wastewater 
and solid waste management. This was particularly the case in 
areas of Akkar where there are no local hospitals, wastewater 
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networks are mixed with irrigation canals, and public schools are 
not available for all educational levels. 
70% of the coastal population in Akkar lack any kind of 
health insurance compared with 42% in Menieh and Batroun, 39% 
in Tripoli, and 31% in Koura. Only 20% of citizens in Akkar 
benefit from the National Social Security Fund, whereas 1% 
benefit from private insurance, and 9% from other type of health 
insurance. For Menieh, 49% of citizens benefit from the National 
Social Security Fund, 4% from private insurance, and 5% from 
other type of health insurance. In Tripoli, 52% of citizens benefit 
from the National Social Security Fund and 9% from private 
insurance. Koura has the highest percentage of people who are 
able to afford private insurances, with 46% of citizens benefiting 
from the National Social Security Fund, 19% from private 
insurance, and 4% from other type of health insurance. For 
Batroun, 47% of residents are able to benefit from the National 
Social Security Fund, 9% from private insurance, and 2% from 
other type of health insurance. 
Despite the perceived low quality of public services 
delivery, around 90% of citizens in the five coastal areas have 
never complained to the authorities regarding the delivery of 
public services, even though they do have this option. In Akkar, 
89% of the people had not complained to the authorities regarding 
public services delivery, Menieh 91%, Tripoli 84%, Koura 92%, 
and Batroun 98%. According to the citizens, they chose not to 
complain because even if they did they expected to be neglected 
and their voices to go unheard. This is confirmed in the survey, 
where the majority of citizens in the five areas who had 
complained about public services delivery revealed that their 
complaint had not been resolved.  
The results show that individuals do have the opportunity to 
complain but the majority do not take advantage of this 
opportunity. For the minority who do use this opportunity to 
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complain about public services delivery, the preferred outcomes 
are not achieved. To better understand the results, we sought out 
the reasons and perceptions behind individuals’ choices. Citizens 
were asked their perceptions regarding authorities’ equitability in 
addressing needs and concerns and about the influence of political 
and religious characteristics on the authorities’ treatment of 
people.  
 
Perception Area 
A
k
k
a
r 
B
a
tro
u
n
 
K
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u
ra
 
M
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n
ie
h
 
T
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li 
T
o
ta
l 
Do you think that the authorities 
are more or less effective when 
addressing other people’s needs/ 
concerns compared to yours? 
 
      
Much more effective 
Slightly more effective 
Neither more nor less effective 
Slightly less effective 
Much less effective 
35% 
5% 
 
59% 
 
 
1% 
0% 
24% 
13% 
 
56% 
 
 
3% 
4% 
28% 
2% 
 
61% 
 
 
4% 
5% 
20% 
14% 
 
56% 
 
 
4% 
6% 
19% 
8% 
 
67% 
 
 
3% 
3% 
25.2% 
8.4% 
 
59.8% 
 
 
3.0% 
3.6% 
       
Do you feel the way in which the 
authorities treat people is affected 
by people’s religion or political 
affiliation? 
 
Yes, very much 
Yes, slightly 
No, not at all 
Would rather not say 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69% 
5% 
25% 
1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79% 
5% 
13% 
3% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75% 
6% 
13% 
6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57% 
10% 
14% 
19% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69% 
15% 
12% 
4% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69.8% 
8.2% 
15.4% 
6.6% 
Table 8.1: Authorities’ equitability in addressing needs and concerns, and the 
influence of political and religious characteristics on the authorities’ treatment 
of people 
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Around 60% of respondents in the five areas believed that the 
authorities were neither more nor less effective when addressing 
other’s people needs or concerns than their own, whereas 35% of 
citizens in Akkar, 20% in Menieh, 19% in Tripoli, 28% in Koura, 
and 24% in Batroun and thought that the authorities were much 
more effective when addressing other people’s needs or concerns. 
These people believed that it all depended on power or personal 
connections, particularly with local authorities and politicians. 
Similarly, when it came to the influence of political and religious 
characteristics on the authorities’ treatment of people, 69% of 
citizens in Akkar, 57% in Menieh, 69% in Tripoli, 75% in Koura, 
and 79% of citizens in Batroun perceived that the way in which 
authorities treat people was very much affected by political 
affiliation and religion (Table 8.1). 
 
4.1.1. Correlation analysis and Logistic regression analysis
33
 
To further understand these results, the relationships between the 
various indicators were sought (using Spearman's rho 
correlations) for each of the five areas. The indicators included in 
the analysis were education level, complaining about public 
services delivery, equitability in addressing needs and concerns, 
and influence of religious and political affiliations on the 
authorities’ treatment of people. The following significant 
relationships were found: 
- A weak positive correlation between the perception of 
equitability in addressing needs and concerns, and the 
perception of the influence of social characteristics on the 
authorities’ treatment of people in Akkar (Sig. = .327**) 
and in Menieh (Sig. = .258
**
). That is, those who think that 
authorities are more effective when addressing other’s 
people needs or concerns than their own are more likely to 
                                                          
33
 We thank Mrs. Rania Najjar for helping with the analysis through SPSS 
Software. 
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also perceive the way that authorities treat people to be 
affected by political affiliation and religion.  
- A weak positive correlation between complaining about 
public services delivery and a perception that political and 
religious characteristics influence authorities’ treatment of 
people in Tripoli (Sig =.223
*
). In other words, people who 
complain about public services delivery are more likely to 
also think that the way in which authorities treat people is 
affected by political affiliation and religion. One possible 
explanation is that Tripoli is a large city - the largest 
outside the capital Beirut - and the complex reality of 
Lebanon’s society in terms of diverse religious and 
political affiliations is therefore more apparent to its 
residents. 
In addition, logistic regressions were performed on data for each 
of the five areas to try to explain individual perceptions regarding 
the influence of religious and political affiliations on the 
authorities’ treatment of people. The perception of authorities’ 
effectiveness when addressing people’s needs is an important 
factor and was therefore taken as the dependent variable (Table 
8.2). The independent variables were age, gender, education level, 
income, organization membership, perception of involvement in 
community decision-making processes, and perception of 
authorities’ equitability in addressing needs and concerns. 
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Probability:  * <0.05, ** < 0.1 
Table 8.2: Logistic regression to evaluate determinants of individual 
perceptions as to whether the way in which authorities treat people is affected 
by people’s religion or political affiliation 
 
In terms of significant determinants, the following results are 
worth noting: People in Akkar, Menieh, and Koura, who think 
that authorities are more effective in addressing other people’s 
needs/concerns than their own are more likely to feel that the way 
in which authorities treat people is affected by people’s religion or 
political affiliation. This might be due to the deprivation and 
poverty witnessed in these areas and the authorities neglect of 
people’s conditions and their failure to cover basic needs in many 
cases. In addition, people in Akkar who are more involved in their 
community are more likely to feel that the way in which 
authorities treat people is affected by people’s religion or political 
affiliation. One possible explanation might be that, with the 
deprivation and lack of opportunities in this area, being involved 
in the community is an opportunity to enlarge one’s social 
network and seek development opportunities.  
Independent 
Variable 
Batroun Koura Tripoli Menieh Akkar 
Age 0.001765 -0.036604 0.012491 -0.075569* 0.041824 
Gender -1.807316* -0.714654 0.300579 0.658762 0.395893 
Education 0.183793 -0.229410 0.204958 0.042293 -0.080191 
Income -0.026309 0.447103* 0.016032 0.001264 -0.103495 
Organization 
membership 
0.744262 -2.598135** 0.600897 1.530159 0.554039 
Involvement -0.104652 -0.435822 0.696319 -0.239450 1.350588** 
Effectiveness 0.063095 1.695380* 0.135259 0.665038* 1.402461* 
C  1.714031 -2.213624 -
1.514911 
0.984452 -6.037262 
      
McFadden R-
squared 
0.127122 0.260365 0.052472 0.169340 0.239485 
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Overall, the goodness of fit of the models, as represented by 
Mc Fadden's R
2
, is adequate. The variations in the dependent 
variable explained by the selected independent variables are as 
follows: 23% in Akkar, 16% in Menieh, 5% in Tripoli, 26% in 
Koura, and 12% in Batroun. The findings highlight the variations 
among the studied areas in terms of the influence of the various 
independent variables in explaining perceptions of the authorities’ 
treatment of their citizens. This reflects the uniqueness and 
different constitutions of the areas included in the study.   
During the focus group sessions, the participants were also 
asked about the poor public services delivery that had been seen 
in the survey findings, and people’s perceptions regarding 
authorities’ effectiveness and treatment. According to the 
participating local authorities, the monthly budgets assigned to 
each municipality are very limited and do not cover municipal 
needs. It was also reported that, in many cases, delays in 
providing the money are commonplace. The limited financial 
potential hinders progress and development by the municipal 
council, which is unable to cover many of its citizens’ needs in 
general and public service delivery in particular. It was also 
mentioned that the municipalities are sometimes restricted by 
conditions laid down by the state, given the centralized system 
that limit their performance. Another important aspect is power, 
which was referred by the participants during the focus groups. 
The effect of power and personal relationship or social network is 
evident in the way authorities address needs and concerns, which 
is mainly based on political and religion characteristics, at the 
local and national level. 
4.2.  Market Domain: Labour 
In terms of financial assets, Akkar is the least endowed area in 
terms of income followed by Menieh. Respondents in Koura and 
Batroun report the highest incomes, followed by Tripoli. The low 
incomes in Akkar and Menieh could be related to characteristics 
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linked to education level, type of occupation, and family size. The 
Akkar area shows the lowest level of education and the largest 
family sizes of the areas studied. In addition, incomes in Akkar 
mainly rely on natural resources in farming, fishing, and small 
enterprises, reflecting the rural nature of the area. The Akkar 
sample also had the highest percentage of unemployed: 32% of 
those interviewed in Akkar area were unemployed, compared with 
15% in Menieh, 12% in Tripoli, 25% in Koura, and 10% in 
Batroun. It was reported during the focus group discussions that 
the high levels of unemployment, particularly in Akkar and 
Menieh, were leading to an increase in social problems such as 
drugs, violence, robberies, and other crimes. It is important to note 
that the impact of the Syrian war on the labour domain was 
emphasized during the focus group discussions, including by 
representatives from the Akkar and Menieh areas. They 
commented that Lebanese citizens were suffering from a lack of 
job opportunities and that many employers were replacing 
Lebanese workers with Syrian refugees because they could pay 
them less. 
4.2.1. Correlation analysis and Logistic regression analysis 
To study the degree of empowerment in the labour domain, 
indicators reflecting control over employment or occupation 
choices were used. Spearman's rho correlations were calculated to 
study the relationships between a range of indicators: education 
level, feeling of security in current occupation, choice in deciding 
occupation, and ease of changing occupation.  
The following significant relationships were found: 
- Weak positive relationships in Akkar between education 
level and feeling of job security (Sig = .333
**
) as well as 
between education level and the existence of choice in 
occupation (Sig =.307
*
). This reflects that individuals who 
have completed higher levels of education in Akkar have 
greater choices in deciding their occupation, and feel more 
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secure in their current occupation, than individuals who 
are less well educated. This is understandable since the 
Akkar area, as discussed earlier, has the lowest level of 
education of the areas studied with less than 20% having 
completed higher education.  
- Weak to moderate relationships between there being a 
choice of occupation and a feeling of job security were 
found in Akkar (Sig = .251
*
), Menieh (Sig = .259
*
), and 
Tripoli (Sig= .253
*
). That is, individuals in these areas 
who have a choice in deciding their occupation feel more 
secure in their occupation than individuals who do not 
have a choice in deciding their occupation.  
To further understand the findings, logistic regressions were 
performed to study factors that might influence the feeling of job 
security in each of the five areas. An individual’s perception of 
security in their present occupation is a significant factor and was 
therefore taken as the dependent variable (Table 8.3).  
Probability:  * <0.05, ** < 0.1 
Table 8.3: Logistic regression to investigate determinants of individual 
perceptions of job security 
Independent 
Variable 
Batroun Koura Tripoli Menieh Akkar 
Age 0.004004 0.002526 -0.043089* 0.005261 -0.067168* 
Gender -2.000537* 0.029716 0.563470 -1.947866* -1.530899* 
Education 0.164578 0.667514** -0.196285 0.073982 0.261146 
Income 0.058272 0.044134 -0.063654 0.052995 0.162755 
Life change -1.330468* -2.276586* -0.520127 0.924351 -0.057612 
Organization 
membership 
0.197509 -0.660740  -1.324511 0.079696 
Decision 0.353620 -0.090203 0.707917* 1.286794* 0.009502 
C  0.478392 -0.895859 2.082592 -1.518048 1.553353 
      
McFadden 
R-squared 
0.187077 0.201547 0.116611 0.209616 0.177877 
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The independent variables considered were age, gender, education 
level, income, aspiration for life change, organization 
membership, and existence of choice in deciding occupation.  
Of the significant findings, the following results are the 
most noteworthy: The probability of individuals feeling secure in 
their job is higher in Menieh and Tripoli when they have a choice 
in determining their occupation. Results also show that gender is 
an important factor in Akkar, Menieh, and Batroun, with men 
feeling less secure than women in their jobs. In Akkar and 
Menieh, this might be because these two areas can be 
characterized as masculine societies where women are less 
involved within their society. As a consequence, men are usually 
the main sources of income and decisions in the family and this 
may put a burden on the male head of household, particularly 
given the large families, relatively poor education, and lack of job 
opportunities. However, the finding also applied to Batroun, 
where women are more involved in the labour and social domains. 
Here, the reasons might be related to individual lifestyles in this 
area. Other significant findings are that the probability of 
individuals feeling secure in their job decreases with age in Akkar 
and Tripoli, and when individuals would like to change something 
in their lives in Koura and Batroun.  
The goodness of fit of the models, as represented by Mc 
Fadden's R
2
, is adequate. Overall, 17% of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by the selected independent 
variables in Akkar, 20% in Menieh, 11% in Tripoli, 20% in 
Koura, and 18% in Batroun. The variation in the independent 
variables found to partly explain the feeling of job security again 
reflects the uniqueness of each area and the different factors that 
influence empowerment in each area.   
4.3. Society Domain: Community  
In addressing the community sub domain, the survey showed that 
more than 95% of citizens in Akkar, Menieh, Koura, and Batroun 
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were aware of the main decision-makers regarding local public 
services. Here, Tripoli stood out: 17% of those surveyed did not 
know and 6% thought that nobody took decisions. However, 
everywhere, a large percentage of the citizens did not consider 
themselves involved in community decision-making processes. 
Tripoli, Koura, and Batroun led the way with 87%, 85%, and 80% 
respectively claiming non-involvement, followed by Menieh with 
78% and Akkar with 65% making similar claims (Table 8.4). 
  
 
 
Perception of 
involvement in 
Community 
decision making 
processes 
 
 
Akkar 
 
Batroun 
 
Koura 
 
Menieh 
 
Tripoli 
 
Total 
Very involved 1% 1% 2% 3% 1% 1.6% 
Fairly involved 6% 8% 5% 12% 5% 7.2% 
Slightly involved 28% 11% 8% 7% 7% 12.2% 
Not involved at 
all 
65% 80% 85% 78% 87% 79.0% 
Table 8.4: Perception of involvement in Community decision-making processes 
 
4.3.1. Correlation analysis and Logistic regression analysis 
To further understand the reasons behind the high level of non-
involvement in decision- making processes, the relationships 
between various indicators combinations were studied (using 
Spearman's rho correlations). The indicators were education level, 
involvement in community decision-making processes, aspiration 
to be involved in community decision-making processes, and 
influence in community decision-making processes.  
Notable results are as follows: 
- Weak to moderate positive correlations between involvement 
in community decision-making processes and influence in 
community decision-making processes in Akkar (Sig = 
.366
**
), Menieh (Sig = .538
**
), Tripoli (Sig = .329
**
), and 
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Batroun (Sig = .247
*
). That is, individuals who are involved in 
community decision-making processes believe they have an 
influence on the community decision-making processes, and 
those uninvolved believe they have less influence.  
- Weak positive correlations between aspiration to become 
more involved in community decision-making processes and 
influence in community decision-making processes in Akkar (Sig 
= .329
**
), Menieh (Sig = .337
**
), Koura (Sig = .314
**
), and 
Batroun (Sig = .239
*
). In other words, individuals who think that 
they can influence community decision-making processes aspire 
to be more involved in their community whereas those who do not 
think they can have an influence are not inclined to get involved.  
- A weak positive correlation between education level and 
influence in community decision-making processes in Akkar (Sig 
= .210
*
) suggesting that individuals with a high level of education 
perceive that they have a greater influence on decision-making 
processes. This might be due to the generally low level of 
education in the Akkar area. This is due to the relatively late 
arrival of schools in Akkar, the continuing lack of access to 
schools, and poverty that forces many students to leave school to 
help their family livelihoods. Therefore, for those living in the 
Akkar area, having completed a high level of education presents 
an opportunity and an advantage, not open to the less well 
educated majority, to see options and make purposeful choices 
that enhance their abilities to influence decision-making 
processes.  
To further understand the relationships, logistic regressions were 
performed to study the influence of various factors on an 
individual’s involvement in community decision-making 
processes in each of the five areas. Individual involvement in 
community decision-making processes is seen as an important 
factor and was therefore taken as the dependent variable (Table 
8.5). The independent variables considered were age, gender, 
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education level, income, aspiration for life change, organization 
membership, aspiration to be involved in community decision-
making processes, and perception of influence in community 
decision-making processes. 
 
  Probability:  * <0.05, ** < 0.1 
Table 8.5: Logistic regression to uncover determinants of an individual’s 
involvement in community decision-making processes 
 
The following significant relationships are particularly interesting: 
The probability of individuals in Menieh, Tripoli, Koura, and 
Batroun being involved in community decision-making processes 
is higher when the individuals perceive they have a greater 
influence on decision-making processes. Further, the probability 
of individuals being involved in community decision-making 
processes in Menieh is higher if the individual belongs to an 
organization or aspires to become more involved in decision-
making community processes.  
The goodness of fit of the models represented by Mc 
Fadden's R
2
 is adequate. Overall, 6% of the variation in the 
Independent 
Variable 
Batroun Koura Tripoli Menieh Akkar 
Age -0.088534* 0.012315 -0.013233 0.002253 0.036672 
Gender 2.283146* 1.326512 -0.465089 -0.907656 0.762311 
Education -0.356629 0.704542** -0.606467 -0.432047 0.162105 
Income 0.038748 -0.041889 0.080175 0.031544 -0.117735 
Life change -2.210232* -0.816062 0.425527 0.199654 -0.103994 
Organization 
membership 
1.123032 -0.562743 1.269680 2.307381*  
Like 
Involvement 
-0.212059 0.456245 0.584451 0.781516* -0.233986 
Influence 0.894163* 0.646492** 1.027577* 1.347295* 0.505173 
C  2.344762 -8.994422 -2.964509 -4.574730 -2.783656 
      
McFadden R-
squared 
0.266223 0.159095 0.203103 0.382225 0.061482 
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dependent variable is explained by the selected independent 
variables in Akkar, 38% in Menieh, 20% in Tripoli, 15% in 
Koura, and 26% Batroun. 
The question of citizens’ involvement in the community was 
also raised during the focus group sessions with the local 
authorities of the different coastal cities and villages. They 
claimed that citizens do not want to participate because they feel 
deceived and are dissatisfied with the outcomes. In addition, the 
participants perceived that individuals’ participation in the 
community was influenced by the overall political ambiance and 
that citizens simply did not trust public institutions.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The findings are in line with the statement that the degree of 
empowerment in one domain can be associated with another, 
similar, degree of empowerment in a different domain or sub-
domain (Alsop et al., 2006). Even though agency differs between 
different areas, the combination of agency and opportunity 
structure result in similar degrees of empowerment for the three 
sub domains in each area. Thus, although the determinants of 
empowerment differ between one area and another, depending on 
the geographical location, socioeconomic situation, and 
marginalization of the area, the opportunity structures in these 
areas, characterized by a lack of adequate political representation, 
lack of transparency in institutional activities, and political 
influence on various activities, have a significant and similar 
influence on individuals’ degrees of empowerment and limit their 
decisions and expectations for a better outcome. Individuals in 
Menieh, Tripoli, Koura, and Batroun do have the capabilities and 
opportunities to make choices, but they do not really take 
advantage of the opportunities to choose and improve their 
livelihoods. However, in the Akkar area, many citizens have few 
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such opportunities and are also limited by the formal and informal 
institutional contexts.  
Elsewhere, education has been seen as “the most frequently 
recurring determinant of empowerment” (Samman and Santos, 
2009:20) and, based on our results, education would also seem to 
be a crucial factor in the Akkar area. This is classified as one of 
the most deprived areas in Lebanon (Das and Davidson, 2011) 
and has all the typical characteristics of poor and marginalized 
rural communities, with bad infrastructure and poor quality 
services, including in education, in addition to other features, such 
as limited income sources and inadequate support from 
government and civil society, that have produced a cycle of 
poverty and increasing deprivation. In such a situation, a higher 
level of education offers better opportunities and increases 
people’s capacity to visualize options, express preferences, and 
make purposeful choices.  
The coastal area of north Lebanon provides a good 
illustration of the way that degrees of empowerment can vary 
within communities within a relatively small geographical area. 
The study also shows that empowerment should not only be 
considered as an ‘extension of agency’. In many cases, despite the 
presence of capacities and opportunities, the desired outcomes are 
not achieved due to structures that can inhibit available choices. 
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CHAPTER 9 
RESILIENCE AT THE MUNICIPAL AND COMMUNAL 
LEVEL 
The Significance of Trust and Cooperation in Environmental 
Management: A Case Study of Al-Fayhaa Union
34
 
Nivine H. Abbas 
 
Abstract: Developing the insights on individual resilience that 
were presented in Chapter 8, the current chapter takes resilience 
beyond personal empowerment and explores the socio-cultural 
and political dynamics that shape resilience at a communal level. 
The chapter starts from the premise that the effectiveness of the 
Lebanese government to address environmental challenges is 
constrained by a large variety of factors and that trust is one of the 
most important among them. Yet, knowledge of trust relationships 
and as a factor affecting environmental management is 
significantly lacking in Lebanon. The results of our survey 
demonstrate a lack of trust among the stakeholders that hinders 
environmental management. This lack of trust of the government 
undermines citizens’ participation in environmental activities and 
their compliance with regulations related to environmental 
management.  
Keywords: Trust, cooperation, participation, government 
legitimacy, solid waste management 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Lebanon is a country that is rich in natural resources. 
Nevertheless, it has long been threatened by environmental 
degradation and threats which, not only affect the natural 
environment, but also people’s health and economic development 
(Sarraf et al., 2004; Geara-Matta et al., 2010), their well-being 
(Khagram et al., 2003), and human security (Shambaugh et al., 
2001; Khagram et al., 2003; Huseynov, 2011). Lebanon’s 
environment has been, and still is neglected (IMAC, 2007a).  
Lebanon’s environmental degradation can be attributed to 
different factors, one of which is armed conflict. Armed conflicts 
represent a particular threat to the environment, not only because 
of direct impacts (El Asmar et al., 2012; World Bank, 2007; 
Ministry of Environment, 2006); but also because of the break-
down of trust between different stakeholders and the sectors 
involved in managing the country (Abbas, 2014; Issa, 2014). 
Since the 1975 civil war, the repeated arm conflicts in Lebanon 
have caused social fragmentation (Bazzi, 2007) and led to weak 
institutions and increased corruption. Second, human activities in 
the agricultural, fisheries, industrial and tourist sectors also 
contributed to environmental deterioration of the coastal area in 
North Lebanon. These human activities resulted in soil erosion; 
depletion of underground water resources; pollution from 
pesticides, fertilizers and agricultural by-products; and, seawater 
pollution from unregulated industrial waste disposal (IMAC, 
2007a). Finally, environmental deterioration has also resulted 
from political and institutional weaknesses. The ongoing 
instability of Lebanon greatly hinders environmental protection 
(McCornack, 2012). The Government is said to be unable to take 
proper decisions, to propose necessary laws to protect the natural 
environment (Bazzi, 2009; Kisirwani, 1992) and to enforce 
existing laws. Masri (2009) argues that the main reason behind 
several environmental issues is poor management and inadequate 
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enforcement of existing laws. For example, disregard for 
construction laws has resulted in much illegal building (El Asmar 
et al., 2012). 
The link between trust and successful natural resources 
management (Idrissou et al., 2013; Baral, 2012) and project 
management (Pinto et al., 2008; Berkes, 2009) is considered to be 
fundamental. According to Hoffman et al. (2001), human 
dimension, one of which is trust, is the single most significant 
determinant of project success. It is also argued that trust has an 
important role in building positive relationships among project 
stakeholders (Pinto et al., 2008). This notion has developed within 
the framework of natural resources planning and public 
dependence on government agencies to protect natural areas and 
provide public welfare (Davenport et al., 2007). Trust is 
considered to be the basis for building and sustaining relationships 
between environmental management agencies and communities 
affected by management action and plans (Sharp et al., 2013). It is 
said that trust cements and reinforces the relationships among the 
stakeholders involved in a project, thus determining its success 
(Bresnen and Marshall, 2000; Chan et al., 2003). Trust among 
stakeholders is perceived by many scholars to be crucial in the 
implementation of public programs (Tyler, 1998; Gilson, 2003; 
Tsang et al., 2009).  Trust explains, at least to some extent, why 
participants decide to cooperate or not (Ostrom and Walker, 
2003). Based on the social exchange theory, the less citizens have 
trust in the stakeholders involved in management process, the less 
they will be willing to comply with rules and regulations, to adjust 
their behaviour, or to volunteer to contribute (Axelrod, 1984). 
This theory argues that citizens will be willing to comply with 
rules and regulations and to adjust their behaviour provided they 
have confidence that the private or public sector organizations are 
able to produce a beneficial event or to provide beneficial 
services. One way to gain confidence is by having more trusting 
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relationships. While ‘trust’ has been referred to in the literature in 
this respect, it has not been systematically studied in the case of 
Lebanon. To help fill this gap in knowledge, this research 
investigates the trust relationships among the various stakeholders 
involved and its impact on environmental management process in 
north Lebanon.  
In this chapter we want to identify which factors contribute 
to poor environmental management process, and how 
municipalities cope with environmental degradation. We assume 
that trust is a key component of effective implementation of 
management processes and programs. We look at the extent to 
which citizens themselves indicate their preparedness to comply 
with existing regulations and to volunteer for environmental 
management initiatives. Their cooperation is, amongst others, 
related to their trust in the functioning of government authorities, 
and directly touches upon the legitimacy of the fragile political 
system. We studied the citizens’ perception by analyzing a survey 
conducted in 2011 involving 499 citizens.  Also, using Fuzzy 
cogitative mapping approach (FCM), we took solid waste 
management in Al Fayhaa Union as a case study to discuss all the 
factors that affect this management process in this area. We 
organized a round-table discussion that included five working 
groups representing stakeholders involved in solid waste 
management (SWM) in the Al-Fayhaa Union area of Lebanon: 
from the public sector, from the private sector, and from 
grassroots movements. In our research we studied what is the 
particular role of trust on variables that affect, or are affected by, 
solid waste management in Al-Fayhaa Union, Tripoli, Lebanon? 
How is trust related directly and indirectly to solid waste 
management? Finally this research show that trust relationship is 
one of the factor that have an important impact on the 
environmental management in Lebanon. Nevertheless, it 
acknowledges that some stakeholders successfully circumvent 
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environmental regulations, using trust and cooperation with public 
authorities to effectively obstruct environmental regulations. We 
argue that the willingness to cooperate for the general interest (or 
public good) is much lower than trust and cooperation for 
personal benefit. 
This research used a definition of trust by Morton Deutsch 
when asking respondents questions about their specific 
expectations: "To trust another person /organization to produce a 
beneficial event X, or to provide a service, an 
individual/organization must have confidence that the other 
individual/organization has the ability and intention to produce it" 
(adapted from Deutsch 1960: 125). Although this definition may 
seem to be outdated, we found it was still valid and applicable to 
the various stakeholders involved in environmental management 
in Lebanon. We used and communicated this definition to the 
people interviewed. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the context and setting of this research. Following this, 
Section 3 presents and discusses the results from both survey and 
Fuzzy cogitative mapping before Section 4 draws conclusions and 
recommendations. 
1.1.  The stakeholders 
The definition of stakeholders adopted in this research is that of 
Freeman who states: stakeholders are "those groups who can 
affect or are affected by the achievement of an organization's 
purpose" (1984: 49). Natural environmental problems are 
complex and multi-scale and require multiple actors and agencies 
(Reed, 2008). In Lebanon, three broad categories of stakeholders 
are involved in the environmental management process, whether 
directly or indirectly: stakeholders in the public sector; 
stakeholders in the private sector; and, citizens. 
The environmental management process primarily is in 
public sector hands. The public sector at a national level consists 
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mainly of policy makers, ministries, Government and its institutes 
(MOE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011). Politicians, normally outside the 
public sector, are key-decision makers within the ministries. 
Therefore, they are included in our category of the public sector. 
It is the municipality that is charged by law to oversee and 
implement environmental projects benefiting communities within 
its area of jurisdiction at the local level (IMAC, 2007b). 
Nevertheless, many public organizations, at both local and 
national levels, are administratively weak and are not able to 
implement developmental projects or provide adequate services to 
the citizens (Atallah, 2012).In addition, and significantly, the 
private sector, which is considered a secondary stakeholder, also 
plays an important role in environmental planning and 
management in Lebanon (IMAC, 2007a). The private sector 
broadly includes private companies, but also academic or research 
centres, and experts (to the extent these are being paid for their 
services). Private companies work as consultants for the public 
sector, as contractors, or as providers of specific services, such as 
collecting solid waste or water supply. The public and private 
sector are closely related and, to some extent, interwoven. Various 
forms of ‘cooperation’ between the public and private sectors in 
environmental management are: (a) cooperation in project 
implementation; (b) cooperation through advisory work or 
consultation; (c) cooperation through contracting; or, (d) 
cooperation through service provision. A number of ‘councils and 
funds’ play a key role in the disbursement of funds from public to 
private sectors. A number of joint-stock ventures were also 
established. These funds, councils and joint-stock ventures have 
played a crucial role in rehabilitation and reconstruction of major 
infrastructure. Thereby, they have an impact on the natural 
environment. Last, but not least, citizens can play a crucial role in 
the environmental management process through complying with 
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laws and regulations, by volunteering in environmental initiatives, 
or by resisting new plans. 
 
2. CONTEXT AND SETTING 
 
2.1. Coastal areas of north Lebanon 
This research was generally undertaken in the coastal areas of 
north Lebanon which includes the five main areas of Akkar, 
Minieh-Dinnieh, Tripoli, Koura and Batroun. This 100km long 
stretch of coastline constitutes around 40% of the Lebanese coast 
(Mitri et al., 2012) and consists of 24 villages and cities where 
most of the population lives (IMAC, 2007a). The population 
comprises people from different backgrounds, religions, social 
and economic levels. Environmental pressures and problems, such 
as solid waste dumping and wastewater discharge, exist here and 
in  many other areas in Lebanon. These have been exacerbated by 
an inflow of refugees. North Lebanon remains affected by 
repeated episodes of armed conflicts which have contributed to 
social fragmentation and disruption (Bazzi, 2007), weak 
organizations, increased corruption (Leenders, 2012) and the 
break-down of trust between citizens and the Government. These 
facts make this area a good place for our research to fill the gaps 
in knowledge. The survey conducted has covered all coastal areas 
of north Lebanon.  
2.2. Why the Al-Fayhaa Union as a case study? 
Solid waste problems in Lebanon generally, and especially in 
North Lebanon, continue to degrade the environment (Sarraf et 
al., 2004; IMAC, 2007a; IMAC, 2009). This problem is not only 
negatively effecting the natural environment but also human 
health (Sarraf et al., 2004). Solid waste management is generally 
considered to be one of the central environmental health services 
and a fundamental part of basic urban services (Ahmed and Ali, 
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2004). In Lebanon, especially since the civil war, solid waste 
collection and disposal services have deteriorated significantly (El 
Hoz, 2007; ELARD, 2004). Today, there is no efficient or well-
implemented national policy on solid waste management 
(Massoud and El Fadel, 2002; IMAC, 2007a; European 
Commission, 2006; El-Hoz, 2007; MOE, UNDP and ECODIT, 
2011) and the Lebanese Government is seen as unable to address 
these challenges (IMAC, 2007b; IMAC, 2009; Habib, 2012; 
Abbas et al., 2013; MOE, UNDP and ECODIT, 2011). 
The Al Fayhaa Union area (Figure 9.1) which includes the 
municipalities of Tripoli (the second largest city in Lebanon), El-
Mina, and El-Beddawi was chosen specifically as a case study 
area for solid waste management for the following reasons. The 
Al-Fayhaa Union has the largest population (around 330,000 in 
2007) of the unions found in the coastal area of North Lebanon 
(UNEP, 2009). In the Al-Fayhaa Union, as in all other areas of 
Lebanon, the Lebanese Government is unable to address many of 
the environmental challenges, including the disposal of solid 
waste. There are many reasons for this including the weakly 
defined national planning authorities (IMAC, 2007b); the lack of 
continuity in developing, implementing, and managing 
environmental programs (IMAC, 2009; MOE/UNDP/ECODIT, 
2011); the lack of cooperation among public institutions involved 
in environmental protection generally (Habib, 2012; Abbas et al., 
2013) and solid waste management specifically; and the failure of 
citizens to cooperate and comply with environmental laws and 
regulations (Abbas et al., 2014). In Lebanon, municipal solid 
waste is still regularly dumped in uncontrolled seafront landfills, 
on beaches, or inland. In the area considered, Al-Fayhaa Union’s 
largest seafront dumping site is at Tripoli and it receives 
municipal solid waste from around 400,000 people. This 
dumpsite, as with many other dumpsites in Lebanon, is a source 
of local pollution (European Commission, 2006; ELARD, 2004). 
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In Al-Fayhaa Union, a private company, LAVAJET, is 
responsible for municipal solid waste collection and street 
cleaning. Another private company, BATCO, is responsible for 
managing the landfill. The landfill of Tripoli receives around 280 
tons daily, not only from the three major cities in Al-Fayhaa 
Union but also from the municipality of Al Qalamoun (a village in 
the northern coastal area of Lebanon), from a slaughterhouse, 
from a Palestinian refugee camp, and from a few resorts (UNEP, 
2009). The landfill reached its maximum capacity in 2010, but is 
still open and in use until today. This is a huge problem and a 
threat to the health of the people. 
This study area was also chosen specifically by 499 citizens 
surveyed who chose the solid waste collection by Lavajet 
Company in this area as the most positive initiative in the coastal 
area on North Lebanon. Many citizens could compare solid waste 
collection today with earlier times when this operation was a 
municipality responsibility. My personal background is also 
rooted in Tripoli which is one of the three cities that form this 
union and this, also made it easier for me to choose the Al- 
Fayhaa Union as a study area. 
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Figure 9.1: Showing villages and cities in coastal North Lebanon, including the 
Al –Fayhaa Union  
 
3.  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. From the Survey 
The results of the survey reveal that 96% of the citizens reported 
that they perceive there is lack of trust between citizens and public 
authorities involved in environmental management at national 
level in Lebanon(whether in general or in relation to provision of 
services and decision making). 60 % had little confidence or trust 
that the municipality provided a good and sufficient management 
for environmental problems in their area (Abbas et al., 2014) This 
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finding shows that citizens did not trust stakeholders within the 
public sector at both local level and national level. These findings 
reflect the low level of political trust or “vertical” trust (Allen, 
2011). This result, although rarely mentioned, is supported in the 
literature. For example, it was mentioned that citizens regard 
officials as corrupting forces in society (Haddad, 2002). Also a 
recent study by Issa (2014) stated that citizens in coastal area of 
north Lebanon did not trust public institutions nor trust the public 
services. Therefore, political trust in Lebanon is perceived to be 
significantly low.  
Some scholars consider these trust scores as a measure of 
how well the political system is performing in the eyes of its 
citizens (Newton, 2001). The low level of political trust suggests 
the politicians and or the institutions of the political system are 
functioning poorly (Newton, 2001). The respondents referred to 
both. It is argued that “political trust gives legitimacy to political 
institutions” (Haddad, 2002:202). The low level of trust in the 
governance authorities and institutions in Lebanon is a proxy for 
the legitimacy of the government and its institutions. Political 
trust increases the practical possibilities of social cooperation; for 
example, the probability that citizens will pay their taxes 
(Newton, 2001). 
The results of this research suggest that the lack of political 
trust reduces the chances that people will comply with laws or 
participate (volunteering) in environmental initiatives. This was 
confirmed by the citizens themselves in many of their answers. 
97.4% of the citizens agreed that the more you trust decision 
makers and stakeholders involved in the environmental 
management process, the more you (as citizen) are willing to 
comply with relevant laws and regulations. Also 99.2% of the 
participants agreed that for them as citizen, the more they trust a 
stakeholder involved in an environmental management initiative, 
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the more they are likely to cooperate in this initiative (Abbas et 
al., 2014). 
When citizens were asked if they have ever participated in 
an environmental initiative, 63.3% answered no. Also 92.2% 
disagreed that citizens in Lebanon play an important role in the 
environmental management process. When asked an open 
question as to why people did not participate in environmental 
initiatives, many of the respondents said they simply did not trust 
the stakeholders involved in the environmental initiatives and they 
thought most initiatives were seen as being politicized (Abbas et 
al., 2014). This result is confirmed by the Social Exchange Theory 
(Axelrod, 1984) which state that the lack of trust and confidence 
in stakeholders involved in environmental initiatives encourages 
poor participation by citizens in environmental initiatives or 
activities. Many citizens stated they think giving their opinion is 
useless since that the decision makers (represented by politicians 
and administrators) didn’t ask them to participate in the decision-
making and planning process and are sure they will not take their 
opinions into account during any implementing phase. This 
finding goes parallel with the findings of a study done by Issa 
(2014) which argues that citizen in north Lebanon do not want to 
participate or get involved in the community because they feel 
deceived and are dissatisfied with the outcomes.  
This research argues that this directly touches upon the 
legitimacy of the fragile state in Lebanon.  This is confirmed by 
Prohl (2004) who state that the system must facilitate public 
participation in decision-making process in order to create 
legitimacy and to create the feeling that citizens’ interests or 
preferences are taken into account and are reflected in the system. 
This result agrees with research which argue that public 
participation, as one measure of political trust (Newton 2001), is a 
vital part of public decision making in general, and in 
environmental policies specifically (Tsang et al., 2009). 
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According to Boedeltje and Cornips (2004), citizens’ involvement 
in the policy making process helps to lower resistance to political 
decisions and, as a result, the decision making process gains more 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Prohl, 2004; Solitare, 2005). 
Webler and Tuler (in Ginger 2013) stress that citizens need to feel 
that they can make a difference and that they are listened to. Our 
research supports these finding. Citizens have stated that they 
know much more than decision makers, as their knowledge about 
the environmental problems comes from everyday experiences 
and the local problems that affect them. This point of view is also 
supported by some scholars such as Elias and Alkadry (2011). 
Christensen et al. (2011) argue that citizens’ acceptance of, and 
trust in, the government’s approach to problem solving is very 
important in a democratic system. Government derives its 
legitimacy from the support it takes from its citizens (Schaeffer 
and Loveridge, 2002). 
The finding of this research showed that citizen believes that 
trust and cooperation among the various stakeholders involved is 
important for better management in Lebanon. This is important 
for better and more successful decisions. Based on citizens’ 
perception, the lack of trust among the public stakeholders, is 
preventing them from taking proper decisions and, thus, achieving 
good environmental management. This is in return is considered 
as one of the reasons which leads to a lack of citizen’s trust in 
public sector. 
3.2. From the Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping
35
 
Considering the solid waste management as a case study, this 
research tried to investigate from the various stakeholders’ 
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perceptions the role of “Lack of trust relationships” compared 
with the other variables in the system. The result of the drawing 
maps based on the 45 predefined list of variables given to the 29 
participants should that trust relationship on top of the ten 
variables from the 49 variables (45 predefined and three added by 
the participants) in terms of centrality identified by each sector 
(Table 9.1).  
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1 Decentralization 2.82 Political will 8.16 Waste minimization  5.66 
2 Lack of trust 
relationships 
2.66 Lack of trust 
relationships 
4.66 Poor processing and 
poor treatment of solid 
waste 
5.00 
3 Lack of 
cooperation 
2.66 Lack of national 
environmental 
policy 
3.83 Current operating 
landfill 
5.00 
4 No solid waste 
sorting 
2.50 Good awareness 
of citizens 
2.83 Lack of funding 4.32 
5 Current 
operating 
landfill 
2.17 Environmental 
degradation 
2.50 Lack of trust 
relationships 
4.00 
6 Availability of 
space for a new 
landfill  
2.16 Lack of 
standards and 
legislation 
2.50 Armed conflict  4.00 
7 Lack of law 
enforcement  
2.00 Armed conflict  2.33 Waste collection system 4.00 
8 Lack of urban 
planning 
(zoning) 
2.00 Economic 
situation 
2.16 Lack of national security 4.00 
9 Private sector 
involvement 
2.00 Lack of funding 2.00 Private sector 
involvement 
3.98 
10 Media 1.99 No solid waste 
sorting 
2.00 Citizens/households 3.33 
Table 9.1: Top ten variables in terms of centrality in each sector. 
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In social network analysis, centrality is the more analyzed indices 
in terms of map complexity and is represented by the sum of both 
out-degree and in-degree relationships of a variable. It reflects the 
connectivity of this variable to other variables in the map showing 
the cumulative strength of its connections (Eden et al., 1992). The 
higher the centrality value, the more important a variable is in the 
system. Table 9.1, showing the most central variables, helps 
clarify which variables are most important and central in the 
Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (Zhang et al., 2013). This table shows 
that the public and private sector stakeholders put trust 
relationships (or the lack thereof) in second place, and the 
grassroots group put this in fifth equal place (along with “Armed 
conflicts”, “Waste collection system”, and “Lack of national 
security”).  
The analysis also shows that cooperation is the third most 
important variable for the public sector stakeholders. In other 
words, for the public sector stakeholders, who are the primary 
stakeholder in solid waste management in Lebanon both trust and 
cooperation are considered one of the most important variables in 
solid waste management. This finding is consistent with findings 
by many scholars (Pinto et al., 2008; Delisle, 2004; Kadefors et 
al., 2007; Chan et al., 2003). Interestingly, the private sector and 
grassroots stakeholders attached much less importance to “Lack of 
cooperation” as a variable with a relationship with solid waste 
management. It is also important to note that in all three maps 
“Lack of trust relationships” is an ordinary variable: it affects and 
is affected by other variables. 
3.2.1.  The “Lack of trust relationships” variable 
In order to analyze in greater detail the role of trust relationships 
as a variable affecting or being affected by the solid waste 
management system, we created ‘neighbourhood maps’ for this 
particular variable showing only those concepts that are directly 
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connected with “Lack of trust relationships”. The “neighbourhood 
maps” were used to make the analysis easier and clearer. This 
research zoomed only on the grassroots’ map in order to better 
understand their perception about trust relations.  
Figure 9.2, representing the grassroots’ point of view, shows 
a negative relationship between “Lack of trust relationships” and 
“SWM” while this group believed that “Lack of trust 
relationships” decreases “Waste minimization” and the 
“Citizens/households” contribution. All neighbouring concepts or 
variables directly connected to the “Lack of trust relations” 
concept and their linkages for the Grassroots group. Solid arrows 
represent positive and dotted arrows negative effects; the sizes of 
circles reflect the centrality of the variable. 
 
Figure 9.2 
 
Based on the grassroots’ perceptions, the trust relationship can 
play an important role in the success of solid waste management 
since solid waste management decreases when “Lack of trust 
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relationships” increases (i.e. trust deteriorates) and vice versa. 
This result is supported by scholars who note the link between 
trust and the success of projects and management (Pinto et al., 
2008; Kadefors et al., 2007; Hoffman et al., 2001). The negative 
relationship between “Lack of trust relationships” and “Waste 
minimization” also indicates that the less trust there is, the less 
waste is minimized, an aspect of solid waste management.  
This map shows that enhancing trust between citizens and 
the public and private stakeholders involved in solid waste 
management can be one way to encourage citizens to comply with 
laws and regulations related to solid waste or change their 
behaviours and try to minimize their waste production. This 
finding is in general agreement with Social Exchange Theory 
(Axelrod, 1984). This is also supported by the relationship found 
between “Citizens/households” and “Lack of trust relationships”. 
When “Lack of trust relationships” increases, citizens will play a 
less important role in solid waste management. That is, the less 
citizens have trust in the stakeholders involved in solid waste 
management, the less they will be willing to comply with rules 
and regulations, to adjust their behaviour, or to volunteer to 
contribute. The relationship between “Citizens/household” and 
“SWM” shows that a link exists between the citizens’ sector and 
solid waste management. This is consistent with findings 
elsewhere regarding the important role of citizens in 
environmental management in general (Elias and Alkadry, 2011). 
This supports Berkes (2009), who argues that people affected in 
their livelihoods by management decisions should have a say in 
how those decisions are made. 
3.3. The “wasta” concept and its relation to trust 
The result from survey and the Fuzzy cogitative mapping both 
showed that trust and cooperation, between citizens and 
stakeholders in the public and private sector are indeed important 
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to jointly address environmental problems. Nevertheless, this 
research has also found that trust and personal relations are also 
used to jointly circumvent existing environmental regulations. In 
Lebanon, as in many other Middle Eastern societies, ‘cooperation’ 
has two faces: one that increases the likelihood of successful 
implementation of policies and programs; and one that seems to 
achieve the opposite. Wasta according to Smith et al. is ‘the 
process whereby one can achieve goals through links with key 
persons in positions of high status (2012, with reference to 
Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1993). 
When citizens were asked their opinions on this issue, many 
agreed saying that, from their experience, they had noticed that, 
nowadays, some citizens and private sector stakeholders use the 
“wasta” with their leaders to circumvent laws, including 
environmental ones. According to some citizens, even public 
sector stakeholders use “wasta” with public authorities in higher 
positions to bypass laws and regulations. According to corruption 
– trust theory, citizens who have lack of trust in public authorities 
and consider that they are living in a corrupt society, feel that in 
order to survive they also have to take part in this corruption. This 
could be an explanation of why some people use trust and 
cooperation with public authorities to effectively obstruct 
environmental regulations. This also agrees with Levi (1998), and 
argues that citizens and some of the private sector stakeholders 
perceive that there is lack of trust in the public sectors stakeholder 
of involved in environmental management. That there is not 
enough fair and just implementation for environmental policies 
can explain why some stakeholders use trust and cooperation 
relations for their personal interest instead of the general interest. 
This result is also supported by some scholars who claim that 
individuals with low in trust are considered to be less likely to 
contribute to public goods than those with high in trust 
relationships and vice versa (Parks 1994 in Parks et al. 2013). 
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According to Leenders, some private companies in Lebanon 
dealing with solid waste management trust the political leaders, 
because of their personal interests and financial benefits, to 
cooperate with them and assist them in making agreements and 
contracts with the Government (2012). Another example is 
illustrated by Allès (2012) who argues that many of the local 
political elites showed remarkable resistance to the public –private 
partnership project in water sector in Tripoli. It was mentioned 
that not only the clients but also some elites used their 
relationships or the “wasta” to try to get or hire someone in a job, 
in the context of cronyism in public administrations. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results from the survey showed that citizens did not trust 
stakeholders within the public sector at both local and national 
level.  The results of the survey clearly demonstrate that, from a 
citizens’ perception, there is a positive link between trust 
relationships on the one hand, and a citizen’s participation (in 
terms of participation in joint activities, compliance with 
regulations, and adjusting) and the legitimacy of the government 
and its organizations on the other. One of the reasons what 
citizens do not participate in environmental management 
initiatives in Lebanon is because they do not trust the stakeholders 
involved in the environmental initiatives and they think most 
initiatives were recognized as being politicized. This result is 
implicit in social exchange theory (Axelrod, 1984). The lack of 
trust and confidence in stakeholders involved in environmental 
initiatives encourages poor participation by citizens in 
environmental initiatives or activities.  
Applying the Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping method to a solid 
waste management case study confirmed earlier findings that trust 
is a prerequisite for effective environmental management. Various 
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respondents ranked this higher or lower in the list of variables 
linked to environmental management, depending on their 
denomination (public/private sector or grassroots organizations). 
On the other hands, the results of this chapter disagreed to some 
extent with other findings that human dimension of project 
management including trust is to be the single most important 
determinant of any project success or management (Hoffman et 
al., 2001). The results of this research have found that other 
factors are considered by stakeholders to be higher in importance 
and were better ranked than trust to the solid waste management. 
Specifically, the analysis of the cognitive maps (Table 9.1) shows 
that “Lack of trust relationships” is a central variable and ranked 
second by the public and private sector stakeholders (after 
“Decentralization” and “Political will” respectively) and fifth by 
the grassroots representatives (after “Waste minimization”, “Poor 
processing and treatment of solid waste”, “Current operating 
landfill” and “Lack of funding”) of the 49 variables identified as 
having a relationship with solid waste management. It is not 
surprising that some variables were better ranked. Some of the 
factors stated were already mentioned earlier in literature as a 
common problem in Lebanon. Scholars have already mentioned 
the problem of centralization in the Lebanese administrative 
system, both organizationally and geographically (Abou Assi, 
2013). Thus, decentralization was stressed on by the public sector. 
As for the “Political will” that was ranked first by the private 
sector stakeholders, or the other variables such as “Waste 
minimization” and “Lack of funding” that were rank higher by the 
grassroots, this study argues that all these variables are directly or 
indirectly linked to “Lack of trust relationships”. Interaction of the 
variables reveals the complexity and nuance in trust relationships 
in Lebanon, and shows the important impact they have on the 
environmental management process. 
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This research supports the literature that has already 
addressed the importance of trust in management processes (Pinto 
et al., 2008; Kadefors et al., 2007; Hoffman et al., 2001; Berkes, 
2009). This research shows that trust is an essential element that 
affects and is affected by solid waste management specifically and 
environmental management generally in Lebanon. Although trust 
and cooperation were found to be weak, there was also evidence 
that such relationships are used to hinder environmental 
management; specifically where some stakeholders use ‘wasta’ to 
effectively obstruct measures that could reduce environmental 
problems. This finding is supported by other studies (e.g. 
Leenders, 2012; Wakim, 1998).We argue that the willingness to 
cooperate for the general interest (or public good) in Lebanon is 
much lower than trust and cooperation for personal benefit 
The natural resource base is so important for peoples’ 
livelihoods, that the lack of capacity to address environmental 
degradation is an important manifestation of limited resilience at 
municipal level. On the basis of the result, we do not claim that 
trust relationships are the only reason behind the weak 
environmental management process in Lebanon; nor do we argue 
that trust is the only factor that enhances cooperation or citizen 
participation. However, we do conclude that citizens’ perceptions 
show that trust is one of the factors that play a substantial role in 
the environmental management process in Lebanon.  
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CHAPTER 10 
RESILIENCE FROM AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Determinants of Official Development Assistance in Lebanon: 
A Pre- and Post-War Assessment
36
 
Roula Al Daïa 
 
 
Abstract: The current chapter is the first of our two final 
empirical chapters that together constitute Part 3 of this book. Part 
3 is devoted to linking studies of vulnerability – of exposure and 
sensitivity as discussed in Part 1 and resilience as explored in Part 
2 – to the political economy of international policy-making. This 
Chapter 10, accordingly, examines the determinants of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) flows received by Lebanon from 
1970 to 2010. Over this period of time, Lebanon’s economy and 
socio-political reality has been under strain due to the outbreak of 
the civil war (1975-1990). More specifically, the chapter attempts 
to understand the linkage between ODA and civil armed conflict 
and as well as other factors that might affect these flows. The 
importance of examining ODA lies in the fact that these funds 
might serve as resources in the reconstruction process – as 
bulwarks of resilience, in other words. ODA per capita amounts in 
Lebanon, the chapter finds, is positively linked to both GDP per 
capita and occurrence of armed conflict. This highlights the 
importance of political factors in aid allocation.  
                                                          
36
 A previous version of this chapter was published as: Al Daïa R., Van der 
Molen, I. and Nader, M. 2014. “Determinants of Official Development 
Assistance in Lebanon: a pre- and post-war assessment.” In Conference 
Proceedings of the International Interdisciplinary Business Economics 
Advancement Conference. Istanbul: IIBA, 573-580. Permission for re-print was 
granted by the publisher in question. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
OECD’s Development and Cooperation Directorate (DCD – 
DAC) defines Official Development Assistance (ODA)
37
 is as 
'grants and loans to countries and territories on the DAC list of 
ODA recipients and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) 
undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic 
development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at 
concessional financial terms […] Grants, loans and credits for 
military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private 
individuals […] are in general not counted'. Therefore, ODA’s 
main objective is development-oriented; although political and/or 
human rights motivations cannot be excluded (more details are 
given in the literature review section). The United Nations 
Development Program even considered that 'ODA is allocated in 
ways that seem strange and arbitrary – however you look at it' 
(UNDP, 1992). 
Lebanon makes it to the DAC list of ODA recipients, and 
evidence of aid reception goes back as far as 1960 (DAC Online 
Database
38
). A closer look at the data shows that ODA has peaked 
during the war in 1981 and later on in the post-1990 period, from 
2006 till 2008.  
More generally, the Lebanese economy was permanently 
scarred by civil armed conflict, with colossal destruction requiring 
massive funds for reconstruction, which left the country with high 
                                                          
37
  The full definition can be found at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacglossaryofkeytermsandconcepts.htm#ODA.   
38
  http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats. 
Resilience from an international perspective 
 
 251 
levels of fiscal deficits and public debt and in bad need for 
external assistance in that respect (Harvie and Saleh, 2008).  
The objective of this paper is to study the evolution of 
Lebanon’s ODA over a period of 30 years, spanning from 1970 to 
2010, and inclusive of the 1975-1990 conflict. The paper also 
aims to explore the nexus between ODA allocation and armed 
conflict as well as several socio-economic and political variables, 
for a deeper understanding of determinants of these inflows and 
their potential impact on the country. More particularly, the paper 
will attempt to uncover whether ODA flows were higher during or 
after the conflict in order to understand whether these funds were 
motivated by crisis relief during war or socio-economic 
reconstruction after the war. Section 2 will present an overview of 
the literature on the topic, with a focus on the literature pertaining 
to ODA in war-affected countries. In section 3, a model of ODA 
determinants will be developed and analyzed, with clear 
explanatory and explained variables. Section 4 will conclude.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature about ODA can be broadly divided into two main parts. 
Some studies research the impact of various socio-economic and 
political factors on ODA allocation; in other words they take 
ODA as a dependent variable while other papers consider the 
impact of ODA on other factors, in other words, they take ODA as 
an independent variable.  
2.1. ODA as a dependent variable 
Several studies have attempted to look at the determinants of 
ODA. Wall (1994) extends a model of one donor's bilateral ODA 
to a model integrating several donors. Taking three separate time 
periods, and data for net ODA recipient countries, the author 
regresses ODA per capita on the following independent variables: 
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infant mortality, GNP per capita, an indicator of human rights and 
a population size variable. Results indicated that only per capita 
income (of the recipient country?) and population were correlated 
with ODA. 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that aid is influenced as 
much by political considerations as by economic needs of the 
recipient. In this respect, they emphasise the importance of 
colonial past and political alliances as well as the importance of 
the democratization process in attracting aid. In comparison, 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) seems to be more sensitive to 
economic incentives.  
Aid allocation also seems to be linked to donor type. For 
instance, Neumayer (2003) found an important difference in aid 
allocation between UN agencies and regional development banks 
in that the latter tend to rely more on economic need (measured by 
GDP per capita) as a criterion for aid allocation whereas UN 
agencies also tend to incorporate the quality of life as a condition 
for aid allocation.  
Also from the perspective of donors, Shweinberger and 
Lahiri (2006) develop a theoretical model of donor countries 
behaviour, and make a distinction between private and public aid. 
In the same line of thought, Tingley (2010) attempts to understand 
the role of domestic political variables in determining aid effort. 
He finds that more economically conservative governments 
tended to allocate less aid.  
Ali and Isse (2006) find that taxes on trade have a 
significant impact on foreign aid receipts, and conclude that 'fiscal 
distortions increase country’s dependency on foreign aid'. Among 
other significant determinants of aid, the authors find that higher 
GDP per worker, higher trade levels and higher levels of human 
capital imply lower levels of foreign aid suggesting that more 
developed countries are less dependent on foreign aid. Greater 
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ethnic diversity seems to be positively correlated with aid, and so 
is the relationship between government expenditures and aid. In 
addition, size does matter since larger countries seem to receive 
less aid and finally, the relationship between aid and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is negative, suggesting a crowding out effect.  
Chong and Gradstein (2008) examine the determinants of 
foreign aid from the perspective of the individual willingness to 
provide foreign aid (hypothetical level) and from the perspective 
of actual donor country data. Using a probit model, they find that 
the respondents’ tendency to agree on higher levels of aid being 
attributed to poorer countries increased with income, and with 
higher satisfaction from own government performance. Other 
explanatory variables were also included such as gender and 
education. Concerning the actual aid payments, evidence from the 
model shows that richer and more egalitarian countries are more 
likely to give aid, whereas own government efficiency has a 
negative impact on amounts of attributed aid. However, the 
interesting finding is that recipient country corruption levels do 
not seem to affect foreign aid. Interestingly also, the number of 
donors is inversely related to the amount of aid, suggesting a free 
riding behaviour among donors.  
Beyond the causal relationships some authors have 
attempted to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework for 
modelling ODA allocation (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985 and 
Neumayer, 2003). These models identify two stages in ODA 
allocation decisions. The first stage, also called the 'gatekeeping' 
stage, is a screening phase where the donors determine the pool of 
eligible states. The second stage, called the 'level' stage where the 
actual amount of aid is determined. In this context, Gomez (2007) 
studied the impact of the cold war system on aid allocation for the 
1980-1989 period considering 8 major aid donors and 72 
recipients. He finds that human rights seem to be an important 
factor at the gatekeeping level; however, they do not have a 
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significant impact on the amount of aid at the level stage. Balla 
and Reinhardt (2008) find that donor countries condition aid on 
conflict (at the gatekeeping stage), however, controlling for 
several development, economic and political variables, the authors 
find that donors tend to reduce aid to countries with or bordering 
conflict (at the level stage). Therefore, political considerations and 
conflict seem to play an important role in aid allocation.  
In this perspective, Findley, Powell and Strandow (2011) 
use georeferenced data for foreign aid projects targeting Angola, 
Mozambique and Sierra Leone, they find that conflict is 
concentrated in locations where fungible aid has been granted, 
with fungibility of aid defined as its 'potential to be diverted for 
purposes other than those intended by its donor'. 
In the field of post-conflict intervention, research has shown 
that OECD countries respond to conflict situations, and increase 
their aid in the aftermath of conflicts. In addition, conflict 
characteristics are an important determinant of aid, and so are the 
national attributes of the receiving country. Furthermore, aid tends 
to peak after a conflict before levelling off (Kang and Meernik, 
2004). 
In the previous section, the determinants of aid were 
investigated in literature; the objective was to understand what 
were the factors affecting ODA transfers from a donor to a 
recipient. However, the causality is also worth examining in the 
reverse direction, i.e. it is important to understand how aid affects 
other variables, especially in terms of economic development. 
This is what the next section will deal with.  
2.2. ODA as an independent variable: 
In a seminal paper, Burnside and Dollar (2000) examine the 
impact on aid on economic growth and conclude that 'aid has a 
positive impact on growth in developing countries with good 
fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the 
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presence of poor policies'. This paper was used as a basis by 
policymakers and multilateral agencies in order to justify aid 
transfers (Easterly, 2003).
39
  
As mentioned before, the purpose of aid is development-
oriented; therefore it is natural that some studies have attempted to 
examine the impact of aid on economic growth, especially when it 
comes to developing countries. The results concerning the impact 
of aid on growth were found to be mixed depending whether the 
model was estimated for different time periods of for different 
regions (Ekanayake and Chatrna, 2010). These results are 
contradicted by Minoiu and Reddy (2010) who find a positive 
relationship between aid and growth in the long run.   
Other analyses examine the relationship between aid and 
governance and find a negative relationship between the two 
variables, with aid having a negative impact on governance 
(Busse and Gröning, 2009). 
Moe (2008) develops a model of ODA as a determinant of 
human and educational development in eight selected Southeast 
Asian medium development level economies. ODA appears to 
have a positive impact on human development (measured by the 
Human Development Index) of recipient countries, alongside with 
other factors such as gross domestic product and foreign direct 
investment.  
Selaya and Sunesen (2012) examine the relationship 
between flows of FDI and aid. Both are sources of foreign capital 
for recipient countries, therefore it is relevant to examine the 
potential complementarities or competition between both flows of 
funds. The authors find that 'the composition of foreign aid 
matters' and recommend investing aid in complementary inputs 
                                                          
39
  However, this view was later on challenged by Easterly in the same paper 
(2003). 
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since these investments seem to encourage aid flows, whereas 
direct investment of aid in infrastructure has a crowding out effect 
on FDI. In the same line of research, Bhavan, Xu and Zhong 
(2011) find a complementary relationship between FDI and aid in 
selected South Asian countries.  
Aid has also been linked to real exchange rate 
overvaluation, especially in post-conflict countries. (Elbadawi, 
Kaltani and Schmidt, 2008). 
Nasir, Rehman and Orakzai (2012) examine the nexus 
between aid and war on terror. In the short run, aid does not seem 
to have an impact on the number of terrorist incidents; however, 
the relationship was positive and significant in the long run. The 
authors considered that the reason behind this result was the 
conditionality and the direction of aid targeting military assistance 
and was perceived by the insurgents as reward for the government 
for logistic support to the US and allied forces thereby bringing on 
retaliation.  
Some authors have attempted to examine the impact of 
foreign aid on conflict occurrence. Taking data for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Ree and Nillsen (2009) find that increasing aid flows tend 
to decrease civil conflict duration. Collier and Hoeffler (2007) 
find diametrically opposite results. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This section now presents a model of the determinants of the 
flows of Official Development Assistance to Lebanon between 
1970 till 2010, inclusive of the 1975-1990 civil war episodes. 
ODA is taken as dependent variable, and it is regressed against a 
set of independent variables (table 10.1). The independent 
variables can be classified into two main categories: 
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- The economic variables, which are an indicator of the 
level of socio-economic development and well-being of 
the country: GDP per capita, government expenditure, 
saving rate and openness to international trade. 
- The institutional/political environment variable, which 
include measures of the occurrence of armed conflict.  
Table 10.1 provides a description of the data.  
 
 
Dependent variable: Official 
Development Assistance. 
Symbol Figure Source 
1. Total ODA per capita (in 
constant 2011 USD) 
ODA/c Fig. 1 OECD and 
PWT for 
population data, 
author’s 
calculations 
Independent variables:   
2. Real GDP per capita (constant 
2005 USD) 
GDP/c Fig. 2 PWT40 
3. Government Consumption 
Share of GDP Per Capita (2005 
constant prices) 
G Fig. 3 PWT 
4. Saving rate or investment 
Share of PPP converted GDP 
Per Capita (2005 constant 
prices) 
S Fig. 4 PWT 
5. Openness  OPEN Fig. 5 PWT 
6. Occurrence of armed conflict 
(0 for no and 1 for yes) 
 
WAR Fig. 6  
Table 10.1. The model’s variables 
 
 
                                                          
40
  Penn World Tables, https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu. 
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3.1.  Descriptive statistics: a quick look at the evolution of 
the model’s variables between 1970 and 2010 and the 
rationale behind them 
Before analyzing causal relationships, a quick look at the 
evolution of each of the above mentioned variables allows us to 
highlight interesting facts. Concerning the amount of aid per 
capita (calculated by dividing total aid by population size), it 
peaks at the beginning of the eighties, and then in the mid-2000 
years (post-war era). The latter could be explained by the 
occurrence of the 2006 war of Israel on Lebanon and the 2007 
Nahr El Bared events. Overall, the evolution is rather erratic even 
if an overall upward trend can be traced.   
GDP per capita follows an erratic movement that is largely 
explained by the occurrence of armed conflict, plunging in the 
mid-eighties then witnessing a more or less sustained growth in 
the post-conflict period (starting 1990). 
Government consumption share of GDP per capita, a proxy 
of government expenditures, peaks in the early eighties, however 
it maintains itself at a relatively steady ratio in the post-war era. 
This could be explained by higher levels of fiscal discipline, but 
could also be attributed to tightness of public budgets and the 
need to remedy the ever-growing public debt.  
The investment share of GDP per capita is used as a variable 
to proxy the saving rate in the economy. Since savings are the 
major determinants of investment, classical growth model (Solow 
type) have proven that a higher saving rate leads to higher levels 
of income per capita. Therefore, the saving rate represents a 
measure of the resilience of the economy and its capacity to 
generate new investments that will pull the economy forward. A 
closer look at figure 10.4 shows that the saving rate had a 
tendency to increase even after the start of conflict, however it has 
been constantly decreasing until the beginning of the new 
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millennium. Several explanations can be developed. The initial 
increase could be attributed to a more risk-averse behaviour on 
behalf of consumers because of the need to hold back 
consumption in periods for armed conflict in prevention of an 
unstable environment both politically and economically. This 
environment is reflected in the parallel decreasing trend of GDP 
per capita over the same period. In the beginning of the nineties 
however, the trend was reversed, which could be attributed to the 
advent of the "peace period" but also to the fact that the economy 
was left vulnerable after the end of conflict, resulting in a lower 
propensity to save. Since the year 2000, this rate has tended to 
stabilise.  
Openness is defined as exports plus imports over GDP. This 
ratio measures the extent to which a country is open for 
international commercial and financial transactions and is an 
indicator of the integration of the country in the world economy. 
Openness was on an increasing trend up till the end of the war, 
however it plummeted right afterwards but seems to be on an 
upward trend again.  
When it comes to accounting for armed conflict in the 
model, a qualitative variable was used. It takes the value of 1 in 
periods of armed conflict and zero in periods of peace. The 
variable was assigned the value of 1 for periods ranging between 
1975 and 1990 and also for years 2006, 2007 and 2008 (Israel 
war; Nahr El Bared events).  
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Figure 10.1. Total ODA per capita (in constant 2011 USD) 
 
 
Figure 10.2. Real GDP per capita (constant 2005 USD) 
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Figure 10.3. Government Consumption Share of GDP Per Capita (2005 
constant prices) 
 
 
Figure 10.4. Saving rate or investment Share of GDP Per Capita (2005 constant 
prices) 
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Figure 10.5. Openness 
 
 
Figure 10.6. Occurrence of armed conflict (0 for no and 1 for yes) 
 
3.2. Regression analysis 
Before performing regression analysis, the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller test was used in order to detect the existence of unit root. 
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All variables except ODA/c and WAR need to be taken at the first 
difference.  
As mentioned previously, a regression analysis was 
conducted in order to assess whether GDP per capita, the saving 
rate, government expenditures, openness and war have an impact 
on aid receipts by Lebanon during the 1970 and 2010 period. The 
following equation has been tested: 
ODA/ct = β1 + β2GDP/ct + β3Gt + β4St + β5OPENt + β6WARt + εt 
Where variables are defined in table 10.1. In addition t is the 
subscript for time, and ε represents the residual. The βs are the 
coefficients of the independent variables in the equation. Their 
sign indicates the direction of the causality between each of the 
independent variables and the dependent variable. Table 10.2 
presents the results of the regression. Overall, only 20% of the 
variations in foreign aid per capita are explained by the 
independent variables. Concerning the significant variables, only 
GDP per capita and WAR are significant (at 10% and 5% levels 
respectively) with positive signs. This means that a higher level of 
GDP per capita induced higher aid inflows. This is logical since 
aid needs to be related to the economic size of the country in order 
to be efficient. The coefficient of the WAR variable is also 
positive, implying that aid per capita is significantly higher in 
periods of war, and therefore war seems to be an important 
determinant of aid allocation in Lebanon. The only negative 
coefficient in this regression is the saving coefficient implying 
that a higher saving rate results in lower aid being allocated. This 
could be explained by the fact that a higher saving rate implies a 
population with more "reserves" set aside and therefore more 
resilient to internal and external shocks and in less need for 
external aid. However, this result needs to be taken with caution 
as the coefficient is not significant.  
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Dependent Variable: ODA_C   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1971 2010   
Included observations: 40 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 85.14295 18.66507 4.561620 0.0001 
D(GDP_C) 0.017019 0.010033 1.696284 0.0990 
D(G) 4.209483 4.536399 0.927935 0.3600 
D(OPEN) 0.211820 0.546560 0.387552 0.7008 
D(S) -3.371612 2.688320 -1.254171 0.2183 
WAR 73.02390 27.93704 2.613874 0.0132 
     
     
R-squared 0.209269     Mean dependent var 120.2628 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092985     S.D. dependent var 87.06667 
S.E. of regression 82.91999     Akaike info criterion 11.81111 
Sum squared resid 233774.6     Schwarz criterion 12.06444 
Log likelihood -230.2222     F-statistic 1.799634 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.482227     Prob(F-statistic) 0.139329 
Table 10.2. Regression results 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper attempted to investigate the determinants of foreign aid 
flows received by Lebanon between 1970 and 2010. It was found 
that only GDP per capita and armed conflict affect ODA per 
capita flows. GDP per capita is an important explanatory variable 
as it encompasses the level of economic development and serves 
as a proxy of the level of well-being in the country. A higher level 
of GDP per capita implies that higher ODA flows are needed in 
order to make a tangible impact. However, since correlation does 
not imply causation, it might be interesting to investigate the 
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reverse causality. Concerning armed conflict, it seems to be a 
major determinant of ODA flows, which reinforces the idea that 
ODA is politically motivated. the model's overall goodness of fit 
remains low (R
2
=.20) and the model could be improved by adding 
independent variables, however there are major data limitations in 
the case of Lebanon, especially for such a long period of time.  
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CHAPTER 11 
CAN INTERNATIONAL AID CONTRIBUTE TO 
RESILIENCE? 
Perceptions of Aid Effectiveness Following the 2007 Nahr el 
Bared Crisis 
Aseel Takshe, Irna van der Molen and Jon C. Lovett 
 
 
Abstract: As the final empirical contribution to this book, this 
Chapter 11 adds to the insights developed in Chapter 10 on how 
international policy and politics shape, either positively or 
negatively, resilience to the environmental dangers posed by 
armed conflict. Building on the preceding chapter, we further 
scrutinize the assumption that development aid depends on socio-
economic, rather than political, considerations. We find that 
overseas development aid per capita in Lebanon is positively 
linked to not merely GDP, but also to the occurrence of armed 
conflict. This highlights the importance of political factors in aid 
allocation. Thus, it could be suggested, conflict itself generates the 
aid that can contribute to the resilience that is needed to minimize 
the effects of the conflict. Exploring this thesis, the chapter offers 
an in-depth examination of the motivations that drive aid 
allocation and absorption and, as such, impact resilience. In 
particular, we explore how the idea, and the practical 
interpretation and implementation, of a social contract determine 
the effect of international aid and hence the contribution such aid 
might make to a country’s resilience to conflict-generated 
environmental hazards. 
Keywords: International aid, resilience, Nahr el Bared, social 
contract  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Effectiveness of aid is related to the concept of the social contract 
as a mediating factor between society, state and donor 
organization (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2008).  However, in the past three 
decades, the nature of this contract has been questioned and 
benefits of international aid have been under scrutiny (e.g. 
Epstein, 2011; De Renzio, 2007; Awokuse, 2010). Policy makers, 
aid practioners, and scholars have questioned the effectiveness of 
development aid in alleviating poverty, decreasing conflicts, and 
promoting environmental and social development (Adam and 
O’Connell, 1999; Burnside and Dollar, 1997, 1998 and 2000; 
Easterly, 2001). The work of Burnside and Dollar (1997, 1998 
and 2000) has been particularly influential. They argue that aid is 
effective, but only in an appropriate macro-economic policy 
environment. An alternative analysis is proposed by Hansen and 
Tarp (2010), who conclude that it is the investment and 
aggregated savings component of aid that has a strong effect on 
development, and that this is not dependent on the policy context 
as suggested by Burnside and Dollar. The relation between aid 
and growth, between aid and governance, and between aid and 
human development are further touched upon by Roula Al Daia 
(this book). In her review, she refers to both positive and negative 
relations between aid and specific manifestations of development 
(such as growth, governance, human development), sometimes 
under particular conditions. 
Regardless the mixed results on the effectiveness of aid, 
there is often a widespread and persistent perception of aid 
ineffectiveness that has challenged both aid agency officials and 
scholars. In this paper, we explore perceived (in)effectiveness of 
aid at the level of intervention by examining perceptions amongst 
staff of donor organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and 
recipients in North Lebanon. Opinions of what is considered 
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successful or effective (or not), may differ between actors. 
Delivery of services or infrastructure (re)construction, such as 
urgent post-conflict repair of a bridge, road or electricity, may be 
considered effective by the donor and the state, but local actors 
might perceive it ineffective or unsuccessful. 
The research for this chapter is conducted in North Lebanon 
near the Nahr El Bared Camp (NBC). The camp has been the 
scene of violent conflict. In 2007 clashes between the Lebanese 
army and Palestinian jihadists of Fatah al-Islam killed 400 people. 
In 2008 US $277 million was pledged for reconstruction of the 
NBC and surrounding region, an amount rising to the $328 
million in May 2009. A wide range of actors are involved in 
delivering reconstruction activities. These not only include 
donors, the state and local municipalities; but also private 
companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
international organizations and civil society.  
Aid interventions for reconstruction after armed conflict are 
usually complicated by strongly polarized international political 
stances; and in this respect are quite different to donor assistance 
following natural disasters. We explore the perceptions among, 
between and across multiple stakeholders, recipients as well as 
donors, to assess effectiveness of aid to North Lebanon in the 
aftermath of the clashes at NBC in 2007. We argue that the 
concept of ‘effectiveness’ and the conditions necessary for 
‘effectiveness of aid’, have become problematic. 
Operationalization of ‘effectiveness’ becomes meaningless if it 
rests on definitions and conceptualisations that are agreed upon by 
only one of the multiple stakeholders, usually the donor. We use 
Q-methodology to extract discourses from donors, UN agencies, 
and the recipients of aid (municipalities, NGOs, communities, and 
syndicates).  
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2. STUDY SITE: NORTH LEBANON 
Northern Lebanon and its municipalities suffer from being, on 
average, the most impoverished region of the country. Moreover, 
it has the highest ‘inter-governorate inequality’ in Lebanon 
(United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2009). 
Tripoli, Minieh-Dinnieh and Akkar are the poorest areas of the 
region (poverty rates at 63%; Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), 
2007) in contrast with Batroun and Zgharta which have a 
relatively low poverty rate. Overall the region has the highest 
illiteracy rate (29.2%), and one of the largest average family sizes 
(6 persons in the same household) in the country (MoSA, 2007). 
According to the Central Administration for Statistics, public 
school enrollment (60.3% - as compared to 37.2% of youth in 
private schools) is also higher in North Lebanon than in other 
areas. As with the adjacent municipalities, level of access to clean 
water and adequate sewerage and solid waste disposal services 
rate is among the lowest in Lebanon (MoSA, 2007). Closure of 
the Syrian border during and after the July 2006 war by Israel and 
the Nahr el-Bared crisis in 2007 exacerbated the precarious socio-
economic situation. 
The Nahr El Bared Camp (NBC) was established in 1949 in 
Northern Lebanon, around 16 km from the city of Tripoli in 
Akkar governorate. It was established by the League of Red Cross 
Societies to accommodate Palestinian refugees suffering harsh 
winter conditions in the Bekaa valley and Tripoli suburbs. The 
NBC lies 16 km north of the metropolitan city of Tripoli, and 
covers about 20 km
2
. About 31,000 displaced Palestinians
41
 and 
their descendents lived in and around the camp until 2007. 
Between the months of May and September 2007, clashes erupted 
between the Lebanese army and Palestinian jihadists of Fatah al-
                                                          
41
 Around 52% are women and 48 percent are men. 33% of the camp 
population is less than 15 years old. 
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Islam in and around NBC leaving more than 400 people dead, 
including Lebanese soldiers and civilians, Palestinian jihadists and 
civilians (Government of Lebanon (GoL), 2008). Subsequently, 
the situation stabilized and reconstruction of the camp is ongoing, 
yet it remains fragile and families originating from NBC rely on 
aid to cope with the necessities of daily life. Both the camp and its 
surrounding areas also rely on aid for maintenance and 
improvement of its infrastructure.  
In mid-2008, the international community met in Vienna in 
order to secure funds to implement a recovery and reconstruction 
strategy for NBC and its surrounding region. Initially, this was set 
at US $277 million, but this rose to US $328 million
42
 (revised 
budget of May 2009). Most reconstruction activities of NBC were 
the responsibility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), whereas the 
other supporting activities
43
 where undertaken by the World Bank, 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies, as well as 
international and national NGOs, but all in partnership with the 
Lebanese Government. The recipients of the donors were 26 
municipalities, both those directly surrounding the NBC in what is 
termed the ‘second ring’ (Muhammara, Bebnine, Bhanine, 
Minieh, Beddawi and Deir Amar) and others scattered around the 
surrounding area and termed the ‘third ring’. Project 
implementation requires cooperation between multiple 
stakeholders: donors, municipalities, contractors, UNRWA and 
government authorities. These are not equal partners in the 
development process and they hold different perceptions on the 
                                                          
42
 The International Donor Conference for the Recovery and Reconstruction of 
the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian Refugee Camp and Conflict-Affected Areas of 
North Lebanon. 2008. A Common Challenge, A Shared Responsibility. Paper 
presented in the International Donor Conference, Vienna: Austria. 
43
  Such as related off-site infrastructure, capacity building and training on 
community, improving living conditions in the surrounding areas, community 
development and municipal infrastructure projects, socio-economic programs. 
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nature, modalities, objectives and effectiveness of aid. The state’s 
role in service delivery or reconstruction has partly been taken 
over, or is supplemented by private actors (companies such as 
Solidere, International Bechtel Company, Dar al-Handasa or 
smaller firms providing water and electricity), NGOs (Hariri 
Foundation), non-state actors (Hezbollah in the south, and the 
PLO in refugee camps), international organizations (UNRWA in 
refugee camps) or civil society.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In order to explore ’recipient/intermediaries or donors’ 
perceptions, we used Q-methodology to analyze their discourses 
in use. For a brief review of the methodology see Takshe et al. 
(2010). The method combines both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques to extract discourses in as subjective way as possible 
by structuring of opinions, judgements and understandings of risk.  
The Q-methodology involves several steps, starting with a 
literature and policy analysis, and face to face interviews to create 
a concourse of commentary from relevant stakeholders. The 
stakeholders were identified as municipalities (recipients), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), research centers, United 
Nations specialized agencies (intermediaries), national and 
international donors, and ministries. The face-to-face interviews 
(67 respondents) included open-ended questions. These were:  
(1) What are, in your opinion, the strengths and weaknesses of 
donors’ approaches in the region? (2) Are donors effective in 
deliverance of services? (3)What are the preferences among, 
within and across groups of actors regarding the response 
strategies? (4) How can the participation of civil society in future 
mitigation strategies be enhanced? (5) In your opinion, is the 
pattern of aid flows dictated in large part by political and 
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strategic considerations perceived? Face to face interviews were 
carried out during January–April 2010.  
Statements (sometimes quite bold statements) were then 
prepared from the concourse and a selection of statements was 
applied to the survey participants to create Q sorts which are 
analyzed using factor analysis. The answers were transcribed, 
organized and similar statements grouped together. The secondary 
sources of statements were books and journals related to conflict 
resolution, donor strategies, and post conflict international 
assistance. Statements from secondary sources were extracted 
during January and April 2010. Between April and June 2010, a 
total of 246 statements were generated of which 182 statements 
were from primary sources and 64 statements from secondary 
sources. 
A subset of statements, the Q set, was then drawn from the 
original concourse to be presented to the participants. Opinions on 
the optimal number of statements vary. Some authors consider 
there should be at least 60 statements to produce statistical 
stability and reliability, or that the typical set should be between 
50 and 70 (McKeown and Thomas, 1988; Previte et al., 2007). 
Barry and Proops consider that 36 statements are sufficient to give 
meaningful and statistically significant results (Barry and Proops, 
1999; Swedeen, 2006). In order to select the final statements to be 
ranked by the Q-sort participants, three methods were used to 
ensure that those statements were representative.  
First, care was taken to ensure that the selected statements 
covered all the sub-themes that were introduced by the face-to-
face interviews and represent the opinion domain (Watts and 
Stenner, 2005). Secondly, the selected statements included 
positive, neutral and negative statements in order that the 
participants could respond to all points of view. The third and 
major filter was the 4X4 matrix proposed by Dryzek and 
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Berejikian (1993). This matrix shown in Table 11.2 is a 
representation of two categories that are called ‘discourse 
element’ and ‘type of claim’. Statements were chosen so that all 
cells are occupied
44
.  
 
 
Type of 
Claim 
                                            Discourse Element 
Ontology Agency Motivation Relationship 
Definitive 11 12 23 23 
Designative 10 12 19 19 
Evaluative 6 14 21 24 
Advocative 4 12 18 14 
Table 11.2: Matrix for filtering the statements giving number of statements 
selected from the concourse corresponding to each of the 16 categories (Dryzek 
and Berejikian, 1993) 
 
The discourse elements refer to political aspects of discourses as 
follows: 
- Ontology: reflects set of entities such as states, nations, 
individuals, classes, genes, and interests. 
- Agency: reflects various degrees of agency attributed to 
these entities. 
- Motivation: reflects agents’ recognized or denied 
motivation such as self-interest, public-spiritedness, civic 
virtue, impartiality, and survival. 
- Relationships: reflects natural or unnatural political 
relationships mainly taken for granted such as hierarchies 
based on age, education, birth, gender, wealth, social class. 
In this study relations between institutions is also included 
and not only individual relations. 
                                                          
44
 Classification in the 4x4 table was double-blind checked with an independent 
source; results were compared.  
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The type of claim refers to the classification of claims that can be 
made, and it is described as follows: 
- Definitive: reflects the meaning of terms (definitions). 
- Designative: reflects concerning issues of fact. 
- Evaluative: reflects expressions of the worth of something 
that does or could exist. 
- Advocative: reflects something that should or should not 
exist. 
For example an evaluative statement concerning motivation would 
be statement (15) in Table 11.3. ‘There is a strong political agenda 
dictating how international aid is manipulated in the local 
Lebanese context. Lebanese political parties systematically use 
assistance as a mean to sustain their influence’’. A designative 
statement that has to do agency would be statement (1) 
‘International assistances has a positive echo in the area. It was 
the first time after the Nahr El Bared Conflict that the 
international community paid attention to the region’.  Each of the 
246 original statements was assigned matrix categories. Once the 
statements had been filtered for duplication, topic coverage, sign 
and position in the matrix, the final number of statements chosen 
was 55. These statements are presented in Table 11.2. A Likert 
scale of nine points was used ranging from -4 (mostly disagree) to 
+4 (mostly agree).  
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Statement                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Ideal factor score                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
A      B      C 
1 International assistance had a positive echo in the area. It was the 
first time after the Nahr El Bared conflict that the international 
community paid attention to the region.  
1 -2 -2 
2 The work of the international agencies is transparent and clean.  -3 -3 -3 
3 Currently, the aid agencies are transparent in the implementation 
and in the way they spend the money. International aid supported 
local organizations in improving their management qualities. This 
made the projects more organized, and more accountability on the 
performance and implementation is given. 
2 -4 -4 
4 The projects motivated us because they improve our society. 
Projects outside the conflict period are very useful; it helps to 
develop the community. 
3 -3 1 
5 International aid came to build capacity of local organizations. 
This was good. 
3 -2 -1 
6 In general, the international assistance has a lot of positive impact. 
On the economical side, it is useful because international 
organizations bring money and they spend it in the village, they 
create jobs. 
3 -3 -1 
7 The municipality is here, but they cannot do anything without help 
from outside. We need all the help we can get and we are grateful 
for your support. 
1 1 1 
8 Humanitarian aid really helps the people. It relieves some of the 
pressure from conflict in the time before recovery happens. 
2 -2 1 
9 Aid is not primarily delivered as a genuine response to people’s 
needs, but much rather follows an ‘agenda’ that distinctly favors or 
discriminates against certain individuals and groups.  
4 0 0 
10 International aid is part of a local conspiracy.  4 4 3 
11 There is a lack of honesty, integrity and fairness in international 
assistance, and is dominated by opportunistic behavior at the 
decision-making and the implementing levels. 
4 -1 1 
12 Aid should be delivered only by people with a conscience to treat 
people equally. 
1 4 -3 
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13 Most of the aid coming to Lebanon is stolen. 3 1 4 
14 Organizations should work with members who have clean hands. 4 4 0 
15 There is a strong political agenda dictating how international aid is 
manipulated in the local Lebanese context. Lebanese political 
parties systematically use assistance as a means to sustain their 
influence.  
-3 0 3 
16 To increase their influence, political parties try to take control of 
aid distributions.  
-2 0 2 
17 Half of the international assistance was stolen by the government. 4 -3 -3 
18 A lot of money that comes to the municipality is being diverted 
into private pockets. 
4 4 2 
19 If you don’t have ‘wasta’, you won’t get anything. -3 4 1 
20 International organizations should do a better job of assessment to 
make sure they distribute to those who really need it and not to 
their friends. 
1 2 2 
21 International organizations have to be present with their own staff 
members, to monitor and observe how aid is distributed. If you 
don’t do this, then people will bend to the pressure of their 
relatives and friends whom they owe a favor or wish to have 
something in return. 
0 -2 2 
22 NGOs should not be responsible for development; the government 
is responsible. But the way NGOs operate, they circumvent the 
state. NGOs can have a supporting role, but should not be central. 
-1 2 -2 
23 The good thing about the Nahr al-Bared crisis is that it brought 
direct contact between the small local NGOs and the donors. 
Before the war, we could not reach the donors. Now we have 
direct channels. 
-1 -1 -2 
24 There is not enough funding for local NGOs, so the international 
NGOs play the local NGOs against each other – to outbid each 
other. 
-2 -3 -2 
25 Donors do a lot of assessments and focus groups, but then when 
what comes out of these focus groups doesn’t fit their agenda, they 
simply change it to make it fit. There is no real partnership 
between international donors and local NGOs. 
-3 3 -1 
26 Of all donors, definitely USAID has a political agenda. -2 3 0 
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27 Conflict resolution concepts don’t work in Lebanon—it’s not 
about two people not liking each other, you need a political 
solution. Aid money for preventing violence is promoting a false 
reality. 
0 1 -4 
28 It’s the weakness of the state that makes other agencies powerful. 4 2 3 
29 There is a huge issue of not trusting local staff; they have 
limitations in speaking out. 
-3 -1 -3 
30 Organizations spend far too much time and money on 
administration. Especially UN agencies are very heavy and 
bureaucratic.  
2 4 4 
31 There is a need for donor coordination; we see all these 
redundancies and the chaos. There seems to be no vision, no long-
term idea. 
2 4 4 
32 As long as there is no comprehensive assessment or study of need 
you won’t understand whether there has been progress 
3 3 3 
33 The international organizations come and do all these studies. We 
spend a lot of time with them, they ask a lot of questions and we 
need to give them a lot of information. Then they leave and we 
never hear back from them. 
0 1 1 
34 Once a project is done, there is no follow-up, no maintenance. 1 0 3 
35 The international organizations parachuted in, left, and declared 
success. 
-2 2 2 
36 No country has ever developed because of aid. -1 2 -4 
37 Lack of regulation, legislation and transparency can lead to 
profiteering and mismanagement, both within government 
institutions and providers of infrastructure. 
4 2 2 
38 Lack of regulation means that transparency and accountability are 
reduced  
4 1 0 
39 The North of Lebanon is in a chronic need for continuous foreign 
aid as a result of failures of the economic policies conducted in the 
immediate era of the postwar reconstruction phase. 
1 0 3 
40 The hallmarks of corruption, cronyism, and critically ineffective 
service delivery—remain embedded in the fabric of government 
2 1 4 
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Table 11.2: Final selection of statements and scoring  
41 Aid is accompanied by conditionality.  -2 -2 1 
42 Donors may attach goal attainment criteria on countries such that if 
they do not meet donor expectations, targets or goals, aid will be 
reduced or terminated. 
1 0 -1 
43 Donor politics, methods and foreign policy goals led them to 
impose aid programs  
1 0 0 
44 Data gathering and reporting requirements are burdensome for 
Lebanon. 
2 -2 4 
45 Donors often managed projects themselves without the assistance 
of local expertise 
-2 -1 -1 
46 Donors did not always implement aid projects effectively.  0 1 0 
47 Donors had a tendency to push projects to demonstrate immediate 
results  
-1 2 3 
48 Donors may duplicate one another’s programs and leave gaps in 
other areas.  
0 1 4 
49 The international community interest in maintaining calm and 
peace in Lebanon follows different agendas 
0 3 1 
50 There is discrepancy and asymmetry in the relationship between 
donors and recipients 
4 1 1 
51 Initiatives that the international community undertook were to 
encourage additional reform 
3 -4 -3 
52 Municipalities surrounding the camp were the most affected 
development wise 
-1 -3 -2 
53 Recipients are limited by the information they have and given 4 -1 0 
54 There should be trust between donors and recipients when it comes 
to project execution 
3 3 2 
55 Recipients should be trained in order to be able to follow up on 
projects after donors leave 
4 4 4 
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3.1. Respondents 
A Q-methodological study requires only a limited number of 
respondents, known as P set (Brown, 1980). This P set usually is 
smaller than the Q sample (also called as Q set or Q statements) 
(Eden, Donaldson and Walker, 2005). Barry and Proops showed 
that only 12 participants responding to 36 statements are sufficient 
to present statistically valid results (Barry and Proops, 1999, 
Eden, Donaldson and Walker, 2005). The key requirement here is 
that the respondents represent a cross section of the stakeholders. 
Q participants were selected based on two methods. The 
participants were, first, selected based on their contribution to the 
original concourse.  
 
Category of Stakeholders Nr. of Participants 
Interviews 
Nr. Participants 
(Q- sorts) 
Recipients (Municipalities, 
Syndicates) 
27 19 
Intermediaries (UN Agencies) 15 8 
Donors (International and 
National) 
20 9 
Non-Governmental Organizations 5 3 
Focus- Group Discussions45 n.a.  
Total 67 38 
Table 11.1: Respondents from different categories of stakeholders.  
 
During the first round of interviews, some respondents were more 
informed about the concourse and based on their familiarity of the 
                                                          
45
 A homogeneous group. Most of them were male residents of Nahr El Bared 
Camp who returned to the (new) camp. Most of the focus groups were 
composed of men only. This was due to the culture of the camp and usually 
women do not speak with strangers. It was the men who approached the 
researcher to enquire what they were doing and what kind of information was 
being sought. When they were informed about the  research they started 
volunteering information and calling others to come and have a chat.  
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topic they were re selected again for the Q sort conducting. The 
second method was through snowball sampling. We started with a 
key informant and asked them to recommend other useful 
participants. A total of 38 participants completed the Q- sort. 
3.2. The Q-Sort process 
Respondents were asked to sort 55 statements. The Q process was 
explained at the beginning of each sort and the participants were 
briefed as to what the researcher was hoping to learn. The 
researcher emphasized the interest in knowing the personal 
perspective of the respondent and not the official perspective of 
the organization they work for. The statements were presented on 
cards. Respondents had to sort these into a number of categories, 
representing the degree to which they reflect or deviate from their 
own standards, opinions, views or experiences. During the 
interview, the interviewer prompted respondents to account for 
their choice of sorting statements.  
The completed distribution is called a Q-sort. The validity 
of the Q-sample was checked by asking each respondent, at the 
end of the interview, about omissions and biases. Participants 
score each statement according to how strongly they agree or 
disagree with it. A Likert scale of nine points was used ranging 
from -4 (mostly disagree) to +4 (mostly agree). We used a nine-
point scale rather than an 11 or 13 point scale in order not to 
confuse the participants with a long scale. An odd number forces a 
definite agreement/disagreement with the statement. Some 
respondents, especially recipients, tended to score most of the 
statements the same because they had strong feelings about the 
situation as a whole. In order to counter this tendency we 
emphasized that they need to rank the statements relative to each 
other; and even though there might be a lot of statements that they 
feel strongly about, they should prioritize them, other wise we will 
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have to use forced distribution
46
. The respondents all compiled 
with these instructions. Some respondents discussed each Q 
statement. These comments provided important contextual 
information for interpreting results of the Q analysis. 
3.3. Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is a mathematical technique that reveals 
underlying explanations for patterns in a large set of data. In the 
case of Q method the factor analysis looks for patterns among the 
Q sorts. The analysis produces a number of “factors,” representing 
groups of persons with similar (statistically correlated) Q-sorts. 
The outcome of a Q-factor analysis is a number of clusters of 
persons that obviously share a perspective or vision. For this 
study, factor analysis was done by using PQMethod software. 
There is a choice of two factor analysis algorithms a) Centroid 
and b) Principal Components Analysis (PCA). In our experience 
with Q studies of different topics PCA and Centroid both tend to 
give fairly similar results (Frantzi et al., 2009; Takshe et al., 
2010).  
There are two main criteria upon which selection of factors 
depend. The first one is the Kaiser criterion (Yeomans, 1982) that 
the eigenvalues of the factor should be ≥1. The second criterion is 
that a minimum of two Q-sorts load significantly on that factor 
(Brown, 1980; Watts and Stenner, 2005). A significant factor 
loading is calculated by using the equation 2.58(1√N), where N 
equals the number of statements used, and this would be at a 
significance level of P<0.01 (Brown, 1980). In this case a 
                                                          
46
 In a forced distribution the respondent has to fill in all the ranks of the Likert 
Scale with a fixed number for each rank i.e. they are only allowed a certain 
number of statements to be scored (-4), a certain number to be scored (-3), and 
so on. Other studies indicate that a forced distribution is not considered to give 
different results from a free distribution and is not required by the statistical 
analysis (Barry and Proops, 1999; Block, 1956; Cottle and McKeown, 1981; 
Frantzi et al., 2009; McKeown andThomas, 1988; Watts and Stenner, 2005). 
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significant factor loading would be equal to or greater than 
2.58(1√55) ≥ ± 0.35 (Brown, 1980). The factors extracted are 
considered to be the ‘ideal Q-sorts’ around which all the closest 
Q-sorts are gathered. The resulting factors represent common 
patterns of responses across the participants and describe the 
discourses to which the participants contribute.  
According to those two main criteria, in addition to some 
other minor tests (such as a Scree Test; Figure 11.1)
47
 and the 
judgment of the researcher based on additional information from 
the Q interviews, there were three factors extracted. 
 
 
Figure 11.1. Scree Test 
                                                          
47
 Cattell (1966) suggests finding the point where the smooth decrease of 
eigenvalues levels off to the right of the graph. According to this criterion, we 
would retain 3 factors in our study. 
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The analysis revealed three discourses (designated A, B and C) 
with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 and with at least two 
participants loading significantly on them (Table 11.2). Each 
discourse is the interpretation of a specific factor extracted by the 
statistical procedure. Discourses are interpreted by using 
statements statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (P 
< 0.01), followed by those significant at the 95% confidence level 
(P < 0.05). The three discourses are further explained in section 
4.2; 4.3 and 4.4, and are: 
- Discourse A: critical of the way in which international aid 
is organized;  
- Discourse B: the good governance discourse applied to 
recipients and donors alike;  
- Discourse C: problems arising from donor-recipient 
relations. 
According to Webler et al. (2009), the factor analysis also gives 
distinguishing statements, which are defined as ‘‘those that were 
ranked significantly differently between a given factor and all 
other factors’’ (Webler et al., 2009). Moreover the Q-method will 
generate a list of consensus statements in which there are no 
significant differences in the factors.
48
  
3.3.1. Factor correlations and number of sorts loading on 
each factor 
Table 11.4 shows factor correlations and number of sorts loading 
on each factor. Although it is considered an advantage in Q 
method to work with a small sample, this does not mean that 
stakeholder group loadings on a specific discourse are conclusive. 
Statistical certainty cannot demonstrate in Q that certain groups of 
                                                          
48
 The selection is also influenced by both the face-to-face interviews and on 
the discussion with the participants after they have filled in the Q-sorts. 
Although there might be some bias, but it has been reduced by careful selection 
of the Q- statements that have generated from the participants.  
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people load significantly on specific factors. The statistical 
significance observed in Q is based on patterns of statement 
rankings of which the sample size is obviously very large 
(Ockwell, 2008). To be able to get statistical significance in 
relation to which stakeholder groups load on which discourse 
would require large numbers of respondents from each group. 
Until this is done, the general picture of which groups tend to load 
on which discourse must be treated merely as a working 
hypothesis (Ockwell, 2008). 
 
Factor A B C % of variance 
explained 
# of coefficients ≥ 
0.35 
A 1.00   0.37   0.20   15 15 
B 0.37  1.00   0.39   12 9 
C 0.19  0.40   1.00   8 6 
Table 11.4: Correlation matrix between factors and number of sorts loading on 
each factor. Correlations are from 0 (no correlation) to 1 (complete correlation).  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Areas of Consensus and Disagreement 
Statements that present consensus among the participants are 
statements 7, 20, 28, 30, 31, 32, 37, and 40. All the interviewees 
agree that although the municipalities are present, but they cannot 
do anything without help from outside; they need all the help 
(technical assistance, humanitarian assistance, provision of 
sanitation, etc.) they can get and are grateful for the support (7). 
International organizations should do a better job of assessment to 
make sure they distribute to those who really need it and not to 
their friends (20) and that those organizations spend too much 
time and money on administration, especially the UN agencies 
which are bureaucratic (30). The interviewees seem to have a 
common understanding that there is a need for donor 
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coordination, because there are redundancies, chaos, lack of 
vision and long-term ideas (31). At the same time there is no 
comprehensive assessment or study of need, which leads to a 
misunderstanding when assessing the progress levels (32). It is the 
weakness of the state that makes other agencies powerful (28) and 
the lack of regulation, legislation and transparency can lead to 
profiteering and mismanagement, both within government 
institutions and providers (37) which in turn highlight the theme 
of corruption, cronyism and inefficient service delivery that are 
considered embedded in the fabric of the government (40). 
All discourses represent disagreement with statements 2, 7, 
23, 24 and 29.  Everyone disagreed that the work of the 
international agencies is transparent and clean (2). No one seemed 
to agree about what was said regarding the relationship between 
the small local NGOs and donors, that the Nahr El Bared crises 
brought direct contact between the small local NGOs and donors; 
and that before the war they were not able to reach the donors 
whereas now they have direct channels (23) Furthermore, they 
disagree that the local NGOs lack funding hence the international 
NGOs play them against each other in order to outbid each other 
(24). Finally all discourses disagree that there is a huge issue of 
not trusting local staff and that they have limitations on speaking 
out (29). 
Some statements are considered important, such is statement 
15, which reads that there is a strong political agenda dictating 
how international aid is manipulated in the local Lebanese context 
and that Lebanese political parties systematically use assistance as 
means to sustain their influence. This statement is considered 
important because the other factors ranked it highly. Other 
statements which had scoring varying between -2,-1, 1, and 2 with 
a zero included show that the import of this statement is low 
across the discourses because opinions about it are not strong and 
they either mildly agree or mildly disagree. 
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It is evident from all the discourses that there is no trust in 
the Government and there is a fear that not all money is being 
distributed fairly amongst those who needed it the most. The work 
of international organizations has not been seen as effective and 
productive, and many interviewees think their presence is a waste 
of time and an invasion of independence in Lebanon. Yet, at the 
same time, all respondents indicated that municipalities could not 
do anything without support from the outside.  Many of those who 
were interviewed (especially recipients) considered that the 
presence of donors is to benefit the international agenda and not to 
benefit Lebanon, i.e. most of the European countries want to be in 
Lebanon to ensure the stability of the country in order to make 
sure that Israel would be safe and Lebanon would be busy solving 
its internal issues. Moreover they consider Lebanon as a gateway 
of the Middle East, so it is important to have safety and stability in 
the country. Recipients felt that the agenda of donors did not 
match their own agendas. Nepotism (wasta) is considered to 
influence any developmental or aid action, and the most 
impoverished population in northern Lebanon was not reached. 
Recipients assume that the Government sends donors to work in 
the rich villages only, because they have a stronger connection 
with the state.  
Several interviewees said that if donors want to work on 
preventing future sectarian violence they can best focus on 
decreasing socio-economic inequality between different sects in 
Lebanon, by adhering to a positive discrimination policy for the 
most deprived populations in Lebanon. Moreover, it was 
considered that the most deprived areas in northern Lebanon are 
the Muslim Sunni areas (Fatah el Islam is a Sunni Party), who are 
falling into the hands of extremist groups, especially in Tripoli, 
Dinnieh and Akkar (providing low-educated, unemployed young 
men with weapons and $300 a month, to be loyal to more 
extremist groups and ready to fight). The Sunni leaders are, in that 
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way, ‘benefiting’ from the relative deprivation in this area. Most 
of the Christian villages are in Akkar seem to be in better 
condition than the Sunni villages, due to their higher level of 
income and the higher educational level.
49
  
Moreover there is a clear agreement that administrative 
corruption is a challenge nationally and even more so in an 
impoverished area such as the North. In the absence of an efficient 
monitoring mechanism, money for the development of the North 
does not always reach its intended destination. One can observe 
skepticism and bitterness among the population on account of 
organizations having previously performed surveys and then 
never returning with any tangible aid.  
It is interesting to highlight here that several statements 
show similarity with good governance. We see that there is a 
concern of good governance by both donors and recipients
50
. 
Examples of statements related to good governance are 5, 6, 12, 
and 15. Moreover, several statements are concerned with both 
performance and process legitimacy. Statements related to 
performance legitimacy for example are 4, 7, 10 and 11. Where as 
statements related to the process legitimacy are 2, 3, 9, 12, and 16. 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
 The higher education level follows from  missionaries that established 
schools in the Christian villages 
50
 There is a debate and critic related to good governance. More information on 
such debate can be found in  Poluha, E. and Rosendahl, M. 2002. Contesting 
'good' governance: cross-cultural perspectives on representation, 
accountability and public space. New York: Routledge and Agere, S. 2000. 
Promoting Good Governance: principles, practices and perspectives. London: 
Commonwealth Secretariat. 
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4.2. Discourse A: critical of the way in which international 
aid is organized 
Discourse A explains 15 percent of the total variance. The 
distinguishing statements
51
 for this discourse are 1,3,5,6,15,16,17, 
26, 35, 47 and 51. Statements that people strongly agree with are 
9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 28, 37, 38, 50, 53 and 55. In this discourse 
there are no strongly disagreed upon statements. 
This discourse calls for the international community to work 
only with members who have ‘clean hands’ (14) and be able to 
train those members in order to be able to follow up on the 
projects after donors have left (55). The participants agree in this 
discourse that state weakness has made donors powerful (28) 
hence being able to control how programs are executed on the 
ground without being monitored nor governed by the state, which 
should be the legitimate umbrella cover for all activities within its 
areas of control. According to the majority of participants in this 
discourse the lack of regulation, legislation and transparency can 
lead to profiteering and mismanagement, both within government 
institutions and providers (37); moreover transparency and 
accountability are reduced when there are no regulations for 
controlling the activities (38). This discourse agrees with the idea 
that international aid is part of a local conspiracy (10) and that aid 
is not primarily delivered as a genuine response to people’s needs, 
but rather follows an ‘agenda’ that distinctly favors or 
discriminates against certain individuals and groups (9). This 
might explain why the participants agreed that half of the 
international assistance was stolen by the government (17) and 
that the concept of money coming to the municipalities is being 
diverted into private pockets (18); hence lack of honesty, integrity 
and fairness in international assistance, and is dominated by 
                                                          
51
 Those with scores that were significantly different at the p < 0.05 and p < 
0.01 level from the same statement's score on other identified factors. 
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opportunistic behavior at the decision-making and the 
implementing levels (11) is a valid idea. The relationship between 
the recipients and donors does not look good in this discourse, 
where participants strongly agree that there is discrepancy and 
asymmetry in the relationship between both sides (50) and that 
recipients are limited by the information they have and given (53). 
4.3. Discourse B: the good governance discourse applied to 
recipients and donors alike 
Discourse B explains 12 percent of the total variance. The 
statistically distinguishing statements in this discourse are 4, 8, 22, 
25, and 36. Strong agreements are present in 10,12,14,18, 19, 30, 
31, and 55. Other important statements showing strong 
disagreements are 3 and 51. 
There is an agreement that aid should be delivered only by 
people with a conscience to treat people equally (12). This 
discourse critically reflects on the use of nepotism (‘wasta’) to 
achieve something (19). The aid organizations should work with 
members who have clean hands (14) and train the recipients 
appropriately in order to be able to follow up on projects after the 
donors left (55). A similar idea was also highlighted in the 
previous discourse. However, according to the participants, aid 
organizations spend far too much time and money on 
administration, especially the UN agencies which are bureaucratic 
(30). Such a disadvantage calls for more donor coordination, to 
avoid redundancies in projects and chaos where there is no vision 
and long-term goal (31). Once again this discourse also raises the 
idea that international aid is part of a local conspiracy (10) and the 
money that comes to the municipality is diverted into private 
pockets. 
The discourse reveals disagreement regarding transparency 
of the aid agencies, and does not consider them transparent in 
project implementation and in the way they spend money. It does 
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not consider that international aid supported local organizations to 
improve their management qualities (3). This discourse did not 
recognize that initiatives undertaken by the international 
community were to encourage additional reform (51).  
4.4. Discourse C: problems arising from donor-recipient 
relations 
Discourse C explains 8 percent of the total variance. The 
distinguishing statements for this discourse are 12, 27, and 41. In 
this discourse the strongly agreed upon statements are 13, 30, 31, 
40, 44, 48, and 55 whereas statements that interviewees strongly 
disagreed with are 3, 27, and 36. Once again, and unsurprisingly, 
discourse C agrees that most of the aid coming to Lebanon is 
being stolen (13) and this most probably would be the outcome 
when the hallmarks of corruption, cronyism and critically 
ineffective service delivery remain embedded in the fabric of the 
government (40) according to this discourse. This discourse 
highlights the internal problems of the donor agencies and their 
performances. Participants consider that organizations spend far 
too much time and money on administration, especially 
bureaucratic UN agencies (30), and there is a need for donor 
coordination, to avoid redundancies, chaos and to integrate long-
term vision and ideas (31). Moreover it emphasizes the perception 
that donors may duplicate one another’s programs and leave gaps 
in other areas (48). The discourse also highlights a theme that has 
been mentioned in both of the previous discourses, which is 
training recipients to be able to follow up on projects after donors 
leave (55). Currently data gathering and reporting requirements 
are considered burdensome for Lebanon (44). Similar to discourse 
A and B, this discourse rejects the idea that the aid agencies are 
transparent in the implementation and in the way they spend the 
money (3); and asserts that they have not supported local 
organizations in improving their management qualities which has 
left projects unorganized with no accountability on performance 
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and implementation. This discourse shows the need for 
international aid and disagrees with the statements that no country 
has ever developed because of aid (36) and conflict resolution 
concepts do not work in Lebanon (27).  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The objective of this study was to elucidate discourses on 
international aid in northern Lebanon after the 2007 clashes in 
Nahr el Bared Camp. The Q method revealed three discourses.  
- Discourse A: critical of the way in which international aid 
is organized;  
- Discourse B: the good governance discourse applied to 
recipients and donors alike;  
- Discourse C: problems arising from donor-recipient 
relations. 
Analysis of the discourses reveals that aid recipients are of the 
opinion that donors do not understand needs of the region and that 
their agendas do not match local expectations. In contrast donors 
do feel embedded in the region, consider they have studied the 
situation well and that their projects are suitable for the 
beneficiaries; but that, in their opinion, the problem lies with the 
beneficiaries having their own agendas. Beneficiaries feel there is 
information kept from them, where-as donors consider that 
unreported information is of little benefit to the beneficiaries: they 
will not understand it and hence there is no need to dwell on it. 
Underlying the interaction is a basic mistrust between donors and 
beneficiaries; and there is a perception that beneficiaries are 
partners in name only and that donors are pursuing a higher 
political agenda. Donors are worried about handing over projects 
because they believe that the local partners will not implement the 
projects. In consequence, although there is a partnership in project 
proposals, the donors are the main actors in project execution. The 
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beneficiaries, who in this case are mainly the municipalities, do 
not have the means, education or knowledge to execute the 
projects. Donors considered that the priorities of the beneficiaries 
have already been taken into account through what they consider 
to be the participatory nature of the projects; and they felt that the 
projects empower local people to help themselves. 
A number of interesting observations can be made. Firstly, 
there is a mismatch between the expectations that recipients have 
of international assistance and their experience with everyday 
practice and the system of aid. Several statements indicate 
contradictions of the desired process, modality and outcome of 
aid. This reduces the legitimacy of international aid, both in terms 
of process and performance. Secondly, the capacity of the 
municipalities, the state, and international organizations to 
provide services efficiently and effectively is, according to the 
respondents, undermined by corruption, cronyism and nepotism. 
Thirdly, the willingness of elites (national and international) to 
distribute to those most in need is strongly criticized by all 
respondents. Lack of transparency and accountability create the 
opportunities for reproduction of existing inequalities. Fourthly, 
and related to the second point, respondents, both from donor 
organizations and recipient organizations (municipalities), tend to 
position themselves as proponents of the ‘good governance’ 
discourse, in particular in relation to the ‘integrity’, 
‘accountability’ and ‘capacity’. This discourse is criticized by 
some of the academic literature, in particular in relation to so-
called ‘fragile states’ (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Chandler, 2005; 
Menkhaus, 2006; Moore, 2005; Woodward, 2007), but widely 
accepted by international organizations (OECD, 2008). The fact 
that all respondents position themselves as proponents of 
particular aspects of good governance could point towards: (a) 
selective sampling of like-minded respondents, which is not 
unlikely with snowball sampling; (b) agreement amongst and 
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across donors, intergovernmental organizations, INGOs and 
recipient organizations alike about the importance of good 
governance or (c) a selective upset about the outcome of processes 
through which the bargain between donors and recipients is 
struck, reinforced and institutionalized.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The question at the start was how we can understand the 
widespread and persistent perception of aid ineffectiveness 
applied to North-Lebanon. The face-to-face interviews and 
literature study first established the perceptions of aid-
(in)effectiveness in North Lebanon in great detail. We found three 
discourses, the first very critical of the way in which international 
aid is organized; the second that showed that the good governance 
discourse is applied by recipients and donors alike; and the third 
discourse referring to problems arising from donor-recipient 
relations. The discussion in previous section shows a remarkable 
similarity with the conceptualization of the social contract 
between citizens and the state.  
The OECD argues that the social contract “emerges from 
the interaction between a) expectations that a given society has of 
a given state; b) state capacity to provide services, including 
security, and to secure revenue from its population and territory to 
provide these services (in part a function of economic resources; 
and c) élite will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfill 
social expectations. It is crucially mediated by d) the existence of 
political processes through which the bargain between state and 
society is struck, reinforced and institutionalised. Finally, e) 
legitimacy plays a complex additional role in shaping expectations 
and facilitating political process. Legitimacy is also produced and 
replenished – or, conversely, eroded – by the interaction among 
the other four factors.” (OECD, 2008:18).  
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The text adjusted by us in order to make it relevant to the 
case of donor assistance then reads that the ‘social contract’ 
between recipients and international organizations “emerges from 
interaction between a) expectations that a given recipient has of 
international assistance; b) capacity of international 
organizations, state organizations and municipalities together to 
provide services needed to those most in need; and c) élite will to 
direct resources – whether from the state or international 
organizations or both – to those who are most in need, and their  
capacity to fulfill social expectations. It is crucially mediated by 
d) the existence of processes through which the bargain between 
donors and recipients is struck, reinforced and institutionalized” 
(adjusted from OECD, 2008:18). When we then, accordingly, 
apply the conceptualization of ‘social contract’ to a situation 
where donors, intergovernmental organizations, recipients and 
other stakeholders interact with each other, we can only conclude 
that there is a severe lack of social contract between these 
stakeholders in North-Lebanon. The perception of aid 
ineffectiveness should therefore be understood as the 
manifestation of the lack of social contract between recipients and 
international organizations in North-Lebanon. 
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